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INTRODUCTION 
The "private attorney general" is under fire again. It has been in 
and out of favor in the six decades since it was named,1 in part because 
it has come to signify so many different things.2 At its core, however, 
the term denotes a plaintiff who sues to vindicate public interests not 
directly connected to any special stake of her own.3 The remedies 
sought in such actions tend to be correspondingly broad: rather than 
seeking redress for discrete injuries, private attorneys general typically 
request injunctive or other equitable relief aimed at altering the 
practices of large institutions. From school desegregation to fair 
housing, environmental management to consumer protection, the 
impact of private attorney general litigation is rarely confined to the 
parties in a given case.4 It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the 
private attorney general has not been universally admired. While 
some regard it as critical to the effectuation of the public interest, 
others worry its authority may be abused by plaintiffs better likened to 
"extortionist[ s ]."5 Much of this disagreement concerns the wisdom of 
relying on private actors to implement broad public norms. 
Occasionally, however, arguments surface about the legality of doing 
1. See Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), 
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (using the phrase "private Attorney Generals" [sic] for 
the first time to refer to plaintiffs empowered by Congress to "su[e] to prevent action by an 
officer in violation of his statutory powers," and noting the permissibility of granting private 
actors such authority "even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest"); see also 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119  (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (tracing the term "private 
attorneys-general" to Associated Industries). 
2. See Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives 
from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 355 (1988) 
(suggesting that there is no "single, ' lasting' reform, institutionalized as the private attorney 
general"); Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 194-95 (stating "there is still no legal definition, nor any 
well-established pattern of usage, which precisely identifies a litigant as a 'private attorney 
general"'). 
3. The term thus aligns with what Louis Jaffe famously dubbed the "non-Hohfeldian 
plaintiff," and what Abram Chayes first called "public law litigation." See Louis L. Jaffe, The 
Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1033 (1968); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). Jaffe adapted his term from Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
4. See Chayes, supra note 3, at 1284 (including these areas, among others, as examples of 
private attorney general litigation). 
5. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 618 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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so. The latest challenge to the private attorney general takes the latter 
form, and comes from a rather unlikely quarter: the First Amendment. 
The challenge arose in Nike v. Kasky.6 The case was ostensibly 
about the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine, which 
generally permits the government to promote accuracy and integrity in 
the marketplace by prohibiting false advertising and other misleading 
commercial statements.7 A private plaintiff sued Nike under a 
California law prohibiting "unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 
advertising,"8 alleging that Nike had publicly misrepresented the 
working conditions in its subcontractors' factories.9 The main question 
before the Supreme Court was whether Nike's statements constituted 
"commercial" or "noncommercial" speech.1 0  
The Solicitor General of the United States filed a brief as amicus 
curiae supporting Nike, but urging the Court to avoid the commercial/ 
noncommercial issue. Instead, he focused on the fact that the suit 
against Nike was initiated by a private attorney general. California law 
provided that, in addition to direct government enforcement, unfair 
competition and false advertising actions could be brought by private 
plaintiffs even without any allegation that they had been injured by 
the statements in question. 1 1  In the Solicitor General's view, that 
feature of the California regime exceeded the legitimate injury­
compensating scope of traditional common law actions for fraud, 
misrepresentation, and the like. In so doing, it raised the prospect of 
vexatious and abusive litigation, which in tum threatened to "chill[] 
the scope of public debate and the free flow of useful information."1 2  
To protect against that harm, the Solicitor General urged the Court 
to hold that the First Amendment bars "legal regimes in which a 
private party who has suffered no actual injury may seek redress on 
6. 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). 
7. See, e.g. , Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 563 (1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the 
informational function of advertising . . . .  [T]here can be no constitutional objection to the 
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful 
activity."). 
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997). When a private plaintiff sues to 
enforce a speech-restrictive law, the judiciary's involvement constitutes sufficient "state 
action" to bring the First Amendment into play. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 
663, 668 (1991) ("Our cases teach that the application of state rules of law in state courts in a 
manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action ' under the 
Fourteenth Amendment."). 
9. See infra notes 187-194 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text. 
1 1. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
12. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21, Nike, Inc. 
v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
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behalf of the public for a company's allegedly false and misleading 
statements. "13 
At the same time, the Solicitor General argued there should be no 
bar to direct government enforcement of speech restrictions 
substantively identical to those invoked by the plaintiff in Nike. He 
asserted that the Federal Trade Commission and its state counterparts 
are subject to "institutional checks" such as "legislative oversight and 
public accountability,"14 which ensure that their actions do not 
interfere with First Amendment values. Unlike suits initiated by 
private attorneys general, therefore, government enforcement actions 
do not imperil free speech values, even in the absence of any 
allegation that the challenged speech has caused any specific injury. 
Accordingly, the Solicitor General reasoned, the Court ought to 
invalidate the California private attorney general regime while 
preserving the power of government entities to bring essentially 
identical enforcement actions. 
The argument was nothing if not novel.15 A number of state 
consumer protection laws observe the distinction advocated by the 
Solicitor General - requiring injury in suits brought by private 
plaintiffs but not in those initiated by the government16 - but the 
Solicitor General pointed to no judicial precedent or scholarly 
commentary defending the distinction under the First Amendment. 
Yet neither, it appears, had any court or commentator explicitly 
rejected such a distinction. 
13. Id. at 8. 
14. Id. at 23. 
15. Although not framed as such, the argument may echo certain themes sounding in 
the largely moribund "private delegation doctrine." Applied to state governments, the 
doctrine imposes due process limits on delegations of governmental or quasi-governmental 
power to private individuals. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1437-45 (2003) (describing the doctrine). As Gillian Metzger 
describes, the animating concern of the doctrine is that "public power may be abused to 
achieve particular private aims instead of the public interest." Id. at 1437. The Solicitor 
General's argument in Nike certainly takes up that theme, and thus one might wonder about 
the application of private delegation doctrine in cases like Nike. As a practical matter, 
however, invocations of the private delegation doctrine would be unlikely to persuade a 
modern court: the doctrine has been "dormant" since the New Deal. Id. at 1438. Moreover, 
even if the doctrine were active today, it is far from clear that the conferral of private 
litigating (but not more formal regulatory) power would constitute a paradigm case of 
problematic "private delegation." Finally, although Metzger mounts a powerful theoretical 
argument for a new form of private delegation analysis that accounts for the present trend 
toward privatizing governmental functions, see id. at 1456-1501, it appears that her new 
model would not require any greater judicial superintendence of private attorneys general 
than that ordinarily provided by the courts in the course of litigation. In any event, these 
issues are all beyond the scope of this Article. Accordingly, I do not address whether, instead 
of relying upon the First Amendment, the Nike argument against private attorneys general 
could have been supported by recourse to the private delegation doctrine. 
16. See DEE PRIGDEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 5:9 (2002). 
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The Court ultimately avoided the issue by dismissing the writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted, 1 7  but not before as many as five 
Justices expressed at least some interest in the Solicitor General's 
argument. 1 8  More recently, in November 2004, the California voters 
endorsed a ballot initiative that limited the litigating authority of 
private attorneys general by imposing an injury requirement along the 
very lines proposed by the Solicitor General in Nike. 19 Those who 
campaigned in favor of the new limits justified them, in part, on First 
Amendment grounds.20 Thus, both at the Court and in the public at 
large, the idea of a First Amendment distinction between public and 
private enforcement seems to be attracting support. 
If formally embraced as a doctrinal matter, this distinction could 
have substantial theoretical and practical consequences, the latter 
hardly limited to the field of consumer protection. Consider, for 
example, the anti-pornography ordinance proposed by Andrea 
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, a version of which was adopted 
by the city of Indianapolis in 1984. One provision of the ordinance 
made "trafficking in pornography" a civil offense actionable by "any 
woman . . .  acting against the subordination of women."2 1 The 
underlying theory was that pornography inflicted harm on all 
women,22 but the ordinance did not require any showing of injury in 
the conventional sense. Rather, all women were authorized to enforce 
the trafficking provision as private attorneys general. Courts made 
quick work of the ordinance as enacted in Indianapolis, concluding its 
definition of pornography was viewpoint-discriminatory and thus 
facially unconstitutional.23 Although courts thus had no occasion to 
consider other arguments against the ordinance, free speech advocates 
suggested the trafficking provision had additional constitutional flaws 
in that it allowed "anyone to bring a lawsuit to halt any production or 
17. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
18. Justice Breyer issued an opinion dissenting from the dismissal, expressing apparent 
support for the Solicitor General's argument. See id. at 680-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
the dismissal of the writ). Justice O'Connor joined Justice Breyer's opinion . Justice Stevens 
issued an opinion concurring in the dismissal, in which he characterized the Solicitor 
General's argument as raising "difficult and important" questions. Id. at 664 n.5 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the dismissal of the writ). Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens' opinion in 
full; Justice Souter joined it in relevant part. See infra notes 226-230 and accompanying text 
for further discussion. 
19. See infra notes 233-237 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra note 237. 
21. ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 141 (1988). 
22. CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 190 (1987). 
23. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The 
definition of 'pornography' is unconstitutional."), affd mem. , 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
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distribution of sexual materials."24 The problem, on this view, was that 
the speech in question would be intolerably chilled if over half the 
population was suddenly empowered to regulate it.25 
Whether applied to commercial speech, pornography, or any other 
area of regulated expression, the public/private distinction urged in 
Nike might seem a ready solution to such problems. Especially where 
a regulation's substantive provisions are couched" in relatively 
malleable terms, authorizing the general citizenry to enforce the 
regulation might threaten to open the proverbial floodgates of 
litigation, meritorious and otherwise. Government enforcement, in 
contrast, may seem more stable, less subject to abuse, and - to the 
extent the officials responsible for enforcement are sympathetic to the 
position of the entities they regulate - more restrained. 
Analytically, this newly proposed public/private distinction raises 
at least two sets of questions. First, it provokes a number of questions 
specific to the First Amendment. It is clear that the First Amendment 
tolerates some content-based limits on speech.26 True threats, fighting 
words, defamation, obscenity, copyright-infringing speech, and 
commercial speech are all examples of "speech" subject to regulation 
on the basis of its content.27 But the fact that certain speech may be 
regulated does not mean that all forms of such regulation are 
permissible; the First Amendment cares about the means as well as 
the ends of speech regulation. The question raised here is whether the 
First Amendment's sensitivity to regulatory means should distinguish 
among plaintiffs challenging the speech in question. Specifically, 
24. NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE 
FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 76 (1995). 
25. See, e.g. , Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: 
The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607, 640 (1987) (noting 
concerns that "the ordinance . . .  made a bookseller vulnerable to suits brought by almost 
anyone and for any motivation,"  and describing '"fear of what groups like the Moral 
Majority could do with the Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance as a precedent'"). 
26. See, e.g. , Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) ("The protections afforded by 
the First Amendment . . .  are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government 
may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.").  
27. See, e.g. , Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (copyright); Bolger v. Youngs 
Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1980) (commercial speech); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 
323 (1974) (defamation);  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam) (true threats); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). Beyond the fact that the First Amendment accords 
different levels of protection to different kinds of speech, some restrictions are not regarded 
as First Amendment events at all - that is, the expression being regulated is deemed 
beyond the First Amendment's coverage. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92, 134-35 (1982); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the 
First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 1 17 HARV. L. REV. 
1765, 1769-73 (2004). Schauer identifies a number of examples of "speech" regulation falling 
outside the First Amendment, including securities regulation , antitrust law, the law of 
criminal solicitation,  much of the law of evidence, and the regulation of professionals. See id. 
at 1777-84. 
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should it matter for First Amendment purposes whether the party 
invoking a speech-restrictive law is the government or a private actor? 
Does, or should, the First Amendment prefer public over private 
enforcement when it comes to regulating speech? 
The second set of questions goes beyond the First Amendment. By 
contending that there is something especially problematic about 
private litigation by a plaintiff who asserts no direct injury, the 
public/private distinction raises basic questions about the role of the 
private attorney general across substantive domains. On one hand, 
discrete dispute resolution has traditionally been viewed as the basic 
purpose of private litigation.28 On the other, it has long been clear that 
litigation aimed primarily at resolving private disputes can have the 
secondary effect of advancing broader public values.29 But may 
privately initiated "public law litigation"3 0 seek only to advance broad 
public interests, even though the plaintiff has no direct stake in the 
defendant's conduct and has suffered no direct injury requiring 
compensation? Who, in short, may enforce public law? 
I address both sets of questions in this Article. My argument can 
be distilled into two main contentions. First, a categorical First 
Amendment preference for public over private enforcement cannot be 
squared with existing free speech doctrine or the principles underlying 
it. To the contrary, as a general matter, the First Amendment properly 
regards private enforcement of speech-related regulations as neither 
more nor less threatening to free expression than public enforcement. 
Second, the distinction between public and private enforcement urged 
in Nike is best understood as more than merely an unpersuasive First 
Amendment argument. Rather, it should be viewed against the 
backdrop of a number of efforts by the Supreme Court over the last 
decade to limit the power and influence of private attorneys general in 
a whole range of substantive areas, while leaving the government a 
relatively free hand to enforce the laws directly. To the extent the 
proposed public/private distinction garners support at the Supreme 
Court and elsewhere despite its doctrinal weaknesses, the reason may 
be that it seems to offer a novel means of advancing the Court's 
policy-preferred end of elevating public over private enforcement. 
That preference may, in turn, reflect a more fundamental hostility to 
regulation itself. 
28. See Chayes, supra note 3, at 1282 ("In our received tradition, the lawsuit is a vehicle 
for settling disputes between private parties about private rights."). 
29. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 371, 371 n.2 (1986) (noting that in private tort litigation, the "private benefits are 
simply the damage award, whereas social benefits consist of the reduction in accident costs 
resulting from the deterrence effect of private suits"). 
30. See Chayes, supra note 3, at 1284 (describing "public law litigation" as an "emerging 
model," replacing the "traditional model" of private dispute resolution). 
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This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I place the modern 
private attorney general in two contexts, one historical and the other 
policy-based. As to the first, I show that legislatures have long relied 
upon private plaintiffs to enforce public law and to obtain broad 
remedies in the public interest, even when doing so is not connected to 
the vindication of any individualized injury. As to the second, I survey 
contemporary policy arguments for and against the private attorney 
general, showing that views on the matter have vacillated over time. In 
part because of that vacillation, I suggest that the decision whether to 
deploy private attorneys general in a particular context requires the 
kind of pragmatic balancing best undertaken by legislatures, not 
courts. In short, Part I establishes the private attorney general as an 
institution with a long historical pedigree, whose proper role in any 
particular context is best determined by the legislature responsible for 
the underlying law being enforced. 
Part II focuses on the modern Supreme Court's treatment of the 
private attorney general. Although the policy debate over private 
attorneys general yields no universal conclusion about their utility, the 
current Court is hardly in equipoise on the matter. Indeed, the Court 
over the past decade has erected a number of legal obstacles to the 
private enforcement of public law. It has articulated strict new 
standing requirements; it has crafted an expansive view of state 
sovereign immunity; and it has severely limited plaintiffs' entitlement 
to attorney's fees. Though doctrinally diverse, these developments 
reflect a consistent hostility to privately initiated public law litigation, 
and a preference instead for direct government enforcement. By thus 
raising the cost of regulation in a variety of areas, the Court has 
pushed a fundamentally anti-regulatory agenda: hostility to private 
enforcement of the law predictably yields less enforcement overall. In 
the main, however, these developments have been confined to 
litigation in the federal courts; the Supreme Court's ability to shape 
state court litigation is much more limited. 
Enter Nike v. Kasky in Part III, and the Solicitor General's 
argument for a distinction between public and private enforcement 
that, because based on the First Amendment, would apply in state and 
federal court alike. Nike stands as a case study of the proposed 
distinction. Stated most strongly, the contention is that the First 
Amendment should specially disfavor statutory regimes that empower 
private individuals to enforce speech-related regulations by seeking 
broad injunctive and other equitable relief. The basic concern is about 
remedies: the aim is to limit the ability of private plaintiffs to use the 
judiciary to compel far-reaching changes in a defendant's expressive 
activities, especially where those activities are directed not at a 
particular individual but at the public more generally. 
With the First Amendment argument against private attorneys 
general thus laid out, I turn in Part IV to showing that it is 
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fundamentally at odds with free speech doctrine and values. My point 
is not that private enforcement of speech-related laws should be 
immune from First Amendment scrutiny. To the contrary, laws 
regulating speech should be, and are, no less constitutionally suspect 
simply because they are enforced by private plaintiffs instead of the 
government. But neither should they be any more suspect. If a 
particular speech restriction poses First Amendment problems on its 
face, the source of the problem is the substance of the restriction. The 
problem persists regardless of whether it is enforced by private parties, 
government actors, or both. And in the case of public enforcement, 
appeals to the public accountability and wise discretion of the 
enforcing agency do not solve the problem. Indeed, a critical premise 
of the First Amendment is that freedom of speech must not be 
entrusted to the government's discretion. Thus, the government 
cannot cure a regulation's First Amendment defects unless it is 
prepared authoritatively to narrow the regulation's substantive scope. 
If it engages in such narrowing, then it is the resulting, more modest 
reach of the regulation, not the identity of the plaintiff, that relieves 
constitutional concerns. Absent such narrowing, a regulation that 
would raise First Amendment concerns if privately enforced fares no 
better when publicly enforced. 
In the last Part of the Article, I return to a suggestion made earlier: 
that the Supreme Court may see in this new argument against private 
attorneys general an opportunity to extend to the state courts the anti­
private enforcement campaign that it has been pursuing in the federal 
courts. Though untenable as a matter of First Amendment doctrine 
and at odds with centuries of legislative practice, the argument invites 
a Court already distrustful of privately initiated public law litigation to 
impose new limits on its use. Going further, to the extent some on the 
Court may favor the reduction of regulation more generally, the First 
Amendment argument may provide a new, though substantively 
limited, opportunity to pursue an anti-regulatory agenda in the state 
courts. Yet, while this possibility may help explain the argument's 
attraction, it is not a justification: appeals to the Court's own policy 
preferences should be rejected as inadequate to overcome the clear 
legal shortcomings in the First Amendment attack on private 
attorneys general. 
I. PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL IN PRACTICE AND AS POLICY 
New challenges to the private attorney general must be placed in 
context. My aim in this Part is to provide two such contexts. First, I 
trace the long history of legislative reliance on private plaintiffs to 
perform the function we today associate with the private attorney 
general, namely, bringing suit to effectuate broad public interests. 
Second, I survey some of the contemporary policy arguments for and 
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against the private attorney general. The sum of these two 
examinations is that private attorneys general have long been viewed 
as a permissible means of pursuing the public interest, but that the 
wisdom of relying on them depends on policy tradeoffs best made by 
legislatures. 
A. Practice 
Writing in the mid-1970s, Abram Chayes coined the term "public 
law litigation" to denote a new paradigm of private plaintiff-initiated 
litigation. Whereas traditional private litigation "is a vehicle for 
settling disputes between private parties about private rights,"31 public 
law litigation seeks "the vindication of constitutional or statutory 
policies" on a broader plane.32 The interests advanced are those of the 
public at large (or at least a significant subset thereof), not simply the 
individual plaintiff. Often, such litigation targets unlawful government 
action and seeks to remedy it with injunctive relief aimed at 
restructuring the offending institution. School desegregation litigation 
is a prime example. Indeed, Richard Fallon has gone so far as to say 
that "[t]he era of the public lawsuit began with Brown v. Board of 
Education. "33 
Public law litigation need not, however, be confined to suits against 
the government. Chayes himself pointed to "features of public law 
litigation" in numerous fields targeting private actors, including 
antitrust, environmental management, securities fraud, and consumer 
protection.34 That is the kind of litigation relevant here. And although 
Chayes identified a rise in such litigation over the second half of the 
twentieth century, the aim of this Section is to show that its historical 
31.  Chayes, supra note 3, at 1282 (citing M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 251 -
5 2  (1933), a s  exemplifying the traditional view). 
32. Id. at 1284. 
33. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes 
on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 ,  1-2 (1984); accord Myriam E. Gilles, 
Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of 
Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1390-91 (2000) ("The modern structural reform 
revolution began the 1950s, when federal courts began to hear cases asserting the 
deprivation of rights to large groups of people by state and local institutions, such as schools 
and prisons."). Others have contended that, as a matter of form and procedure, the model of 
public law litigation Chayes identified was not as new as he claimed. See, e.g., Theodore 
Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional 
Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980) (arguing that English and American courts have 
been engaged in reordering the affairs of complex institutions for centuries, and that the 
principal change from the 1950s onward was the creation of new substantive rights, not the 
development of novel judicially enforceable remedies). For an account of an emerging 
"experimentalist" model of public law litigation targeting a variety of public institutions, see 
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 1 17 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004). 
34. See Chayes, supra note 3, at 1284. 
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roots are far deeper, and then to highlight some of its contemporary 
manifestations. It is in the context of this long and continuing reliance 
on private actors to enforce public norms, I argue, that contemporary 
questions about the private enforcement of speech regulations should 
be appraised. 
1. Historical Antecedents 
As noted in the Introduction, the term "private attorney general" 
was first used a little over sixty years ago.35 If understood in the terms 
articulated in the Introduction, however - as denoting one who sues 
to vindicate public interests not directly connected to any special 
interest or injury of one's own - its origins are much earlier.36 As the 
Supreme Court observed almost a century ago: 
Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself had 
no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute, 
have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this 
country ever since the foundation of our Government. The right to 
recover the penalty or forfeiture granted by statute is frequently given to 
the first common informer who brings the action, although he has no 
interest in the matter whatever except as such informer.37 
Historically, litigation meeting this description has taken a variety 
of forms. One of the most salient - and the one most directly evoked 
in the above passage - is the qui tam action.38 In England, statutes 
authorizing qui tam actions were enacted as early as the fourteenth 
century.39 Such statutes typically prohibited certain conduct, and then 
35. See supra text accompanying note 1 .  
36. See Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L.  
REV. 255, 302 (1961) ("[T]he public action - an action brought by a private person 
primarily to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of public obligations - has long 
been a feature of our English and American law."). 
37. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905); see Jaffe, supra note 3, at 1035 (" [l]t has 
not been true in the past, and it is even less true now, that Anglo-American courts have 
been . . .  restricted by any requirement of a Hohfeldian plaintiff."). 
38. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (including qui tam 
cases in list of cases involving "private attorneys-general"); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure 
Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1314 (1961) (describing the "private 
Attorney General" coined by Judge Frank in Associated Industries as "akin to the 'relator' 
of the old prerogative writs and the private person currently permitted by the Attorney­
General under the English practice to sue in the latter's name"). As the Supreme Court has 
observed, "Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso 
in hac parte sequitur, which means 'who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as 
well as his own.' The phrase dates from at least the time of Blackstone." Vermont Agency of 
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000) (citing 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160). 
39. See, e.g. , The Penalty for Selling Ware at a Fair After it is Ended, 1331, 5 Edw. 3, ch. 
5 in STATUTES OF THE REALM 266 (reprinted 1993) (1811); see also Vermont Agency, 529 
U.S. at 775 (noting that, starting in the fourteenth century, "Parliament began enacting 
statutes that explicitly provided for qui tam suits," some of which "allowed informers to 
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authorized private parties (known as "relators" or "informers") to 
enforce the prohibition by suing on the government's behalf.40 If 
successful, the relator was typically entitled to share in the damages or 
civil penalties paid by the defendant. Critically, qui tam statutes often 
did not require the relator to have any connection to the controversy 
beyond the right to sue granted in the statute itself.41 
Qui tam statutes have a long history in this country as well,42 dating 
at least from the first years of the Union.43 The most prominent federal 
qui tam statute, the False Claims Act (FCA),44 was first enacted in 
1863 and continues in use today.45 The FCA imposes civil liability on 
those who defraud the federal government, and its qui tam provision 
empowers otherwise uninvolved individuals who learn of such fraud 
to sue on the government's behalf. The FCA also provides for 
direct governmental enforcement of its provisions, and permits the 
government to intervene in and direct actions initiated by private 
relators.46 In this respect, it "establish[es] a dual enforcement scheme 
obtain a portion of the penalty as a bounty for their information, even if they had not 
suffered an injury themselves"). 
40. See Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 418 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (calling qui tam relators "the representatives of the public for the purpose of 
enforcing a policy explicitly formulated by legislation"). Although "relator" and "informer" 
actions are today often grouped together under the qui tam rubric, some commentators 
discuss them separately. See, e.g. , Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the 
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,  1394-1409 (1988). 
41. See Marvin, 199 U.S. at 225 ("The right to recover the penalty or forfeiture granted 
by statute is frequently given to the first common informer who brings the action, although 
he has no interest in the matter whatever except as such informer."); see also Vermont 
Agency, 529 U.S. at 775 (noting that the English Parliament began enacting qui tam statutes 
in the fourteenth century, and that some versions "allowed informers to obtain a portion 
of the penalty as a bounty for their information, even if they had not suffered an injury 
themselves"). 
42. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 776 ("Qui tam actions appear to have been as 
prevalent in America as in England, at least in the period immediately before and after the 
framing of the Constitution."); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 129 
(1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing qui tam actions as "deeply 
rooted in our history"); Richard A Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. 
L. REv. 381, 387 n.37 (citing qui tam statutes from the first Congress and shortly thereafter); 
Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutiunality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 
341-42 (1989) (noting that "the qui tam enforcement framework is familiar to our legal 
tradition," that "qui tam actions were routinely authorized by the First and subsequent early 
Congresses," and that qui tam actions were also popular at the state level in early American 
history); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons 
from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 296-303 (1989) (discussing early American uses of qui 
tam statutes). 
43. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 777 n.6 (listing early qui tam statutes, including Act 
of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 102; Act of Jul. 20, 1790, ch. 29, §§ 1, 4, 1 Stat. 131 ,  133; Act 
of Jul. 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137-38; Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 209). 
44. 31 u.s.c. §§ 3729-3731 (2000). 
45. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. 
46. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2000); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)-(4) (2000). 
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whereby both public officials and private citizens are permitted 
to represent the United States in litigation to enforce statutory 
mandates. "47 To encourage private enforcement, the FCA, like its 
English antecedents, grants relators a share of the damages and civil 
penalties if they prevail.48 In this way, the statute relies on the relator's 
interest in a monetary reward as a means to enforce its substantive 
aims.49 That, in fact, is the basic premise of all qui tam legislation: that 
giving private parties a financial interest in enforcing public law is an 
efficient way to promote the public interest. 5 0 
In addition to enforcing civil remedies on the government's behalf, 
private parties were empowered during some periods in English, 
American colonial, and early U.S. history to prosecute criminal cases,5 1  
whether or not they had been injured by the criminal conduct in 
question.52 Where the criminal penalty took the form of a fine, it was 
47. Caminker, supra note 42, at 350. 
48. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)-(b) (2000). 
49. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997) 
("As a class of plaintiffs, qui tam relators are different in kind than the Government. They 
are motivated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good."). 
50. As the Supreme Court has observed, qui tam statutes are 
passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern civilization, that one of the 
least expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on the Treasury is to make 
the perpetrators of them liable to actions by private persons acting, if you please, under the 
strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such 
means compare with the ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow­
going public vessel. 
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.5 (1943) (quoting United States v. 
Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885)). For more on the view that qui tam and related 
provisions are cost-effective ways to pursue the public interest, see infra notes 85-86 and 
accompanying text. 
51. See Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 , 
801 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "private prosecutions were commonplace 
in the 19th century"); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 127-28 ( 1998) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing the practice); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA 1800-1880, at 1-2 (1989) 
("Private prosecution - one citizen taking another to court without the intervention of the 
police - was the basis of law enforcement in Philadelphia and an anchor of its legal culture, 
and this had been so since colonial times."); John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the 
Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511,  515 (1994) ("[S]cholars have 
determined that the notion of private prosecutions originated in early common law England, 
where the legal system primarily relied upon the victim or the victim's relatives or friends to 
bring a criminal to justice."); id. at 518 ("American citizens continued to privately prosecute 
criminal cases in many locales during the nineteenth century."). 
52. STEINBERG, supra note 51, at 46, 66 (noting that private criminal prosecutions in 
nineteenth-century Philadelphia could be brought even by those not injured by the 
defendant's conduct); H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and 
Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 525 n.72 
(1986) (noting that private prosecution of penal statutes was "an essential feature of the late 
medieval and early modern criminal process," and explaining that "although the private 
award was ordinarily payable to the aggrieved party, it occasionally lost its remedial 
character entirely and was payable, essentially as a reward, to any private citizen ('common 
informer') who successfully prosecuted the offender"). 
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often paid in whole or in part to the private prosecutor as a "reward" 
for obtaining the conviction.53 In this respect, private prosecutions 
mirrored qui tam actions.54 But private prosecutors were not always 
limited to circumstances where a share in the award provided a 
financial incentive to prosecute. In some cases, "[t]he interest in 
punishing the defendant and deterring violations of law by the 
defendant and others was sufficient to support the 'standing' of the 
private prosecutor even if the only remedy was the sentencing of the 
defendant to jail or to the gallows."55 
In sum, the history of qui tam actions and privately initiated 
criminal prosecutions confirms that legislative reliance on uninjured 
private parties to enforce public-regarding statutes is no recent 
innovation. These longstanding historical practices must inform any 
appraisal of comparable modern institutions, and should confer on 
those modern institutions a presumptive legitimacy. 
2. Modern Instruments 
Although qui tam statutes remain in use today,56 the "citizen suit" 
is probably the most familiar contemporary form of private attorney 
general litigation.57 For my purposes, the most significant citizen-suit 
provisions are those that authorize private suits against private actors 
53. Foy, supra note 52, at 525 n.72. 
54. Some treat private prosecutions of this kind as literal qui tam actions. See, e.g. , Cass 
R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan: Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 163, 175 ( 1992) ("The purpose of this [qui tam] action is to give citizens a 
right to bring civil suits to help in the enforcement of the federal criminal law."). Whether or 
not the qui tam label is employed in the criminal context, I do not mean to discount the 
difference between criminal prosecutions and civil suits. Although the line between criminal 
and civil law can be blurry at the margins, the distinction has considerable significance in a 
range of constitutional areas. Thus, empowering private individuals to enforce criminal laws 
may raise special constitutional concerns not present in the civil context. I do not consider 
any such issues here. Rather, my argument in this Article is confined to the civil context. 
55. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 128 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
56. Qui tam statutes remain in use in the United States, but are no longer a part of 
English law. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui 
Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 608 (2000). 
57. The term "private attorney general" also appears in other contemporary contexts. 
For example, it is often used to refer to attorney's fee provisions in federal civil rights laws, 
reflecting the idea that the plaintiff, though suing to enforce his own civil rights, is also 
serving the public interest. See Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 205 ("Attorney's fees are the fuel that drives the private attorney 
general engine. E very significant contemporary civil rights statute contains some provision 
for attorney's fees, and in 1976, Congress passed a comprehensive attorney's fee statute that 
provides for fees under the most important Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes as well." 
(footnotes omitted)); Rabkin, supra note 2, at 180 (noting the frequency with which the 
private attorney general concept is used to describe attorney fee provisions). I discuss the 
Supreme Court's treatment of attorney's fees in Part II, infra. 
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to enforce legal obligations that do not correspond to specific 
individual rights held by the plaintiff.58 Starting in the 1970s, such 
provisions became especially common in federal environmental 
statutes. The Clean Air Act was the first statute in this area to 
authorize citizen suits, and by the early 1990s nearly all federal 
environmental laws contained similar provisions.59 
Typically, a federal citizen-suit statute takes one of two forms. 
After imposing certain legal obligations on the regulated entity, it 
provides that the obligations may be enforced either (1) by "any 
person" (or "any citizen"),60 or (2) by any person "aggrieved" (or 
"injured" or "adversely affected").61 Occasionally, the statute will 
merge these approaches by defining "citizen" or "person" as someone 
who has been "aggrieved" or "injured."62 But even for those plaintiffs 
suing under an "any person" provision that itself does not require 
injury, the Supreme Court has provided that a plaintiff does not have 
constitutional standing to sue in federal court unless she alleges 
"injury in fact."63 I will discuss the Court's standing jurisprudence at 
greater length in Part II, but for present purposes it suffices to observe 
that, whether on account of statutory language or constitutional 
standing doctrine, federal citizen-suit plaintiffs must allege injury. On 
this point, federal citizen suits differ from qui tam actions. 
The critical point here, however, is that even though federal 
citizen-suit plaintiffs must allege injury, the remedies available to such 
58. Cf Sunstein, supra note 54, at 231 ("Many citizen-suit proV1s1ons in the 
environmental laws give the citizen the option of initiating proceedings against the private 
defendant allegedly operating in violation of federal law."). 
59. As Barton H. Thompson, Jr., describes: 
Perhaps the most pervasive, prominent, and continuing innovatic- in the modern 
environmental era has been the involvement of citizens in the enforcement of environmental 
laws. The federal environmental laws passed in the 1970s and early 1980s, although far 
stricter and sweeping than earlier state and local environmental statutes, looked structurally 
similar to the earlier regimes - with one principal exception. Unlike their predecessors, 
almost all of the major laws provided for suits by private citizens to enjoin or penalize 
violations of their provisions. 
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 185, 185; see also James R. May, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10704 (Sept. 2003). 
60. See, e.g. , Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2000) ("any person"); 
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(l) (2000) ("any person"); Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000) ("any person"). 
61. See, e.g. , Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (2000) ("[a]ny party to a proceeding 
under this chapter aggrieved"); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 32909(a) 
(2000) ("[a] person that may be adversely affected"). 
62. See, e.g. , Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000) ("any citizen," which the 
statute defines as "a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely 
affected"). 
63. See infra notes 150-171 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiffs are not necessarily coterminous with their injuries.64 
Provided a citizen-suit plaintiff establishes injury, Congress may 
empower her to seek a broad range of relief having little or nothing to 
do with the remediation of her own injury. Indeed, federal citizen-suit 
statutes frequently do not authorize any monetary compensation for 
the plaintiffs themselves.65 Instead, these provisions often empower 
plaintiffs to seek broad injunctive relief and/or civil penalties payable 
to the government.66 That remedial breadth, more than the presence 
or absence of individualized injury, is the critical ingredient in private 
attorney general litigation. 
Numerous state environmental laws also provide for citizen suits 
seeking broad-gauged relief, and most require no showing of 
individual injury.67 This proliferation reflects not only an increased 
64. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972) ("(T]he fact of economic injury 
is what gives a person standing to seek judicial review under the statute, but once review is 
properly invoked, that person may argue the public interest in support of his claim that the 
agency has failed to comply with its statutory mandate."); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 443-44 n.65 (3d ed. 2000) (describing in similar terms 
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), in which the Court recognized a 
radio broadcaster's federal standing to challenge the grant of a broadcasting license to a 
potential rival; noting that, although the plaintiff was "(m]otivated by its own economic 
injury at the hands of the agency . . .  [its] action as a 'private attorney general' brought to 
judicial attention the interests directly protected by the statute - those of listeners, who 
might lack the means or motivation to challenge what the agency had done"). 
65. Citizen-suit plaintiffs may, however, be able to extract payment through the 
settlement process. 
66. See Holly Doremus, Environmental Ethics and Environmental Law: Harmony, 
Dissonance, Cacophony, or Irrelevance, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 ,  4 (2003) (noting that "in 
most cases, penalties for violations of environmental laws go to the general treasury, and 
although citizen suits can result in injunctions halting harmful actions, they cannot produce 
money damages that might be used to reverse those effects"). Even when the injunction the 
plaintiff seeks is aimed at remedying the plaintiff's own injury, it is in the nature of injunctive 
relief that the award will often confer a much broader benefit. A judicial order directing a 
factory to decrease its emission of certain air pollutants, for example, will necessarily benefit 
not just the individual plaintiff seeking the order but also everyone else similarly affected by 
the pollution. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the 
Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 180 (2003) ("[A] winning effort to 
stop the disputed conduct (or to compel legally required conduct) would, as a practical 
matter, redound to the benefit not just of those who are parties to the litigation but also to 
other affected persons who remain on the sidelines."); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive 
Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 398 (2003) ("(W]here a single plaintiff 
brings an action for injunctive relief against an institutional actor, the remedy benefits not 
only the individual plaintiff, but also all other similarly situated individuals."). 
67. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement 
of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article Ill Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1007-08 
(2001) ("Environmental rights acts or constitutional provisions in fifteen states confer broad 
citizen standing to challenge ecologically deleterious activities. . . . Only three of the 
environmental rights acts condition standing on personal injury or harm."). The fifteen state 
provisions cited by Elmendorf are: HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2; CONN. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-14 to -20 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 2000); IND. CODE §§ 
13-30-1-1 to -12 (2000); IOWA CODE § 455B.lll  (1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2026 
(West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 1-501 to -508 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, 
§ 7A (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.1701-.1706 (2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 
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awareness of the need for robust environmental standards, but also 
a determination that public enforcement alone cannot ensure 
adequate compliance with those standards. In this respect, citizen-suit 
provisions, both state and federal, serve essentially the same purpose 
as qui tam statutes: "[b]oth are designed to encourage private citizens 
to help the executive branch deter and redress violations of . . .  
[public] law."68 
The private attorney general also appears in a number of other 
modern contexts. Many state consumer protection laws, for example, 
empower private citizens to enforce the public interests in fair 
competition and accurate advertising, and to do so by seeking broad 
equitable remedies against those engaged in false advertising or other 
misleading commercial speech.69 At the time of Nike v. Kasky,70 the 
California unfair competition statute was likely the most far-reaching 
of these laws.71 It covered a wide range of conduct, imposing strict 
liability for any unfair business practice and for any "unfair, deceptive, 
untrue or misleading advertising."72 In addition to public 
enforcement,73 the law was enforceable by "any person acting for the 
interests of itself, its members or the general public. "74 Injury did not 
(2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.540-.570 (Michie 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-l 
to:35A-14 (West 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-40-01 to -11  (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§§ 34A-10-1 to -17 (Michie 2000). He identifies Iowa, Louisiana, and North Dakota as the 
three states requiring individual injury. Elmendorf, supra, at 1007-08 nn.22 & 24. 
68. Caminker, supra note 42, at 344. In making this point, I do not mean to suggest that 
qui tam actions and citizen suits are identical in all respects. In particular, the former may be 
understood to involve a private plaintiff suing quite literally on the government's behalf -
that is, acting in the shoes of the executive branch itself - while the latter are better 
described simply as involving private assertions of the public interest. The distinction is not 
germane to this Article, but it might be significant if the object were to identify 
circumstances where private actors wield governmental power as such, as opposed to 
situations where private plaintiffs merely act in the public interest. See, e.g., Metzger, supra 
note 15, at 1462-70 (proposing a more robust, judicially enforceable "private delegation 
doctrine," and arguing that the doctrine should focus on, among other things, whether the 
private actor acts on the government's behalf). 
69. See PRIGDEN, supra note 16, § 6:9, at 6-21 to 6-22 (stating that "thirty-three states 
explicitly authorize" individual plaintiffs "to act as . . .  private attorney[s] general" and to 
seek "not only damages for [their] own injuries, but also to enjoin any future violations of 
the state consumer protection act by the same defendant"). 
70. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
71. In November 2004, the California voters passed a ballot initiative substantially 
amending the statute's private attorney general provisions. See infra notes 233-237 and 
accompanying text for further discussion. 
72. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997); see Cortez v. Purolator Air 
Filtrations Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 717 (Cal. 2000) (stating that the UCL imposed strict 
liability). 
73. The state attorney general, all district attorneys, and certain county and city 
attorneys were, and remain, empowered to enforce the statute. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 
§ 17204 (West 1997). 
74. Id. 
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need to be asserted;75 it sufficed to allege that "members of the public 
are likely to be deceived" by the actions or statements in question.76 
Finally, the statute permitted private attorneys general to seek a range 
of equitable remedies, including injunctions and, in certain cases, 
disgorgement.77 Taken together, the absence of an injury requirement 
and, in particular, the availability of broad remedial measures made 
the California statute especially powerful.78 The design was deliberate: 
as the California courts explained, the private attorney general 
provision operated to "effectuate the full deterrent force" of the 
statute.79 In that sense, private attorneys general acting under state 
laws like the California statute are descendents of the qui tam relator 
and cousins of the federal citizen-suit plaintiff .80 
75. Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668 (Cal. 
1983); see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 235 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996) ("[A] section 17200 violation, unlike common law fraud, can be shown even if no 
one was actually deceived, relied upon the fraudulent practice, or sustained any damage."). 
76. Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. , 673 P.2d at 668. 
77. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 1997). See infra note 203 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of disgorgement. Attorney's fees were available, but only 
to private attorneys general who vindicated important public interests and secured 
significant public benefits. See CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2004); Stop 
Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1 101 (Cal. 1998). 
78. Other state consumer protection laws also confer considerable power on private 
plaintiffs, though somewhat less than under the California statute. In New York, for 
example, a private plaintiff may be able to obtain an injunction against misleading 
advertising by showing only that the advertising will cause irreparable harm to the public 
generally, but without necessarily establishing the likelihood of any particular individualized 
harm. See PRIGDEN, supra note 16, § 6-9, at 6-23 (citing McDonald v. N. Shore Yacht Sales, 
Inc., 5 13 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1987)). Moreover, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, and 
Oklahoma all allow private plaintiffs to seek injunctions against deceptive trade practices if 
they are "likely" to be harmed by the practices in question. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.45 
(West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-lO(A) (Michie 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4165.03(A)(l) (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, § 54(A) (2001). 
The California statute raised, and continues to raise other significant issues as well. One 
factor not discussed here is uncertainty over the res judicata effect of private attorney 
general actions. For example, if a private citizen purports to sue on behalf of the general 
public and then settles with the defendant, does that settlement preclude all other members 
of the public (and/or the government itself) from suing the defendant for the same or related 
conduct? The California statute is unclear on this point. See Robert C. Fellmeth, California's 
Unfair Competition Act: Conundrums and Confusions, 26 CAL. L. REVISION COMMISSION 
REP. RECOMMENDATIONS & STUD. 227, 262 (1996). Questions of preclusion like this, 
though important, may presumably be resolved without disturbing the underlying 
mechanism of the private attorney general itself. For example, a private attorney general 
action that yields injunctive relief in the public interest might be deemed preclusive of 
subsequent litigation on behalf of the general public, but not preclusive of suits by 
individuals seeking compensation for their individual injuries. Such considerations, however, 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
79. Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat'! Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cal. 1979). 
80. The availability of disgorgement under statutes like California's also parallels the 
law of unjust enrichment. Claims of unjust enrichment do not necessarily require a showing 
that the plaintiff has been tangibly injured by the defendant's conduct. It may be enough "in 
some cases that the plaintiff simply has a superior moral claim to whatever enrichment the 
defendant obtained." Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
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* * *  
As this Section has shown, Anglo-American legislatures have long 
authorized private parties to sue in the public interest, either as qui 
tam relators, "common informers," private prosecutors, or otherwise.8 1  
Today, citizen-suit statutes and other private attorney general 
arrangements make similar use of private plaintiffs. Federal citizen­
suit plaintiffs are generally required to allege individual injury to 
proceed with their cases, but not because the purpose of the suit itself 
is thought to be confined to redressing individualized injury. Rather, 
the independent limitations of Article III standing doctrine, which I 
will discuss further in Part II, require an allegation of injury. Critically, 
however, the remedies available under all these regimes extend far 
beyond the circumstances of the individual case. In the modern 
period, these remedies often take injunctive form - for example, an 
order compelling a polluter to cease and desist even if doing so would 
affect its industrial activities on a very broad scale, or an order 
directing an advertiser not to make certain false statements and to 
publicly correct those it has made in the past. Legislatures, in short, 
have often commissioned private plaintiffs in the pursuit of the public 
interest. 
B. Policy 
This Section turns from legislative practice to policy debate, and 
reviews some of the more familiar arguments for and against private 
attorneys general. Of course, "law" and "policy" are not mutually 
exclusive domains: legal analysis often includes consideration of 
whether proposed rules are workable and effective in practical terms, 
and policy discussions are necessarily shaped by a sense of what 
options are legally available. Moreover, one's views on law and policy 
may both derive, at least in part, from a common set of ideological or 
other commitments. Still, some distinction is possible. At least at the 
1443, 1448 (2004). Thus, for example, "when the beneficiary of a will murders the testator, 
an heir who would not otherwise have inherited the estate may claim restitution from the 
murderer. Similarly, a trust beneficiary may recover a bribe paid to the trustee even if trust 
assets were not impaired." Id. at 1448-49 (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) 
and RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 187, 197 (1937)). The traditional availability of such 
actions further confirms that laws like the California UCL are not historical anomalies. 
81. See Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal 
Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2241 (1999) (summarizing scholarship identifying "a long history in 
English courts, in the courts of the several states, and in the federal courts themselves of 
judicial proceedings brought by those who have not suffered any . . .  individualized injury in 
fact," and explaining that, "[f]or example, the prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, 
and certiorari, as well as qui tam, relator, and informer actions, could all be brought by 
litigants who had suffered no injury in fact"). 
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level of formal argument, a regime's legal permissibility can be 
separated from its wisdom. Observing that distinction, I have three 
goals here: to sketch some of the contours of the policy debate, to 
show that there are valid arguments both for and against private 
attorneys general, and to suggest that the institution best positioned to 
decide whether to permit private attorneys general in any particular 
context is the legislature.82 
1. A rguments in Favor 
Policy support for the private attorney general has ebbed and 
flowed over time.83 Its supporters tend to mount a relatively familiar 
set of arguments. First, as suggested above,84 private attorneys general 
are depicted as a cost-effective means of supplementing resource­
constrained public enforcement. As Frederick Schauer and Richard 
Pildes have observed in a related context, "[l]aw whose effectiveness 
depends on constant monitoring and enforcement by government 
officials will, absent massive commitment of public resources, be far 
less effective than law that can enlist social norms or private incentives 
to assist in enforcement."85 Operating on that premise, the theory is 
that private plaintiffs valuably supplement the government's 
enforcement efforts without taxing state resources.86 
82. The policy arguments that are relevant here generally assume the existence of some 
form of litigation to enforce statutory norms and then divide over the wisdom of relying on 
privately initiated litigation to achieve those ends. That is, the arguments here are over the 
appropriate form of litigation, not the propriety of litigation in the first place. I therefore do 
not engage the more generalized debate over whether litigation of any kind is an appropriate 
means of achieving regulatory ends. See generally REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. 
Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (collecting essays in that broader debate). 
83. See, e.g. , Garth et al., supra note 2, at 357-66 (describing changes over time in the 
rationales supporting private attorneys general); Rabkin, supra note 2, at 179 ("The 'private 
attorney general' came out of the shadows in the 1970s . . . .  Over the past decade, however, 
the 'private attorney general' has been in retreat, beset by critics and rivals and increasingly 
starved of resources and political support. If not quite back in the shadows, it is certainly 
under a cloud."). 
84. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
85. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalisrn and the First 
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1831 (1999). 
86. See, e.g. , Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (observing that, 
given the modest resources available to the Attorney General to enforce federal fair housing 
law and the "enormity of the task of assuring fair housing," the law could only be effectively 
enforced if "the main generating force" came from private complainants "act[ing] not only 
on their own behalf but also as private attorneys general in vindicating a policy that 
Congress considered to be of the highest priority") (internal quotation marks omitted); 
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.5 (1943) (noting that qui tarn 
statutes are "passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern civilization, that 
one of the least expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on the Treasury is 
to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by private persons acting, if you please, 
under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain") (quoting United States v. 
Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885))); Schnall v. Amboy Nat'I Bank, 279 F.3d 205, 217 (3d 
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A second argument in favor of private attorneys general is that 
they ensure enforcement is "not wholly dependent on the current 
attitudes of public enforcers."s7 In some areas, this point may be 
articulated in terms of "capture." That is, a legislature might enlist 
private parties to enforce a statute out of a concern that if a 
government agency were granted exclusive enforcement authority, the 
agency might become unduly influenced by the entities it regulates.ss 
Whether, and when, agencies actually fall victim to capture is a matter 
of considerable disagreement in the literature.s9 At least in some areas, 
however, the argument can be restated to focus less on capture by 
external forces and more on the executive's simple failure, by choice 
or inadvertence, to enforce certain laws to the extent the legislature 
desires. Where, for example, the legislature is controlled by one 
political party and the executive branch by another, diverging policy 
priorities may lead executive actors to underenforce certain of the 
legislature's enactments. That is, the executive branch might value 
certain legislative goals less than does the legislature that enacted 
them. Mindful of that problem, the legislature might seek to 
circumvent this political conflict by empowering private actors to 
enforce the statute themselves. In other circumstances, the reasons for 
governmental underenforcement may be more cultural than political. 
The private attorney general provision in the anti-pornography 
Cir. 2002) ("Although TISA [the Truth in Savings Act] authorizes the Federal Reserve 
Board to enforce the Act . . .  the Board has limited resources to devote to enforcement, and 
Congress may have deemed it more cost-effective to cede TISA enforcement to individuals 
in the private sector who stand to profit from efficiently detecting and prosecuting TISA 
violations."); see also PRIGDEN, supra note 16, § 6:2, at 373 ("It became apparent early on" 
in the history of consumer protection legislation "that the state could not alone handle the 
quantity of complaints, and so states that did not already provide for a private right of action 
created one by amending their statutes."); Fellmeth, supra note 7S, at 266-67 (noting that in 
the area of California consumer protection law, "[p ]ublic prosecutors are able to pursue only 
a small fraction of potentially meritorious cases, including those which impact on large 
numbers of consumers . . . .  [M]ost of the significant consumer abuses [in California] over the 
past two decades have been detected and litigated by private counsel . . . .  "). 
S7. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Mo. L. REV. 215, 227 (19S3). 
SS. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, SS 
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1713 (1975) ("It has become widely accepted, not only by public 
interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency 
members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the 
process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests." 
(footnotes omitted)); see also Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More 
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (collecting literature on agency 
capture); John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. 
REY. 713, 723-2S (19S6) (same). 
S9. Sources challenging the capture thesis include DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 24-25, 2S-33 (1991 ), and Mark Kelman, On 
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the 
Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REY. 199 (19SS). 
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ordinance proposed by Dworkin and MacKinnon, for example,9(} 
responded to the perception that governments tend to underenforce 
legal protections for women by putting the power of law enforcement 
in women's own hands.91 
Putting these arguments together, we have an assertion that 
private attorneys general are a cost-effective means of both pursuing 
the public welfare and returning power to the people themselves. For 
legislatures that value cheap, robust regulatory enforcement, private 
attorneys general may present an attractive option. 
There are, of course, many potential objections to this positive 
account. Because the objections tend to merge with various 
freestanding arguments against the private attorney general, I will 
move directly to considering those arguments against. 
2. A rguments Against 
Over the last two decades, a number of policy objections to private 
attorneys general have emerged. Four are salient. First, some object 
that private attorneys general are not an army of anonymous, altruistic 
citizens responding to some higher calling to promote the greater 
good.92 Instead, they are individuals and organizations acting on 
specific ideological or financial incentives, using the private attorney 
general's mantle to advance their own interests. In its strongest form, 
this objection casts private attorneys general as "extortionist[s]" who 
abuse the power granted them both to assert marginal or even "phony 
90. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
91. See DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 21,  at 54 ("No prosecutors decide 
whether or not a woman's case is valid . . . .  It is time to place the power to remedy the harm 
in the hands of those who are hurt, rather than to enhance the power of those who have 
done so little with so much for so long."); Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 25, at 640 
("MacKinnon and Dworkin saw this (trafficking provision in their anti-pornography 
ordinance) as a means of empowering women, and they envisioned that when women sued 
under the ordinance, the courtroom would become a public forum in which the victims of 
pornography could make themselves heard . . . .  "). 
Occasionally, a legislature will provide for private enforcement precisely because prior 
governmental action has been inadequate. Such was the case for the provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act creating a private damages action for victims of gender­
motivated violence, struck down by the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000). Congress enacted the provision in part to combat the evidence that state 
police departments, prosecutors, and judges tended to regard gender-motivated violence as 
less serious than other violent crime, and thus that state criminal justice systems tended to 
provide inadequate protection from, and remedies to, gender-motivated violence. See id. at 
619-20. 
92. See Rabkin, supra note 2, at 180 ("The abstract term implies that the 'private 
attorney general' could be almost anyone - an ordinary citizen, perhaps, with just a bit 
more public spirit than his neighbors. The truth was always different."). 
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claim[ s]" and to extract settlements from defendants eager to avoid 
the risks of a full trial.93 
To the extent the objection here is simply that private attorneys 
general act out of self interest, there is little with which to quarrel. The 
theory of the private attorney general has never depended on 
idealistic notions of public service or altruism. Rather, it has always 
been clear that citizen-suit provisions and comparable private attorney 
general arrangements would be invoked most frequently by particular 
plaintiffs with particular agendas.94 Indeed, the archetypal depiction of 
private attorneys general casts them as either "mercenary law 
enforcers" seeking to profiteer or "social advocates" hoping to 
advance a political cause. 95 
The critical point here is that ideological and pecuniary 
motivations are not necessarily problematic. In the environmental 
area, for example, the most likely citizen-suit plaintiffs may be 
ideologically driven affiliates of a relatively recognizable set of 
advocacy and special interest groups.96 That can count as a virtue: if 
the point of a citizen-suit provision is to ensure robust enforcement of 
the statute's underlying substance, the fact that the most likely citizen 
plaintiffs are "known quantities" with strong ideological commitments 
to the relevant issues simply increases the likelihood of vigorous 
enforcement.97 The same is true of the financial incentives created by 
qui tam and comparable statutes. Indeed, as discussed above,98 the 
very object of qui tam legislation is to align the private individual's 
interest in financial reward with the public's interest in robust 
enforcement of certain legal standards. To be sure, a careful legislator 
might consider ways to minimize the opportunities for rank 
"extortion."99 But the fact that private attorneys general are motivated 
93. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 618 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
94. See Rabkin, supra note 2, at 182 (noting that citizen suit provisions "do[) not reflect 
any expectation that a random assortment of parties . . .  will come forward to litigate as 
private attorneys general. On the contrary, the underlying assumption is that in each 
particular area, the private attorney general will be a known quantity, reflecting a well­
established interest or constituency."). It is unclear whether Rabkin regards this 
phenomenon as a good thing. But as I argue here, there is no particular reason to view it as a 
bad thing. 
95. Garth et al., supra note 2, at 356. 
96. These include, for example, the petitioner in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), the respondent in Steel Co. v. Citizens for 
a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), and the respondent in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
97. See Garth et al., supra note 2, at 358-59 (noting that private attorney general 
provisions of this and related sorts flourished when there was a general "societal consensus" 
about the importance of the substance being enforced). 
98. See supra notes 50, 85-86 and accompanying text. 
99. I briefly note some such options at infra notes 1 19-121 and accompanying text. 
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by their own peculiar incentives merely states the theory of their 
office, not a persuasive basis for categorically rejecting their use. 
A second, more targeted objection emphasizes a "free-rider" 
problem especially acute in areas where the plaintiff's motivation to 
sue is more economic than ideological. In theory, monetary incentives 
should spur private individuals to ferret out and prosecute violations 
that might otherwise go unnoticed. 100 But such investigative work can 
be expensive and time-consuming. Thus, in areas policed by both 
private actors and governmental agencies, private actors may simply 
wait for the agency to investigate a particular problem and then file 
actions based on the information gleaned from that investigation. 1 01 
That approach is certainly less expensive than relying on one's own 
investigative work, but it may also lead private plaintiffs to focus their 
energies on relatively unimportant cases. Indeed, to the extent the 
cases are those the government itself chooses not to pursue even after 
investigating the matter, they may involve violations that are at once 
easily detected and relatively insignificant from a regulatory 
perspective. If so, then free riding may create a pattern of private 
enforcement that corresponds very little, if at all, to the legislature's 
enforcement priorities.1 02 
One response to this free-rider objection is that private reliance on 
the fruits of government investigation is not necessarily undesirable in 
all cases. Suppose an agency investigates a matter, discovers an 
actionable wrong, and then declines to bring an enforcement action. 
One reason for the inaction might be that, even though it has detected 
wrongdoing, the agency simply lacks the requisite resources to litigate 
the matter. Another might be that the agency's litigation decisions are 
unduly affected by those it regulates - that is, the agency is captured. 
Either way, a legislature interested in vigorous enforcement might see 
value in private enforcement even if the private plaintiff merely free 
rides on government investigations. The legislature's first preference 
might be for private plaintiffs to focus their energies on investigating 
and litigating violations that the government would never uncover 
100. See Coffee, supra note 87, at 220 ("In theory, the private attorney general is 
induced by the profit motive to seek out cases that otherwise might go undetected."); 
Rabkin, supra note 2, at 191 ("From a public perspective, private actions would be most 
beneficial if they focused on pollution sources not already known to the government."). 
101. See Coffee, supra note 87, at 222 ("(A] recurring pattern is evident under which the 
private attorney general simply piggybacks on the efforts of public agencies - such as the 
SEC, the FfC, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice - in order to reap 
the gains from the investigative work undertaken by these agencies."). 
102 See Rabkin, supra note 2, at 191 ("The incentive of the private attorney general 
under the current system is . . .  to focus on those pollution sources which have already been 
identified in government filings, which are thus cheapest and easiest to proceed against in a 
lawsuit."); id. at 191-92 ("There is . . .  an incentive to bring suit when the case is easiest to 
win rather than where enforcement deficiencies are responsible for the most pollution."). 
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itself. But at least to the extent the legislature desires greater 
enforcement than that available through government action alone, any 
extra enforcement may be better than none. 
In some circumstances, however, the free-rider problem may 
produce not just private litigation based on government investigations, 
but private litigation duplicative of government litigation. That is, 
private actors may wait to see what entities the government targets 
with enforcement actions, and then bring their own suits against those 
same entities. A private plaintiff may even wait for the government to 
prevail in its action, and then rely on that result to advance her own 
case. Consider Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,103 which, though not a 
private attorney general case, highlights this particular manifestation 
of the free-rider issue. The Securities and Exchange Commission had 
secured an injunction against a corporate defendant for making false 
and misleading proxy statements, in violation of federal securities law. 
Private shareholders then filed their own action against the same 
defendant, seeking damages on account of the misstatements. The 
Supreme Court permitted the private plaintiffs to invoke offensive 
nonmutual collateral estoppel, barring the defendant from relitigating 
the liability issue that it had lost in the SEC action.104 In authorizing 
this form of preclusion, however, the Court acknowledged certain 
potential problems. First, offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel may 
disserve interests in judicial economy by "increas[ing] rather than 
decreas[ing] the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs 
will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening 
in the first action."105 Second, such preclusion may be unfair to the 
defendant if the small stakes of the first action provided inadequate 
incentive to litigate the issues robustly, or the defendant faced special 
procedural impediments in the first action, or the judgment in that 
action was itself inconsistent with earlier judgments in the defendant's 
favor.106 
103. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
104. Id. at 331-33. 
105. Id. at 330. 
106. Id. at 330-31 .  In addition, permitting nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel will 
eventually encourage defendants to over-litigate the initial case. As Robert Casad and Kevin 
Clermont have described, nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel 
destroys the equivalence of litigating risk, weights the scale against the common party, and 
changes the most basic of the rules of the procedural system: the first plaintiff risks losing 
only the one case, which is all the defendant can win; in return, the defendant risks losing all 
the cases at once, so that over the series of cases the odds overwhelmingly favor the 
plaintiffs; and the first plaintiff thereby acquires tremendous settlement leverage, but in the 
absence of settlement will face an opponent willing to litigate down to the scorched earth. 
ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS 
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 177 (2001 ) .  
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To be sure, free riding of the sort permitted in Parklane may well 
yield certain difficulties. But those difficulties are not unique to 
private attorneys general, or to private enforcement actions more 
broadly. Preclusion problems in particular can be addressed from 
within preclusion doctrine, while leaving the basic operation of private 
enforcement intact.107 
Beyond the specific question of preclusion, the extent of any free­
rider problem is likely to vary across substantive areas. Some statutes' 
private attorney general provisions may raise serious free-rider 
concerns; others may not. Legislatures are particularly well situated to 
make those assessments on a statute-by-statute basis. Consider, for 
example, the 1986 amendments to the federal False Claims Act, which 
permit qui tam actions even when based on information the 
government has in its possession, except where the information has 
been publicly disclosed and the relator is not the original source of the 
information. 108 In enacting those amendments, Congress evidently 
weighed the benefits of a more robust qui tam presence against the 
costs of free riding, and struck a balance somewhere in the middle.109 
Other legislatures may reach different conclusions in other areas. But 
to the extent the balance may vary from area to area and statute to 
statute, the best response to the free-rider issue may be to resist 
seeking a single, uniform resolution. 
A third objection to private attorneys general is that they too 
willingly accept cheap settlements. This is a more particular 
articulation of the extortion argument. The point here is that because 
the amount the defendant stands to lose in a formal judgment often 
far outstrips the amount the private attorney stands to gain, there is a 
powerful bilateral incentive to settle the case.11° There is evidence to 
107. That is, courts could decide to permit nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel only 
rarely. Parklane itself did not make this sort of preclusion available in every case. Rather, it 
"grant[ed] trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied," based in 
part on an assessment of whether the problems identified above are present in a given case. 
439 U.S. at 331. 
108. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(4)(A) (2000). Before 1986, the FCA directed district courts to 
"dismiss [all qui tam] action[s] . . .  based on evidence or information the Government had 
when the action was brought."  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982). In 1986, however, Congress 
loosened that restriction in an effort to revive qui tam enforcement. See Hughes Aircraft Co. 
v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946 (1997) ("Congress amended the FCA in 
1986 . . .  to permit qui tam suits based on information in the Government's possession, 
except where the suit was based on information that had been publicly disclosed and was not 
brought by an original source of the information."). 
109. The 1986 amendments certainly increased the volume of qui tam litigation under 
the False Claims Act. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 48 (2002) 
("Before 1986, the DOJ received about six qui tam cases per year. Since the 1986 
amendments went into effect, and through October 30, 2000, 3326 qui tam cases have been 
filed and $4.024 billion has been recovered." (citations omitted)). 
1 10. See Jan T. Chilton & William L. Stem, California's Unfair Business Practices 
Statutes: Settling the "None/ass Class" Action and Fighting the "Two-Front War'', 12 CEB 
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suggest this may be a substantial problem in some areas. 1 1 1  It may be 
especially problematic in areas where the private plaintiff has suffered 
no injury, and where the available judicial relief includes broad 
injunctive relief and/or statutory penalties payable only to the 
government. In such cases, the defendant has an incentive to settle for 
less than the cost of complying with the injunction or paying the 
penalties, and the plaintiff may be likely to regard any settlement for 
any value above the cost of litigation as a windfall.1 12 As a result, and 
contrary to one of the basic tenets of the affirmative case for private 
attorneys general, such plaintiffs may actually contribute to the 
underenforcement of the substantive norms in question. 
At least as a theoretical matter, this argument has some force. As 
with the free-riding issue, however, it seems likely that the extent of 
the problem may vary considerably from area to area. The problem 
may be most acute, for example, where the only available remedies 
are injunctive relief or civil penalties paid to the government. Qui tam 
relators, in contrast, may be less prone to settle on the cheap, since 
they are entitled to a share in the (potentially much larger) final 
judgment if the action succeeds. On the other hand, this distinction 
might point in the other direction: if a suit for injunctive relief is 
brought by an "ideological" private attorney general, then the plaintiff 
might have no interest in a monetary settlement; but if a qui tam 
relator is acting principally out of pecuniary opportunism, she might 
be more likely to accept a cheap settlement, thinking any amount is a 
Civ. LITIG. REP. 95, 96 (1990) (noting the complementary incentives of the plaintiff to assert 
interests beyond his own and the defendant to settle "cheaply," thus undervaluing the third­
party interests supposedly represented in the suit). 
111. See Coffee, supra note 87, at 225-26 (stating that evidence from antitrust class 
actions "seems to show that private litigated judgments are few, cheap settlements are 
common, and the typical settlement recovery is below even the level of the compensatory 
damages alleged by the plaintiffs (despite the existence of a treble damages penalty). Such 
evidence is consistent with a diagnosis that the private enforcer tends to accept inadequate 
settlements."). 
112 See Rabkin, supra note 2, at 191 ("If (defendant] firms must pay all fines to the 
federal Treasury, both the firm and the plaintiff advocacy group have an incentive to reach 
an out-of-court settlement so long as the cost of the settlement is less than the full cost of 
paying the fine."); see also Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental 
Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339 (1990) (concluding that citizen suit provisions in federal 
environmental statutes do not yield a sensible enforcement regime). Note that this account 
assumes that a settlement between a private attorney general and a defendant would 
preclude later suits by different private attorneys general challenging the same conduct, at 
least to the extent the later suits sought the same public-benefiting remedies sought in the 
initial suit. Cf CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 106, at 160-61 (discussing similar preclusion 
issues in the context of successive suits by public officials and private plaintiffs). Where there 
is reason to believe the settlement would not preclude any later litigation, the defendant's 
incentive to settle may be severely undercut. On the other hand, experience under the 
California unfair competition statute shows that defendants in these circumstances may 
settle despite the absence of any assurance of preclusion. See infra notes 209-211  and 
accompanying text. Those cases suggest that the tendency to settle may be especially strong 
where the defendant is a relatively small entity with limited litigation experience. 
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windfall. Yet whichever way these varying incentives cut, the precise 
nature and extent of the problem is likely to be context-dependent. As 
with free riding, therefore, the cheap-settlement problem may be best 
tackled by legislatures on a statute-by-statute basis. 
A fourth objection emphasizes the need for coordinated and 
consistent enforcement. The D.C. Circuit made this point in the early 
1970s when it refused to construe the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) Act to support a private right of action. 1 13 Noting that the Act 
contained no express provision for private suits, the court concluded 
that recognizing a private right of action would conflict with the 
exclusive enforcement authority that the Act vests in the FTC. The 
court stressed the importance of "providing certainty and specificity to 
the [broad] proscriptions of the Act," and reasoned that reserving 
enforcement authority to the FTC alone would contribute to "the 
centralized and orderly development of precedent applying the 
regulatory statute to a div�rsity of fact situations." 1 14 Permitting 
private enforcement, on the other hand, could produce "piecemeal 
lawsuits, reflecting disparate concerns and not a coordinated 
enforcement program," thus "burden[ing] not only the defendants 
selected but also the judicial system." 1 15 In the court's view, Congress 
gave the FTC exclusive enforcement authority in order to avoid that 
precise outcome. 
This objection has traction as an argument that judges should not 
recognize a private right of action if it appears the legislature did not 
intend one. That is, to the extent a statutory regime evinces a 
legislative preference for exclusive enforcement by the government, 
courts should not undermine that preference by creating a private 
right of action. By itself, however, this argument does not establish 
why legislatures should favor public over private enforcement in all 
cases. The choice is a matter of policy preference. Assuming, 
arguendo, that government enforcement reliably produces greater 
coordination and consistency, a regime of private enforcement may 
nevertheless carry a more powerful deterrent effect.1 1 6  If the 
legislature prefers maximum deterrence over tightly coordinated 
enforcement, then it may opt for a private right of action. 1 1 7  That 
1 13. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp. ,  485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
1 14. Id. at 998. 
1 15. Id. at 997-98. 
1 16. Indeed, such greater deterrence may exist precisely because it is more difficult to 
predict the incidence of suit in a private enforcement regime. See, e.g. , PRIGDEN, supra note 
16, § 6:2, at 373 (noting that in the consumer protection context, " [a]llowing private actions 
is . . . more random and less subject to politicization than a government enforcement 
approach"). 
1 17. See Karlan, supra note 57, at 200 ("Reliance on private attorneys general elevates 
full enforcement of broad policy goals over formal political accountability for discrete 
enforcement decisions."). 
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judges should be reluctant to imply such rights of action simply does 
not speak to whether legislatures, having struck the policy balance in a 
particular way, should expressly create them.1 1 8  
Moreover, there are a number of mechanisms available to 
legislatures interested in facilitating doctrinal coordination and 
coherence without forfeiting the deterrent power of private 
enforcement. If a legislature drafts a broad, open-ended statute, it 
could empower the attorney general or a subject-specific agency to 
promulgate narrowing regulations, binding in public and private 
enforcement actions alike. 1 1 9  A legislature could also require those 
planning to sue as private attorneys general to obtain governmental 
certification of their actions before proceeding to court.120 Finally, a 
legislature could grant the relevant government agency the right to 
intervene in, and assume control over, all private attorney general 
actions. 12 1  Put simply, the availability of these and other similar 
measures confirms that enlisting the services of private attorneys 
general need not entail loosing them on the world, unfettered. 
* * *  
There is, in sum, no definitive resolution to the policy debate over 
private attorneys general. There are reasons to regard them as 
valuable partners in the effectuation of the public interest; there are 
reasons to worry that they might be ineffective - or, worse, n 
counterproductive - means to that end. Over the past few decades, 
legislatures have displayed inclinations in each direction. A few 
examples from the federal level make the point. On one hand, as 
discussed above, Congress since the 1970s has inserted citizen-suit 
provisions into virtually every major piece of federal environmental 
legislation.122 Similarly, in 1986 Congress liberalized the qui tam 
1 18. Cf Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (noting, in the course of refusing 
to recognize an implied private right of action, that "the Legislature is far more competent 
than the Judiciary to carry out the necessary 'balancing [of] governmental efficiency and the 
rights of employees"') (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983)). 
119. See, e.g. , PRJGDEN, supra note 16, §§ 7:23-24, at 507-8 (discussing agency 
rulemaking power under state consumer protection statutes). 
120. Cf Bessler, supra note 51 ,  at 515-16 (noting that although British citizens retain the 
authority to institute criminal proceedings, "two English public authorities, the Director of 
Public Prosecutions and the Attorney General, have placed severe limitations on the ability 
of private citizens to prosecute criminal actions"). 
121. See, e.g., 31  U.S.C. § 3630(c)(l)-(2) (providing that the federal government may 
intervene in and then dismiss or settle a False Claims Act action originally filed by a qui tam 
relator, and may also continue litigating the case while limiting the relator's participation); 
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (granting the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power 
to foreclose a Clean Water Act citizen suit by undertaking its own action); id. § 1365(c)(2) 
(providing the EPA may intervene in a Clean Water Act citizen suit "as a matter of right"). 
122 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
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provision in the federal False Claims Act, making it easier for relaters 
to file actions based on information already in the government's hands 
- that is, potentially to free ride on the government's investigations.123 
On the other hand, Congress in the mid-1990s enacted substantial new 
constraints on the litigating power of individual shareholders under 
the federal securities laws. 124 In the end, this mixed legislative record 
suggests, unsurprisingly, that there is no C<'nsensus today about the 
policy wisdom of the private attorney general, and that legislatures 
will resolve the issue differently in different contexts. 
II. EXISTING JUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS 
Despite the long history of legislative reliance on private attorneys 
general and the presence of credible policy arguments to support that 
reliance, in the last decade the Supreme Court has crafted a number of 
robust limits on privately initiated public law litigation. These limits 
operate in diverse doctrinal areas, ranging from state sovereign 
immunity, to attorney's fees, to standing. I examine these limits in this 
Part, and show that they reflect the Court's own opposition to the 
expansive litigating power traditionally wielded by private attorneys 
general. So far, however, the Court's efforts to cut back on that 
authority have been mostly confined to the federal courts; the Court 
has done far less to shape private attorney general litigation in the 
c state courts. 
A. Limits in Federal Court 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court's inclination was to respect 
legislative choices to enlist private plaintiffs in the enforcement of 
public law. In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,125 for example, the 
Court considered an argument that the False Claims Act should be 
construed narrowly when enforced by a qui tam relator rather than by 
the government directly.126 The Court rejected the argument, refusing 
to "say that the same substantive language has one meaning if criminal 
prosecutions are brought by public officials and quite a different 
123. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. 
124. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified in scattered sections of Title 15 of the United States Code). Shareholder 
lawsuits may not leap to mind as a classic instance of public law litigation, but the structural 
similarities are sufficient to make legislative developments in this area relevant to 
considerations of congressional attitudes towards private attorneys general. See Rabkin, 
supra note 2, at 193 (describing, in the course of discussing citizen-suit litigation under 
federal environmental statutes, shareholder litigation under the securities laws as "somewhat 
analogous [to] private attorney general litigation"). 
125. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
126. See id. at 540-41 .  
February 2005] Private Attorneys General 619 
meaning where the same language is invoked by an informer. "127 
Congress having provided for both public and private enforcement of 
the statute, the Court would not privilege one method of enforcement 
over the other. 128 Echoes of that approach are still heard today. In 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. , 129 
for example, the Court described the citizen-suit provision in the 
Clean Water Act as reflecting Congress's belief that private 
enforcement was needed to achieve the goals of the Act, and stressed 
that "[t]his congressional determination warrants judicial attention 
and respect. "13 0 
Such deference has not, however, been the norm in recent years. 
As Pamela Karlan observes, the Rehnquist Court has implemented a 
number of doctrinal changes the combined effect of which has been to 
"sharply abridge[] the ability of private attorneys general to get their 
day in court. "131 The Court's efforts to that end have taken a variety of 
forms. Common to each, however, is a determination to leave the 
substance of the law largely intact while severely restricting the power 
of private plaintiffs to enforce it. 
1. State Sovereign Immunity 
One area to which Karlan points is state sovereign immunity.132 In 
a series of cases starting with Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,133 
the Court has articulated an expansive principle of state sovereign 
immunity loosely affiliated with, but by no means constrained by, the 
Eleventh Amendment.134 Under that principle, the legislative 
127. Id. at 542. 
128. Cf Metzger, supra note 15, at 1437-45 (discussing the Supreme Court's strong 
reluctance, dating to the New Deal, to invalidate delegations of governmental or quasi­
govemmental power to private actors). 
129. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
130. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 185. 
131. Karlan, supra note 57, at 187. 
132. See id. at 188-95. 
133. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) . 
134. The text of the Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or 
subjects of any foreign state." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. But the Court has held that the 
immunity reflected in the Amendment also bars suits against a state by citizens of that state. 
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. 
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). In 
addition, the Court has applied the principle of state sovereign immunity to contexts beyond 
the federal courts. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 
(2002) (holding states immune from privately initiated administrative proceedings before the 
Federal Maritime Commission); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding states 
immune from private suits in state court for violations of federal law). The Court has now 
conceded that this immunity is not found anywhere in the text of the Constitution. See Fed. 
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authority granted to Congress by Article I of the Constitution is 
insufficient to abrogate states' immunity from damages actions by 
private plaintiffs.135 Thus, Congress may not rely on private damages 
actions to enforce Article I legislation against unconsenting states. In 
contrast, the Court has made clear that state sovereign immunity does 
not limit Congress's ability to authorize the federal executive branch 
to enforce federal legislation directly, through government 
enforcement actions. 136 
The Court's sovereign immunity decisions have received a great 
deal of judicial and academic criticism.137 I agree with much of that 
criticism, but I will not dwell on it here. Instead, I want simply to stress 
that one of the effects of the Court's decisions in this area is to 
privilege government enforcement over enforcement by private 
actors. Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to suggest that if a statute 
provides for both public and private enforcement, we may expect that 
any truly important violations will be redressed by public 
enforcement.138 As Karlan observes, this expectation "defies the 
central idea behind the private attorney general - that Congress 
might decide that decentralized enforcement better vindicates civil 
rights policies 'that Congress considered of the highest priority."' 1 39 
Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 754 ("[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends 
beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment."); id. at 767 n.18 ("The principle of 
state sovereign immunity enshrined in our constitutional framework . . .  is not rooted in the 
Tenth Amendment."). 
135. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364 ("Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of 
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I."); 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power 
under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations 
placed upon federal jurisdiction."). Only when legislating pursuant to its authority to enforce 
the Reconstruction Amendments may Congress empower private plaintiffs to bring such 
actions. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364 ("Congress may subject nonconsenting States·to suit in 
federal court when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its § 5 [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] power."). 
136. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9; id. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Alden , 527 
U.S. at 755-56, 759. 
137. See, e.g. , Alden, 527 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 
76 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole 
Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parle Young, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception", 
110 HARV. L. REV. 102 (1996). 
138. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 759 (suggesting that the instant case did not implicate a 
strong "federal interest in compensating the States' employees for alleged past violations" of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act because "despite specific statutory authorization, the United 
States apparently found the same interests insufficient to justify sending even a single 
attorney to Maine to prosecute this litigation" (citation omitted)); Karlan, supra note 57, at 
194 (noting the Court's "equation of importance with centralized enforcement"). 
139. Karlan, supra note 57, at 194 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 
400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)). The point must be qualified, as Karlan acknowledges, by the 
fact that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar private plaintiffs from suing state actors for 
injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Karlan, supra note 57, at 195. In 
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The Court, in other words, has effectively dictated to Congress the 
approach it must take if it wishes its statutes to be enforced effectively: 
it must appropriate sufficient funds for the government to take care of 
the enforcement itself. 
2. Attorney's Fees 
Karlan notes a parallel phenomenon in the attorney's fees area. 140 
A number of privately enforceable federal statutes award attorney's 
fees to the "prevailing party." 141 In Buckhannon Board & Care Home, 
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources,142 the 
Court considered whether a plaintiff who achieves the precise object 
of the suit by way of the defendant's voluntary conduct qualifies as a 
prevailing party, despite the absence of a formal court judgment or 
court-ordered consent decree in her favor.143 Up until then, settled 
precedent in at least nine federal courts of appeals observed the 
"catalyst rule," under which the plaintiff would be deemed a 
prevailing party in those circumstances.144 In Buckhannon, however, 
the Court rejected the catalyst theory as inconsistent with the 
statute.145 
Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg described the Buckhannon decision 
as "allow[ing] a defendant to escape a statutory obligation to pay a 
o plaintiff's counsel fees, even though the suit's merit led the defendant 
to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on, to accord plaintiff 
sooner rather than later the principal redress sought in the 
complaint. " 146 In addition to "imped[ing] access to court for the less 
well heeled," the decision "shr[u)nk the incentive Congress created for 
that respect, the Court's sovereign immunity cases do not signal the end of all private party 
litigation against state entities under the statutes in question. But even admitting that 
qualification, the limitation on damages actions is significant. Indeed, Karlan seems right to 
suggest that "if the Amendment has any bite, that bite cuts deep into the heart of the private 
attorney general." Id. 
140. See id. at 205-08. 
141. See, e.g. , 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1973/(e) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 
1988(b) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2000). 
142. 532 U.S. 598 (2001) .  
143. Specifically, the case involved the attorney's fees provisions in  the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205; 42 U.S.C. § 
3613( c )(2). 
144. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601-02 (describing the catalyst theory); id. at 602 n.3 
(collecting cases adopting the catalyst theory); id. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(describing the Court's decision as departing from "long-prevailing Circuit precedent 
applicable to scores of federal fee-shifting statutes"). 
145. See id. at 605-06, 609-10. 
146. Id. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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the enforcement of federal law by private attorneys general." 147 Of 
course, Buckhannon had no impact on the litigating authority of the 
federal government itself; it simply decreased the likelihood that 
private parties would be the effective enforcement instruments that 
Congress meant them to be. 
Buckhannon thus fits the trend visible in the sovereign immunity 
cases. As Karlan describes, the "overriding theme" in both areas is a 
decline in the actual enforceability of the law. 148 While imposing few 
substantive constraints on Congress's legislative authority, the Court 
has "engaged in a form of court stripping that reduces the possibilities 
for judicial enforcement of statutory commands." 149 The specific target 
of that court stripping is the private attorney general. Public 
enforcement remains intact, but the erection of new barriers to private 
enforcement makes effective regulation more costly and, therefore, 
less likely. 
3 .  Standing 
The Court's sovereign immunity and attorney's fees decisions 
notwithstanding, it is in another area - standing - that the Court has 
had the greatest impact on private attorney general litigation. 
As every federal courts student knows, the federal judicial power 
extends only to "cases" and "controversies" within the meaning of 
Article III of the United States Constitution.150 The core of that 
limitation is the rule that a plaintiff must show she has suffered, or is in 
imminent danger of suffering, concrete, distinct, and palpable injury as 
a result of the defendant's conduct. 1 5 1  The injury must be more than 
"injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed"; it must be an 
"injury in fact" that distinguishes the plaintiff from the general 
citizenry. 152 
147. Id. at 623 (Ginsburg, J . ,  dissenting). 
148. See Karlan, supra note 57, at 208-09. Karlan discusses decisions in two other areas 
- arbitration and implied rights of action - and contends they display the same hostility to 
private attorneys general apparent in the sovereign immunity and attorney's fees cases. See 
id. at 195-205. Those areas are less germane to my argument here, however, because they do 
not involve the imposition of judicially crafted constraints on the express legislative 
delegation of litigating authority to private parties. 
149. Id. at 209. 
150. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
151. See, e.g. , Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-
81 (2000) (explaining that "to satisfy Article Ill's standing requirements, a plaintiff must 
show," among other things, "it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical . . . .  "). 
152. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998). 
February 2005] Private Attorneys General 623 
The critical case in the modern Court's treatment of Article III 
standing is Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.153 In Lujan, the Court held 
that an environmental organization lacked Article III standing to file 
suit challenging a federal regulation interpreting the Endangered 
Species Act's interagency consultation requirement.154 Although the 
Endangered Species Act by its terms plainly authorized the suit, the 
Court held that the plaintiff organization could not establish that the 
regulation would inflict injury on it (or any of its members) in a way 
that distinguished the organization from any other citizen.155 Rather, 
the organization was asserting "only a generally available grievance 
about government," and to permit such a suit would be to allow "the 
injury-in-fact requirement [to be] satisfied by congressional conferral 
upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental 'right' 
to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law."1 56 
Under Lujan, therefore, it appears that legislation that both 
creates legal obligations and authorizes certain individuals to enforce 
those obligations might not, without more, satisfy the requirements for 
Article III standing. In this respect, Lujan is a marked departure from 
the Court's earlier approach to standing. As Laurence Tribe notes: 
Traditionally, the Article III-based injury requirement was understood 
only to limit the ability of federal courts to confer standing in the absence 
of statute; it was not thought to limit Congress' power to designate 
categories of individuals or groups as sufficiently aggrieved by particular 
actions to warrant federal judicial intervention at their behest.157 
Lujan, however, appears to make the assessment of individualized 
"injury in fact" an inquiry undertaken somehow outside the context of 
the statutory framework governing the substance of the case.1 58 
153. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
154. Id. at 578. 
155. Id. at 573-74. 
156. Id. at 573 (emphasis in original); see id. at 576-77 (rejecting the argument that "the 
public interest in proper administration of the Jaws . . .  can be converted into an individual 
right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or, for that 
matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue"); id. at 573 n.8 
(rejecting the argument "that the Government's violation of a certain (undescribed) class of 
procedural duty satisfies the concrete-injury requirement by itself, without any showing that 
the procedural violation endangers a concrete interest of the plaintiff (apart from his interest 
in having the procedure observed)"). 
157. TRIBE, supra note 64, at 394 (footnote omitted). This traditional approach is 
exemplified in cases like Warth v. Seldin, where the Court stated that the injury required by 
Article III "may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which 
creates standing . . . .  "' 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda RS. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 
614, 617 n.3 (1973)). 
158. I acknowledge, however, that the precise ramifications of Lujan remain unclear. 
First, at least in some narrow circumstances, the Court since Lujan has been more accepting 
of Congress's role in defining legally cognizable injuries. In Federal Election Commission v. 
Akins, 524 U.S. 11 ,  13 (1998), for example, a group of voters challenged a decision of the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee was 
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Lujan's treatment of the Article III injury requirement has faced 
considerable judicial and academic criticism.159 Cass Sunstein, for 
example, has argued that the Court's approach is premised on the 
fundamentally flawed idea that there is a "prepolitical or prelegal" 
way to separate those legitimately injured in a given transaction from 
those who are mere bystanders. To the contrary, he argues, injury is 
properly understood as "a function of law, not of anything in the world 
that is independent of the legal system." 160 On this view, a statute that 
broadly prohibits false advertising and other marketplace-corrupting 
conduct, and then grants all citizens a right of action to enforce the 
not a "political committee" under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and thus was 
not subject to the Act's requirements relating to the disclosure of membership and 
contribution information. The Court held that the voters had standing to challenge the 
FEC's decision on the ground that the statute created a right to information whose violation 
constituted "injury in fact." Id. at 21. That is, the Court measured Article III injury with 
reference to a statutorily created right to information, not some "pre-legal" notion of 
individual harm. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing, 
147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 642-43 (1999) (describing Akins as taking the approach that 
"[w]hether there was injury 'in fact' depended on what had been provided 'in law,"' and 
arguing that "the principal question after Akins, for purposes of 'injury in fact,' is whether 
Congress or any other source of law gives the litigant a right to bring suit"). Applied broadly, 
this approach might seem to signal a repudiation of Lujan's conception of "injury in fact." 
But Akins did not overrule Lujan, and subsequent decisions have continued to cite Lujan as 
binding authority. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 707-09 
(2003); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). 
Thus, the precise impact of Akins on Lujan is unclear. Arguably, however, A kins may signal 
a shift in the direction of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan, which did not go so 
far as to say that assessing individualized "injury in fact" is an entirely pre-legal exercise, but 
instead simply stressed that Congress must speak clearly and carefully when creating 
enforceable legal rights: 
Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise 
to a case or controversy where none existed before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to 
suggest a contrary view. In exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very least 
identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to 
bring suit. 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Time will tell whether 
the Court adopts Justice Kennedy's approach. 
159. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Sunstein, supra note 
158, at 638 ("There now appears to be a consensus that the 'injury in fact' idea has extremely 
serious problems."); id. at 638-41 (elaborating on the doctrine's shortcomings); Sunstein, 
supra note 54, at 167 (describing "the very notion of 'injury in fact"' embraced and 
developed in Lujan as "not merely a misinterpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act 
and Article III but also a large-scale conceptual mistake," and arguing that "the injury-in­
fact requirement should be counted as a prominent contemporary version of early twentieth­
century substantive due process"). 
160. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1432, 1436 n.18 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 158, at 640 ("The legal system does not 'see' an 
injury unless some law has made it qualify as such. If this point seems obscure, it is only 
because of widespread agreement, within the legal culture, about which injuries are 'injuries 
in fact' and which are not. But the agreement comes from understandings of law, not 
understandings of fact. ") ;  id. at 641 ("'Injuries' are not some kind of Platonic form, so that 
we can distinguish, without the aid of some understanding of law, between those that exist 
'in fact' and those that do not exist 'in fact. '"). 
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prohibition, creates by legislation an interest that ought to suffice for 
purposes of Article 111.161 That is so without regard to whether the 
targeted defendant has otherwise "injured" the plaintiff bringing the 
action. By appearing to hold otherwise, Lujan and its progeny 
substantially limit Congress's ability to enlist private plaintiffs in the 
enforcement of public law.162 
This is not to say that modern standing doctrine prevents private 
plaintiffs from ever seeking the broad, institution-changing remedies 
typically associated with private attorneys general. To the contrary, as 
noted above in Part I, private attorney general litigation exists in 
federal court today in the form of the citizen suit (and also the qui tam 
action, to which I return below). Under the Court's standing 
requirements, citizen-suit plaintiffs must generally establish 
individualized "injury in fact" in order to sue. But once they show such 
injury, they may, as noted above, seek remedies extending far beyond 
their individual circumstances.163 Thus, the Court's Article III injury 
doctrine does not categorically disable all private plaintiffs from 
pursuing broad-gauged "public law litigation" in federal court. But it 
does significantly reduce the number of private individuals 
constitutionally eligible to bring such litigation, and in that respect 
circumscribes Congress's authority to choose how its laws shall be 
enforced. 
The Court has, however, recognized at least one clear exception to 
its individualized "injury in fact" requirement: qui tam litigation. As 
noted above,164 the federal False Claims Act contains a qui tam 
provision granting private individuals the authority to bring fraud 
actions on the government's behalf. Because the Act does not require 
qui tam relators to show that they have been injured by the alleged 
fraud, it might seem to run afoul of the Court's "injury in fact" 
requirement. The Court considered that argument in Vermont Agency 
of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,165 but rejected it. 
The Vermont Agency Court cited two reasons for concluding that the 
Act's qui tam provision satisfies Article III. First, it reasoned that it 
161. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 166 (arguing that standing analysis should focus on 
"whether the law . . .  has conferred on the plaintiffs a cause of action"). 
162. As Sunstein explains: 
[T]he injury-in-fact requirement should be counted as a prominent contemporary version of 
early twentieth-century substantive due process. It uses highly contestable ideas about 
political theory to invalidate congressional enactments, even though the relevant 
constitutional text and history do not call for invalidation at all. Just like its early twentieth­
century predecessor, it injects common law conceptions of harm into the Constitution. 
Id. at 167. 
163. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
165. 529 U.S. 765 (2000). 
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was possible to understand the Act as partially assigning to the relator 
claims originally belonging to the United States, and giving the relator 
a legally cognizable interest in the assignment.166 On this reasoning, 
because the United States clearly has standing to assert the fraud 
claims, that standing travels with the claims when assigned. Second, 
the Court stressed uninjured qui tam relators' long history in Anglo­
American law, and reasoned that the existence of qui tam statutes at 
the time of the Founding suggests the Framers thought they were 
consistent with Article 111.167 This second reason amounts to a carve­
out from the modern Court's "injury in fact" rules, but by itself offers 
no principled justification for the exemption. 
The existence of qui tam statutes during the Founding era strongly 
suggests that the modern Court's standing jurisprudence is at odds 
with historical practice. 168 Indeed, as Steven Winter has observed, a 
review of litigation patterns in the early years of the Republic reveals 
that federal courts regularly heard cases "astonishingly similar to the 
'standingless' public action or 'private attorney general' model that 
modern standing law is designed to thwart." 169 My goal here is not, 
however, to make out a complete indictment of the modern Court's 
166. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773-74. For further discussion of Vermont Agency's 
theory of standing, see Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and 
the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315 (2001). 
167. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 774-78. 
168. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 176 (contending that the lack of contemporaneous 
constitutional objection to early qui tam statute's is "extremely powerful evidence that 
Article III  did not impose constraints on Congress' power to grant standing to strangers"); 
Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia Took History and the Rule of Law Seriously?, 12 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 155, 160 (2001) (arguing that early qui tam statutes "give the lie 
to the Court's Article III  jurisprudence"). 
A recent article by Ann Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson argues that "the notion of 
standing is not an innovation [of the modern Court] ,  and its constitutionalization does not 
contradict a settled historical consensus about the Constitution's meaning." Ann 
Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
689, 691 (2004). Specifically, they contend that the nineteenth-century Supreme Court 
occasionally articulated ideas similar to the precepts of modern standing doctrine, and thus 
that it is not accurate to say that the modern doctrine departs from consistent, unanimous 
historical views and practices. At the same time, however, they acknowledge that "[t]he 
subsistence of qui tam actions alone might be enough to refute . . .  [the] suggestion" that 
"history compels acceptance of the modern Supreme Court's vision of standing." Id. 
Woolhandler and Nelson further acknowledge that the early qui tam statutes "undoubtedly 
support the notion that Congress could authorize private citizens to initiate and conduct 
litigation on behalf of the public," id. at 726-27, at least where the defendant is a private 
actor and not the government, id. at 727. It is that legislative authority - to empower 
private plaintiffs to enforce broad public interests against other private actors - that is 
principally at issue here. Thus, whatever the force of Woolhandler and Nelson's defense of 
modern standing doctrine as a general matter or as applied to private suits against the 
government, in the specific context of private attorney general litigation against private 
defendants, they apparently agree that history - especially the history of qui tam litigation 
- cuts against modern doctrine. 
169. Winter, supra note 40, at 1396. 
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standing doctrine. Others have already performed that task. 17 0 Rather, 
m�· aim is simply to note the effect of the Court's "injury in fact" 
decisions: with the exception of isolated pockets like informational 
standing and qui tam litigation, Lujan and its progeny have severely 
limited Congress's ability to enlist private plaintiffs in the enforcement 
of federal law. 17 1 
In contrast, the Court's Article III standing doctrine does not 
constrain government enforcement actions. Federal courts regularly 
adjudicate government enforcement actions that would lack "injury in 
fact" if brought by private plaintiffs. 172 As a formal matter, the Court 
squares such cases with its standing rules by saying the United States 
suffers Article III injury "to its sovereignty" when its laws are 
violated, even when the violation causes no concrete injury to 
anyone. 173 In other words, "generalized grievances" fall within the 
federal judicial power when brought by the United States itself, but 
not when brought by private plaintiffs. 
* * *  
Rather than viewing private attorneys general as central to the 
"realiz[ ation] [of] some of our most fundamental constitutional and 
political values,"174 the current Court has consistently chipped away at 
Congress's power to deploy them. Government enforcement, on the 
other hand, has remained largely undisturbed. Again, the underlying 
assumption - an assumption quite contrary to the basic theory of the 
private attorney general - appears to be that if an important violation 
of federal law occurs, the executive branch will attend to it directly, 
without raising any of the risks posed by private enforcement. Put 
differently, the Court seems to be suggesting that if Congress cannot 
find a way to fund effective governmental enforcement of a given 
statutory regime, then the substantive regime itself must not be very 
important.175 
The practical effect of the Court's decisions in all these areas is to 
increase the cost of enforcing broad, public-regarding federal statutes. 
170. See, e.g. , supra notes 159, 168. 
171. See Gilles, supra note 166, at 315 (noting that the Court's standing decisions over 
the past three decades have "placed unprecedented limitations upon federal legislators who 
might otherwise wish to vest private individuals with broad standing to enforce various 
laws"). 
172. See generally Hartnett, supra note 81. 
173. See Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex. rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 
771 (2000) (describing "the injury to [the United States') sovereignty arising from violation 
of its laws" as sufficient to establish "injury in fact" in government enforcement actions). 
174. Karlan, supra note 57, at 209. 
175. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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This is especially true of the Court's standing decisions. Under Lujan 
and its progeny, if Congress passes a law establishing certain 
substantive standards whose violation is unlikely to inflict 
individualized "injury in fact" on any particular party, its ability to rely 
on private plaintiffs to enforce the law is, at best, in serious doubt. 
Effective enforcement of the law in question may therefore depend on 
the appropriation of enough funds to ensure robust direct 
governmental enforcement. Such appropriations must compete with 
all the other demands on the general fisc. Of course, tradeoffs like this 
are an everyday fact of government. But by severely limiting 
Congress's discretion to rely upon private attorneys general to enforce 
federal law, the Court imposes new tradeoffs that could otherwise 
have been avoided. 
Undoubtedly, at least some of these tradeoffs will yield 
underenforcement of the substantive law at issue. Congress will not 
always be able (or willing) to appropriate enough funds to support the 
level of public enforcement that a private right of action could have 
provided. As Karlan puts it, by privileging more expensive public 
enforcement over its cheaper private counterpart, the Court 
contributes to "an ever-greater regulation-remedy gap."176 Thus, the 
Court's preference for public over private enforcement also seems to 
reflect a preference for - or at least a willingness to tolerate - less 
robust regulation. The Court's various moves against private 
enforcement, in other words, may be best understood as 
fundamentally anti-regulatory. 
B. Inapplicability of the Federal Limits in State Court 
Though dramatic, the above-described decisions constricting the 
power of private attorneys general are limited in one respect: as a 
general matter, they apply only in federal court. The Court's state 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, for example, is principally confined 
to litigation in federal tribunals.177 In addition, its attorney's fees 
decisions all involve the interpretation of federal statutes that are 
enforced mostly, if not exclusively, in federal court. The Court's 
control over the interpretation of state statutes is far more modest; it 
generally defers to state supreme courts on the proper construction of 
state law.178 
176. Karlan, supra note 57, at 208-09. 
177. The exception is Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), which held states immune 
from private state-court damages actions alleging violations of federal law, at least where the 
federal law is passed pursuant to Congress's authority under Article I of the Constitution. 
Even after Alden, however, it seems clear that the Court's state sovereign immunity 
decisions have had greater effect in the federal courts. 
178. See, e.g. , Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983) (per curiam); Landmark 
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 n.9 (1978). A famous, though 
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The Court's "injury in fact" standing decisions are similarly 
confined.179 To say that Article Ill's limitations on the "federal judicial 
power" apply only in federal court is to state a tautology. Yet there is, 
as Helen Hershkoff has observed, a tendency to discuss the Court's 
standing rules "in universal or essential terms, as if Article III courts 
represent the institutional possibilities of courts more generally. "18 0  
The point is therefore worth stressing: federal standing doctrine has no 
bearing in state court.1 81 
To be sure, federal and state courts do share certain basic features 
defining them as courts in the Anglo-American tradition. 182 
Accordingly, to the extent some aspects of federal standing doctrine 
are "founded in concern about the proper - and properly limited -
role of the courts in a democratic society," 1 83 state courts may observe 
substantively specific, exception to that rule is the Chief Justice's concurring opinion in Bush 
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111  (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). For a brief argument that the 
Bush v. Gore concurrence misconceived the Court's role in interpreting state statutes, see 
Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal 
Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 478 n.122 (2001). For an argument that the Court 
in fact has more authority to interpret state law than is often thought, see Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in 
Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003). Even on Monaghan's or the Chief 
Justice's account, however, the Supreme Court lacks the authority to set aside a state 
supreme court's interpretation of state law in cases where no federal issue is implicated by 
the interpretation. 
179. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) ("[T]he constraints of 
Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the 
limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability . . . .  "). But see 
William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudication of 
Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263 (1990) (arguing that state courts should be required 
to adhere to Article III case or controversy requirements, at least when they adjudicate 
questions of federal law). 
180. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1836 (2001). 
181. Beyond Article Ill's literal irrelevance to state court litigation, the main 
constitutional principle underlying federal standing doctrine has no necessary bearing on 
cases in state court. That principle is the separation of powers. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 752 (1984) (stating that standing doctrine is "built on a single basic idea - the idea of 
separation of powers"). The fact that the federal government is divided into three 
departments has no necessary bearing on the distribution of governmental power at the state 
level. See Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937); Dreyer v. Illinois, 
187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902). Admittedly, all states do distinguish in some measure among 
legislative, executive, and judicial power. But states need not, and often do not, adopt the 
fine points of federal separation of powers doctrine. 
182 See Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of 
Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 61 (1998) (suggesting that "the state court 
shares with the federal court the limitations that flow from its status as a court"); Fletcher, 
supra note 179, at 265, 294-302 (describing some justiciability rules as reflecting "essential 
preconditions for wise adjudication" in any court). Moreover, "several provisions of the 
original federal constitution (e.g. , the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder) 
seem to presuppose the existence of a separate state judicial system," distinct from the other 
branches of state government. Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 n.23 (1970). 
183. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
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similar rules. The Supreme Court's notion of individualized "injury in 
fact," however, is not one of those rules. As Hershkoff has detailed, it 
is commonplace for courts in many states to hear cases where there is 
no individualized "injury in fact."184 It follows, then, that the Article 
III version of injury is not necessary to our basic conception of judicial 
adjudication. 
In sum, the Court's various decisions limiting the power of private 
attorneys general are largely confined to the federal courts. The 
Court's ability to shape state court litigation is , much more modest. 
This is no accident: in "split[ting] the atom of sovereignty,"185 the 
Framers left most administration of state law and litigation to the 
states themselves. Still, the Court does retain the power to affect state 
court litigation in some respects, most significantly by enforcing the 
Constitution against the states.1 86 Thus, to the extent the Court is 
troubled by privately initiated public law litigation at both the federal 
and state level, it might look for a federal constitutional basis for 
reaching the state courts. Nike v. Kasky offered just that. 
III. A NEW CHALLENGE: THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In the previous two Parts, I described the long history of legislative 
reliance on entities we would today call private attorneys general, the 
competing policy arguments for and against private attorneys general, 
and the limitations imposed by the current Supreme Court on private 
attorneys general in the federal system. It is against that backdrop, I 
suggest, that the anti-private attorney general argument pressed in 
Nike v. Kasky is best viewed. Unable to apply the restrictions it has 
crafted at the federal level to public law litigation in state court, the 
Supreme Court might be particularly solicitous of arguments relying 
184. Hershkoff, supra note 180, at 1836-37, 1842-75 (summarizing and then discussing in 
detail certain state practices that diverge from the federal model). 
185. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 5 14 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
186. One other notable doctrinal means by which the Court affects state court litigation 
is the doctrine of preemption. Preemption does not necessarily involve privileging public 
over private enforcement, but many preemption cases do involve a federal regulatory regime 
displacing state tort law in a way that restricts private plaintiffs' litigating authority, or at 
least restricts their entitlement to recovery. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 
U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that a Department of Transportation regulation impliedly 
preempted a state tort action targeting an auto manufacturer's failure to equip its vehicles with 
airbags). Moreover, although "'the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre­
emption case," Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks Int'I 
Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)), the form of preemption known as 
implied conflict preemption turns not on strict statutory interpretation but on a judicial 
assessment of whether the state law in question "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
67 (1941). In practice, therefore, implied conflict preemption is controlled more by the courts 
than by Congress. 
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on other, less obvious constitutional theories to achieve comparable 
results. By urging the Court to adopt a First Amendment rule against 
the enforcement of speech regulations by private attorneys general, 
the Solicitor General in Nike made precisely that kind of argument. 
I begin this Part by presenting Nike as a kind of case study for 
examining this new First Amendment challenge to the private 
attorney general. Having done that, I then examine the argument 
more closely, seeking to identify the precise concerns driving it. Once I 
have done that, I will turn in the next Part to showing why the anti­
private attorney general argument is untenable under the First 
Amendment. 
A. Case Study: Nike v. Kasky 
Starting in the mid-1990s, human rights activists, journalists, and 
others accused Nike of engaging :n sweatshop labor practices -
specifically, of doing business with subcontractors that mistreated and 
underpaid workers in their Southeast Asian factories.1 87 Nike 
responded by publicly refuting these charges in a variety of media, 
including press releases, letters to newspaper editors, and letters to 
university presidents and athletic directors.188 In 1998, a labor and 
consumer activist named Marc Kasky sued Nike under the above­
described California unfair competition law (UCL), 1 89 claiming to act 
"'on behalf of the General Public of the State of California."'190 He 
alleged that Nike's responses to the sweatshop allegations contained 
false statements and material omissions of fact concerning the working 
conditions in its factories. 1 9 1  While expressly acknowledging that 
Nike's actions had caused him "'no harm or damages whatsoever," ' 1 92 
Kasky sought an order requiring Nike to "'disgorge all monies . . .  
acquired by means of any act found . . .  to be an unlawful and/or unfair 
business practice."'1 93 He also sought an injunction directing Nike to 
stop misrepresenting the working conditions in its factories and to 
187. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in the dismissal 
of the writ). 
188. See id. 
189. See supra notes 6-8, 70-79 and accompanying text. 
190. Brief for Respondent at 10, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) 
(quoting First Amended Complaint 'll'll 3, 8). 
191. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997) (prohibiting unlawful and unfair 
business practices, including "unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising"). 
192. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) 
(quoting First Amended Complaint 'lI 8). The disclaimer may have been designed in part to 
ensure the case stayed in state court. See infra note 240 and accompanying text. 
193. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002) (quoting First Amended 
Complaint). 
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correct its past false statements on the subject. 194 Nike filed a demurrer 
to the complaint, arguing Kasky's suit was barred by the First 
Amendment. 
After the case made its way through the California courts, 195 the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether 
Nike's statements were commercial speech, and, if so, whether the 
First Amendment permits subjecting Nike to strict liability for any 
false or misleading aspects of its statements. 1 96 These were difficult 
questions: the Court's precedents delineate no categorical line 
between commercial and noncommercial speech, 197 leading some to 
suggest the distinction cannot tenably be maintained at all.1 98 
In an amicus brief for the United States in support of Nike, 
the Solicitor General urged the Court to sidestep the 
194. Id. 
195 .  The California trial court granted Nike's demurrer, the intermediate appellate 
court affirmed, see Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857-63 (Cal. App. 2000), and the 
California Supreme Court reversed. That court concluded that the statements for which 
Nike had been sued constituted commercial speech and that the First Amendment tolerates 
strict liability for false commercial speech. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256-63. 
196. Nike, 539 U.S. at 657 (listing questions presented). 
197. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (stating that "the borders of the commercial speech category 
are not nearly as clear as the Court has assumed"); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (noting "the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly 
cabin commercial speech in a distinct category"); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 594 {1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The plethora of 
opinions filed in [Central Hudson] highlights the doctrinal difficulties that emerge from this 
Court's decisions granting First Amendment protection to commercial speech."). Not 
everyone is troubled by the absence of a single bright line separating commercial and 
noncommercial speech. Steven Shiffrin, for example, has suggested that "the commercial 
speech problem is in fact many problems," and that we should approach commercial speech 
questions with a greater sensitivity to the precise context of each dispute. Steven Shiffrin, 
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1216 (1983). I take no position here on the merits of 
the Court's commercial speech doctrine or any alternative approach. 
198. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) {Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I do not see a philosophical or 
historical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value' than 
'noncommercial' speech."); id. at 523 n.4 ("The degree to which these rationales truly justify 
treating 'commercial' speech differently from other speech (or indeed, whether the requisite 
distinction can even be drawn) is open to question, in my view."); see also, e.g. , Alex 
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 634-50 
(1990). Others, however, take the polar opposite view. See, e.g. , C. Edwin Baker, 
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) 
(arguing that "a complete denial of first amendment protection for commercial speech is not 
only consistent with, but is required by, first amendment theory"); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, 
Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1068 (1998) 
("Corporate political speech is antithetical to the basic principles of democratic self­
government. It should be entirely outside First Amendment protection."). For a variety of 
analyses of the commercial speech issue in the Nike case, see the contributions to 
Symposium: Nike v. Kasky and the Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine, 54 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 965 {2004). 
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commercial/noncommercial issue and to decide the case on a different 
ground. Specifically, he contended that without regard to whether the 
speech in question is commercial or noncommercial, the California 
statute violated the First Amendment by authorizing suits by 
uninjured private attorneys general.1 99 
The Solicitor General's argument proceeded in two parts. First, he 
contrasted the California statute with traditional private causes of 
action for fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit by stressing the "self­
limiting features" of the latter.200 He argued that the common law has 
long provided actions against false statements in the marketplace, but 
only where the statements induce reliance and cause actual injury. 
These requirements, he maintained, confirm that protecting 
transactional integrity and compensating those actually injured are the 
only real public interests at stake in false advertising and like cases. 
They also ensure that traditional common law actions "pose scant risk 
of impinging on First Amendment values because they do not allow 
private plaintiffs to bring lawsuits based on misrepresentations 'in the 
air,' divorced from their actual effects."2 01 The version of the 
California statute then in force, in contrast, required no showing of 
reliance or injury. As a result, it invited litigation based on mere 
"disagree[ment], as a theoretical matter, with the content or accuracy 
of the statement" in question.2 02 Such suits extend far beyond the 
government's legitimate interest in "protecting transactions and 
consumers," and "create severe First Amendment concerns, 
particularly in connection with the broad remedies that [the statute] 
affords. "203 
199. The Solicitor General argued: 
The First Amendment . . .  allows government regulation of speech that is false, deceptive, or 
misleading. It does not, however, allow States to create legal regimes in which a private party 
who has suffered no actual injury may seek redress on behalf of the public for a company's 
allegedly false and misleading statements. 
Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, Nike, Inc. v. 
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
200. Id. at 9-10. 
201. Id. at 13. 
202. Id. at 22. 
203. Id. at 22, 21.  Part of the Solicitor General's argument was inaccurate as a statutory 
matter. In developing his position, he characterized the UCL as especially problematic 
because it made disgorgement - the relinquishing of all ill-gotten gains - payable to 
private attorneys general. Id. at 22-25. Disgorgement can be strong medicine: in Nike, 
depending on how a court measured the causal connection between Nike's statements and 
its revenue stream, a disgorgement order might have captured very large sums indeed. While 
Nike was pending, however, the California Supreme Court clarified in a separate case that 
"nonrestitutionary disgorgement" - disgorgement paid to a plaintiff who was not injured by 
the defendant's actions - was not available under the version of the UCL then in force. See 
Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943-49 (Cal. 2003).  Although the 
UCL made "[a]ctual direct victims of unfair competition" eligible for restitutionary 
disgorgement, others could obtain only injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 949. Thus, the 
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More specifically, the Solicitor General contended that the 
California statute encouraged two kinds of plaintiffs. First, persons 
interested only in "the prospect of financial gain" could take 
advantage of the UCL's broad substantive coverage and lack of an 
injury requirement to sue virtually any commercial actor that makes 
public statements.204 Such suits delivered financial rewards either in 
the form of disgorgement orders (where available) or through 
settlements with deep-pocketed defendants. Second, the UCL 
empowered plaintiffs "motivated, not by the need to redress for actual 
harm, but rather by disagreement with the speaker's policies, 
practices, or points of view."205 These two cases correspond to the two 
archetypal descriptions of the private attorney general, discussed 
above in Part I: the "mercenary law enforcer" and the "social 
advocate."206 As a general matter, these characterizations do little to 
undermine the legitimacy of the private attorney general. In the 
special context of speech regulation, however, the Solicitor General 
argued that empowering such plaintiffs could deter commercial 
entities from speaking out on matters of broad public concern.207 
Although not specifically cited by the Solicitor General, anecdotal 
evidence arguably supported his charge. In 2003, for example, the 
press reported that a number of plaintiffs' attorneys had been abusing 
the UCL by suing small retailers solely to obtain nuisance 
settlements.208 One strategy was to file complaints accusing the 
plaintiff in Nike was not eligible for disgorgement. The Solicitor General's mistake on this 
point underscores the perils of asking the Supreme Court to entertain a constitutional 
challenge to a state law before the state's own courts have had an opportunity to consider 
the challenge and to decide whether to resolve - or at least shape - the issue by construing 
the statute narrowly. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959) ("(N]o principle has 
found more consistent or clear expression than that the federal courts should not adjudicate 
the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to interpretation until the state courts 
have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass upon them."). That said, the Solicitor 
General's error in Nike was specific to the California UCL, and a differently minded 
legislature might make disgorgement available to uninjured private attorneys gene'ral. 
Accordingly, nothing in my argument here depends on disgorgement not being available to 
private attorneys general like Marc Kasky. 
204. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Nike 
(No. 02-575). 
205. Id. 
206. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (quoting Garth et al., supra note 2, 
at 356). 
207. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25-26, Nike 
(No. 02-575) ("The potential for massive monetary liability for past statements may cause 
even a company of Nike's size to refrain from presenting its side of the story, or to do so only 
in vague - and far less informative - generalities."). 
208. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Consumer-Protection Law Abused in Legal Shakedown, 
L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2003; Editorial, Legalized Extortion: Consumer Law Needs Fixing, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 28, 2003; Walter Olson, The Shakedown State, WALL ST. J., July 22, 
2003, at AlO. 
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defendants of violating obscure or even nonexistent regulatory 
provlSlons, omitting (because not required by the statute) any 
allegation of injury.209 The complaints would seek relief under the 
UCL, relying on its reference to "unlawful" and "unfair" business 
practices to incorporate violations of regulations that themselves 
create no independent cause of action.21 0 Shortly after filing a 
complaint, the plaintiffs' attorneys would contact the defendant and 
offer a quick settlement, warning that the price would increase if 
acceptance were delayed.2 1 1  To be sure, these highly publicized 
instances of UCL abuse did not directly involve speech. But it is easy 
to imagine an unscrupulous plaintiff invoking the open-ended 
language of the UCL or a similarly structured statute to target 
"misleading" aspects of a corporation's advertising campaign, all in an 
effort to leverage a quick settlement from a defendant eager to avoid 
trial. Indeed, some described Nike v. Kasky in those very terms. 
To bolster his position, the Solicitor General invoked the Supreme 
Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.212 Gertz addressed the 
extent to which the First Amendment protects publishers from 
defamation actions by private citizens. The Court allowed that 
defamation cases implicate a "[strong and] legitimate state interest in 
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation," 
but stressed that this interest "extends no further than compensation 
for actual injury."2 13 Accordingly, the Court held that the First 
Amendment prohibits recovery for "presumed or punitive damages" 
- i.e., damages not compensating proven injuries - unless the 
plaintiff establishes that the defendant knew the statements were false 
209. For example, UCL actions against a number of nail salons alleged that the salons 
"violated rules of the Board of Barbering and Cosmetology by using the same bottle of nail 
polish for two or more customers." Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of 
California, Attorney General Lockyer Files Second Action to Fight Abuse of Consumer 
Protection Law (July 8, 2003), available at http:/lcaag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2003/03-085.htm 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Attorney General Files Second Action]. Such conduct 
does not, in fact, violate applicable regulations, but the lawsuits intimidated many salons into 
paying anyway. See Legalized Extortion: Consumer Law Needs Fixing, supra note 208. 
210. See, e.g., Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Ma·tin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003) 
("Section 17200 'borrows' violations from other laws by making them independently 
actionable as unfair competitive practices."). 
211. See Attorney General Files Second Action, supra note 209; Olson, supra note 208. 
Such tactics do not necessarily go unpunished. In May 2003, for example, the press reported 
that a number of attorneys had been suspended from the State Bar after being accused of 
UCL abuse along the lines described in text. See Legalized Extortion: Consumer Law Needs 
Fixing, supra note 208. Those proceedings were resolved when the attorneys resigned from 
the Bar, but the California Attorney General continued to press enforcement actions (under, 
ironically enough, the UCL itself) against them and other attorneys accused of similar 
practices. See Jeff Chorney, Trio at Center of 1 7200 Storm Resigns from Bar: Trevor Law 
Group Lawyers' Move Ends Bar Case, But AG's Continues, RECORDER, July 1 1 ,  2003, at 1 .  
212.  418 U.S.  323 (1974). 
213. Id. at 348-49. 
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or exhibited a reckless disregard for the truth.214 Analogizing from 
Gertz, the Solicitor General in Nike argued that the California statute 
offended the First Amendment because it lacked the injury and 
remedy limitations that Gertz imposed on the law of defamation.215 In 
so doing, he suggested that the Gertz Court's account of defamation 
reflected not just the specific dimensions of that particular cause of 
action, but rather the limited nature of the public interests served by 
any privately initiated litigation implicating free speech values.2 16 On 
this view, private suits enforcing speech restrictions are justifiable only 
to the extent they seek compensation for direct injury. 
Having assailed the private enforcement provision in the 
California law, the Solicitor General then asserted in the second main 
part of his argument that a substantively identical statute would raise 
no First Amendment problems if it were enforceable only by the 
government. 2 1 7  Here the Solicitor General focused on actions initiated 
by the Federal Trade Commission, while also referring to comparable 
litigation at the state level. The FTC, he observed, is empowered by 
statute to target " [u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce," including false advertising.2 18 Injury need not be shown. 
Thus, the FTC could "bring an action against, for example, a coffee 
grower that represented that it employed rain-forest-protective 
practices or a tuna producer that represented its tuna as 'dolphin safe' 
if, in fact, those representations were false," without regard to whether 
the representations caused actual injury.2 1 9  Moreover, the remedies 
214. Id. at 349; see id. at 350 (observing that "jury discretion to award punitive damages 
unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship," and that "punitive damages 
are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private 
defamation actions" because " [t)hey are not compensation for injury"). 
215. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12-13, 21-
22, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
216. See, e.g. , id. at 22 ("[H)ere, as in Gertz, the state interest in providing a remedy in 
private litigation generally 'extends no further than compensation for actual injury."') 
(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349). 
217. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14-20, 23, 
Nike (No. 02-575). 
218. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2001);  see 15 U.S.C. § 52 (2001 ) .  
219. Brief for the United States as  Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at  28, Nike 
(No. 02-575). Under the Solicitor General's approach, it seems that the allegedly false 
statements at issue in Nike would be subject to ITC enforcement. The Solicitor General 
stressed that a company's statements, "if false, may be actionable [by the ITC] even if they 
appeared in the context of advertisements addressing a matter of public concern." Id. at 28 
n.13. For an argument that the process by which a product is made is a legitimate matter of 
consumer and regulatory concern, see Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The 
Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118  HARV. L. REV. 525 
(2005). 
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available in such an action would include not only injunctive relief but 
also disgorgement.220 
Government enforcement of the FTC Act thus covers just as much 
substantive ground as private enforcement of California's UCL, and 
its remedial reach extends even further. According to the Solicitor 
General, however, direct government enforcement of this kind has 
"inherent safeguards" that ensure compliance with First Amendment 
values.22 1 In particular, he stressed government officials' political 
accountability and their obligation to bring only those enforcement 
actions that "represent the best use of public resources."222 Private 
plaintiffs, in contrast, face no institutional constraints or public 
duties.223 Rather, their interest is solely in obtaining favorable 
outcomes in their individual cases. A system driven by such 
motivations, the Solicitor General asserted, imposes intolerable 
burdens not only on individual defendants but also on the judicial 
system generally.224 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to reach the merits in 
Nike. Instead, it dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted, apparently concluding that review should never have been 
granted in the case. 225 Yet there is reason to think that at least some 
members of the Court may be receptive to the Solicitor General's 
argument in some future case. Most significant in this regard is Justice 
Breyer's opinion dissenting from the dismissal.226 With Justice 
O'Connor joining him, Justice Breyer expressed apparent support for 
a First Amendment distinction between private and public 
enforcement, warning that "a private 'false advertising' action brought 
on behalf of the State, by one who has suffered no injury, threatens to 
impose a serious burden upon speech."227 He found it particularly 
worrisome that the statute permitted suits by "purely ideological 
220. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17, Nike 
(No. 02-575) (citing, inter alia, FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Gem 
Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996); FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 
1994)). 
221. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15, Nike 
(No. 02-575). 
222 Id. at 18. 
223. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 22, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-
575) (arguing that private attorneys general suing under the UCL have no "public duty"). 
224. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19-20, Nike 
(No. 02-575) (citing Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 
1973)). 
225. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
226. See id. at 665-85. Justice Kennedy also dissented from the dismissal, but in a 
separate one-sentence statement containing no substantive discussion. See id. at 665. 
227. Id. at 679. 
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plaintiff[s]."228 In his view, plaintiffs motivated by ideological concerns 
are likely to abuse their litigating authority, whereas more 
conventional public enforcement regimes are constrained by the "legal 
and practical checks that tend to keep the energies of public 
enforcement agencies focused upon more purely economic harm. "229 
To guard against abusive private enforcement, Justice Breyer 
suggested the First Amendment should "limit[] the scope of private 
attorney general actions to circumstances where more purely 
commercial and less public-debate-oriented elements predominate."230 
But the Court did not take that route. Instead, it simply dismissed 
the writ and remanded the case to the California courts for trial. Just 
over two months after the remand, the case settled.231 The parties 
announced that Nike would contribute a modest $1.5 million to a fair 
labor organization, but beyond that the terms of the settlement were 
not disclosed.232 Nike v. Kasky ended quietly. 
Since then, however, the California voters have taken matters into 
their own hands. In November 2004, the voters passed a ballot 
initiative substantially amending the UCL's private attorney general 
provisions.233 The amendments did not touch the substantive reach of 
the UCL, but instead provided that, in order to bring a private 
attorney general action under the statute, a plaintiff must have 
"suffered injury in fact and [have] lost money or property as a result of 
[the defendant's] unfair competition."234 A private plaintiff who 
satisfies that injury requirement and who also meets California's 
separate requirements for class action representation may still seek 
broad injunctive and other relief in the public interest,235 but the 
uninjured private attorney general is apparently a thing of the past in 
California. The campaign in favor of these changes highlighted 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 681. In addition to Justice Breyer's dissent from the dismissal, Justice Stevens 
filed an opinion concurring in the Court's action. See id. at 654-65. Without taking a position 
on the merits of the Solicitor General's argument, he stated that the question whether the 
First Amendment should distinguish between public and private enforcement is "difficult 
and important," and "would benefit from further development below." Id. at 664 n.5. 
Justices Ginsburg and Souter joined Justice Stevens on that point. 
231. See Nike Settles Suit by California Activist Over Statements on Working Conditions, 
72 U.S. L. WK. 2160 (2003). 
232. Id. 
233. See http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov04/prop_64_text_of_proposed_law.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2004) (setting forth the text of Proposition 64, the ballot initiative in 
question); http://vote2004.ss.ca.gov/Retums/prop/OO.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2004) (noting 
the passage of Proposition 64 ). 
234. Http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov04/prop_64_text_of_proposed_law.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2004) (Sections 2 and 3, amending Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203-04). 
235. See id. 
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instances of UCL abuse such as those described above.236 But 
supporters of the changes also invoked the First Amendment, relying 
in particular on Justice Breyer's Nike opinion for the proposition that 
the law in its current form threatened free speech.237 In this way, 
although Nike ended inconclusively, the Solicitor General's argument 
helped support a statutory change very much in keeping with the 
constitutional rule he urged on the Court. 
* * *  
Not only did Nike apparently help spur statutory change in 
California, it also brought to the fore a new challenge to any 
jurisdiction's reliance on private attorneys general to enforce speech­
related regulations. That challenge can be boiled down to a few key 
contentions. First, laws authorizing private attorney general actions in 
the absence of injury go beyond the legitimate state interest in 
remedying actual harm to individual plaintiffs. Second, the substantive 
breadth of a law like the California UCL, coupled with the absence of 
an injury requirement, makes commercial speakers easy targets for 
suit. As a result, such laws threaten to chill commercial speech, 
especially when the topic is one of broad public concern. Third, public 
officials charged with enforcing speech-related regulations are subject 
to a variety of institutional constraints that ensure restraint and 
consistency, so that public enforcement does not raise the First 
Amendment concerns presented by private enforcement. Taken 
together, these contentions form an argument worth contemplating, 
especially on the assumption that the Court will return to the issue at 
some point in the future. 
B. Unpacking the Argument 
This Section parses the First Amendment argument against private 
attorneys general and seeks to identify its fundamental motivating 
concerns. My basic contention here is that, to be most effective, the 
First Amendment opposition to private attorneys general must be 
concerned not just with the plaintiff's lack of individualized injury, but 
with the broad, institution-changing remedies available in private 
attorney general litigation. I also assert that the Solicitor General's 
narrow description of the governmental interest in consumer 
protection is both inaccurate and unnecessary to the main thrust of his 
First Amendment argument. 
236. See supra notes 208-211  and accompanying text. 
237. See, e.g., John H. Sullivan, Proposition 64: A Good Fix or a Disaster? JO Reasons 
Lawyers Should Vote Yes, CAL. B.J., Oct. 2004, at 8. 
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1 .  Injury 
As presented in Nike, the argument for an injury requirement in 
private enforcement actions is largely instrumental: by limiting who 
may sue to enforce the statute in question, the goal is to minimize the 
statute's impact on speech. But if that is the goal, an injury 
requirement alone may often be inadequate because injury will be too 
easy to establish. In Nike, for example, a plaintiff stating that he had 
purchased a pair of Nike shoes in part because he believed Nike's 
public statements about its high labor standards could probably rely 
on the purchase to show injury.238 Or, to borrow an example offered by 
the Solicitor General, purchasing a single can of tuna would likely 
suffice to support a suit challenging the seller's claims that its practices 
are "dolphin safe."239 In an American economy marked by large-scale 
production, mass marketing, and product ubiquity, the number of 
potential plaintiffs who can establish "injury" on the basis of a single 
product purchase or similar low-cost, commonplace activity is surely 
very large. Indeed, in consumer protection cases like Nike the greater 
challenge may be in identifying potential plaintiffs who have not 
suffered any concrete injury as a result of the defendant's allegedly 
false or misleading statements.24 0 In short, in at least some areas of the 
238. Justice Breyer made this point during oral argument: 
QUESTION: What will happen is, they'll find in 5 minutes somebody who bought some 
Nike shoes who feels the same way, you know, so you'll just have this exact suit with a 
different plaintiff. possibly, or maybe Mr. Kasky once bought some, for all I know, and -
and so that isn't really going to help, is it? 
GENERAL OLSON: Yes, it is, Justice Breyer. It will limit . . .  the regulation of marketplace 
speech to the traditional patterns and the regimes that have existed -
Tr. of Oral Argument at 24, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
239. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing the example). 
240. This last point suggests a more tangible effect of requiring state private attorneys 
general to show injury: satisfaction of federal jurisdictional requirements. If the parties were 
of diverse citizenship, and if the alleged injury put more than $75,000 in issue, then the 
articulation of injury would satisfy not only the Article III injury requirement, but also the 
statutory elements of federal diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000). Granted, 
a single purchase of a pair of Nike shoes might not be able to satisfy those requirements, as 
the purchase would not meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy threshold for diversity 
actions. But if the plaintiff sought injunctive relief, and if the value of his claim was 
determined by measuring the cost to the defendant of complying with the injunction, the 
threshold could easily be met. (The Supreme Court has never conclusively decided whether 
this method of measuring the amount in controversy is permissible, but some lower courts 
allow it. See generally 148 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3703, at 121-25 (3d ed. 1998).) Alternatively, if a "socially conscious" shoe 
retailer were to sue its supplier Nike on the same theory relied upon by Marc Kasky, the 
dollar figure could easily exceed $75,000 even if measured purely in terms of the plaintiffs 
injury. With the jurisdictional minimum thus met, and provided Nike and the plaintiff were 
of diverse citizenship (with Nike being from out of state), Nike could remove the case to 
federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441("a)-(b) (2000). 
The possibility of removal could substantially affect the parties' litigating positions: 
empirical evidence suggests that parties do better when litigating in their chosen forum. See 
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law, merely requiring injury may do little to "rein in" ideologically and 
financially motivated plaintiffs with little "real" connection to the 
case. 
Does this mean that the California voters engaged in a fruitless 
exercise when they voted to add an injury requirement to the 
California UCL? Not necessarily. Support for the ballot initiative was 
based in large part on concerns independent of the First Amendment 
- that unscrupulous plaintiffs' lawyers were using the UCL to file 
"shakedown" suits premised on trial technicalities incapable of 
causing any actual injuries. Obviously, an injury requirement could 
help address those abuses. It could provide a significant filer in other 
areas as well. For example, a conventional injury requirement would 
have substantially narrowed private enforcement under Dworkin and 
MacKinnon's anti-pornography ordinance.241 But in cases like Nike -
that is, in cases of misleading advertising or other sanctionable speech 
by a large corporate defendant - an injury requirement alone may 
well have relatively little effect. This suggests that an argument 
seeking to target the full power of the private attorney general must 
lie elsewhere. 
2. Remedy 
Closer examination suggests that the core of the private attorney 
general's power - and, therefore, the place where opposition must 
focus to be most effective - is a matter of remedy, not injury. The 
question of injury and the question of remedy are distinct.242 Even in 
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything 
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 606-
07 (1998) (discussing empirical evidence establishing that choice of forum between state and 
federal court affects case outcomes, and that removal to federal court favors the defendant). 
Indeed, Clermont and Eisenberg calculate that removal in diversity cases reduces the 
plaintiff's chances of prevailing by about one-fifth. Id. at 606-07 & n.81. And although their 
study analyzes only cases brought to final judgment, the "removal effect" undoubtedly 
influences settlement activity as well. Since removal enhances the defendant's prospects at 
trial, its settlement position will be stronger when the case has been removed. See id. at 599 
("After removal . . . the parties will settle or litigate subject to the real or perceived 
differences of the federal forum."). See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) 
(explaining that the settlement process in civil divorce litigation internalizes the governing 
law). The availability of removal, in other words, decreases a claim's value. 
Defendants like Nike might well be grateful for the litigating advantage bestowed by a 
law that creates removal opportunities of this sort. But the First Amendment argument 
against private attorneys general has not been made in forum selection terms, and I see no 
persuasive reason for construing the First Amendment to contain any categorical preference 
as to forum. Thus, this side effect, though potentially significant as a practical matter, is just 
that: a side effect with no bearing one way or the other on the First Amendment question. 
241. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
242. See generally Fallon, supra note 33, at 36-43 (stressing the importance of the 
distinction between justiciability issues and remedial issues). 
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federal cases, where the plaintiff must allege not just injury but "injury 
in fact," remedy and injury need not be coterminous. Injury-remedy 
parity is especially unlikely, moreover, where the plaintiff seeks an 
injunction against a large institutional defendant. Of course, the 
equitable nature of injunctive relief means that its availability is in part 
a matter of judicial discretion.243 The point here, however, is simply to 
observe that injunctive remedies, when granted, may reach far beyond 
the plaintiff in a particular case.244 
In this sense, and as suggested in Part I,245 the real power in a 
private attorney general statute lies in the remedies it authorizes, not 
the absence of injury it excuses. Indeed, although the recent California 
ballot initiative targeted the absence of an injury requirement in the 
UCL while leaving its broad remedial provisions intact (provided the 
injured plaintiff can satisfy California's apparently modest class action 
requirements), those truly worried about the law's potential to chill 
speech should be concerned at least as much, if not more, about 
remedy.246 To put the point in Nike terms, the concern is not so much 
with ensuring that plaintiffs like Marc Kasky establish injury when 
they sue for false advertising and/or unfair competition. Rather, it is 
with limiting Kasky's ability, injured or not, to obtain a judicial order 
directing Nike to alter or abandon certain advertising campaigns, to 
issue public statements correcting errors in its past advertisements, 
243. See, e.g. , Boomer v. At!. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 874 (N.Y. 1970) (approving 
the award of money damages instead of an injunction to successful plaintiffs in a nuisance 
action, even though an injunction is the ordinary remedy for nuisance, in part because the 
cost to the defendant of complying with an injunction would far exceed the plaintiffs' 
economic injuries); cf Jaffe, supra note 38, at 1274 ("The English tradition of locus standi in 
prohibition and certiorari is that 'a stranger' has standing, but relief in suits by strangers is 
discretionary."). 
244. The same is true, of course, of punitive damages, even under the Supreme Court's 
new due process-based limitations on such awards. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
Catherine Sharkey has recently offered a persuasive argument for conceptualizing punitive 
damages as compensatory "societal damages" - i.e. , as aimed not at punishing the 
defendant in a retributive sense, but at redressing "widespread harms caused by the 
defendant, harms that reach far beyond the individual plaintiff before the court." Sharkey, 
supra note 66, at 389. On that view, punitive damages should probably be considered a tool 
of the private attorney general. 
245. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
246. Although much of the Solicitor General's argument in Nike was formally phrased 
in terms of injury, he repeatedly expressed concerns sounding more in matters of remedy. 
See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21, Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (stating that the First Amendment concerns 
raised by California's UCL were particularly acute in light of the "broad remedies that (it] 
affords"); id. at 22-23 (stating, on the basis of what turned out to be a misconstruction of the 
statute, that Kasky's suit "poses a particular prospect for chilling speech because California 
law appears to allow private parties to obtain substantial monetary awards based on no more 
than a threshold showing of materiality"); id. at 23 (criticizing "California's broad license to 
'private attorneys general'"). 
February 2005] Private Attorneys General 643 
and potentially even to disgorge all profits traceable to those past 
advertisements.247 
The likelihood that remedy is at the heart of the concern is 
confirmed by the analogy, suggested by the Solicitor General in Nike, 
to Gertz.248 As noted above, Gertz held that the public interest in 
"compensating private individuals for injury to reputation" was 
sufficient for a defamation action to withstand First Amendment 
challenge, but only to the extent the action sought "compensation for 
actual injury."249 Accordingly, punitive damages are generally 
unavailable in defamation actions, as they go beyond compensation 
for individualized harm.250 In the same vein, broad injunctive relief 
against the speaker is also strongly disfavored, at least to the extent 
the injunction would cover speech not yet specifically adjudged to fall 
outside the First Amendment's protections.25 1 It is this remedial point 
that the Solicitor General endeavored to make by likening Nike to 
Gertz. That is, he cited Gertz not simply to argue that private plaintiffs 
must show injury, but to establish that the plaintiff's remedies should 
be confined to compensation for actual injury. On this view, even if 
Marc Kasky had alleged injury when he sued Nike, the broad 
injunctive relief he sought should have been unavailable. Rather, he 
should have stood to gain nothing more than compensation for his 
economic loss - potentially, the mere price of his running shoes. 
That, it appears, is the gravamen of the argument pressed by the 
Solicitor General and endorsed by Justice Breyer in Nike: that the 
state interest in the private enforcement of speech-related regulations 
247. See supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text (discussing remedies sought in 
Nike); supra note 203 (discussing disgorgement under the California UCL). 
248. See supra notes 212-216 and accompanying text. 
249. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974). 
250. Id. at 350. Gertz does allow punitive damages in cases where the plaintiff 
establishes that the defendant speaker knew its statements were false or exhibited a reckless 
disregard for their truth or falsity. Id. at 349. 
251 .  An injunction running against future speech whose constitutional status has not yet 
been ascertained would amount to a prior restraint. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 
718, 720 (1931) (noting the "deep-seated conviction" that certain "previous restraints upon 
publication[]" would violate the First Amendment, and stating that "[s]ubsequent 
punishment" for libelous statements falling outside the First Amendment's protections "is 
the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege"); see also New York Times 
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (refusing to enjoin publication of the Pentagon 
Papers, and stressing the Court's tendency to regard such prior restraints with strong 
disfavor). For a case closer to the context of the present inquiry, see Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 
542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), vacating an FTC order banning, without regard to context, a 
company's use of the phrase "instant tax refund" in its advertisements. As the Third Circuit 
explained, the FTC, "like any governmental agency, must start from the premise that any 
prior restraint is suspect, and that a remedy, even for deceptive advertising, can go no 
further than is necessary for the elimination of the deception." Id. at 620. On the prior 
restraint doctrine generally, see Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The 
Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981). 
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extends only to remedies that compensate the plaintiff for actual 
injuries. 
3. State Interests 
It is one thing to argue that the First Amendment disfavors 
privately enforced remedies extending beyond compensation for 
discrete individual injuries; it is quite another to assert, as the Solicitor 
General did in parts of his Nike brief, that the state has no interest in 
privately enforced remedies extending beyond such compensation. As 
a categorical assertion, the latter cannot be squared with the long 
history, discussed above in Part I, of what is today called public law 
litigation. Of course, not all laws are designed to pursue broad public 
purposes; some are aimed at securing narrow private rights. But in 
areas where the legislature does seek to pursue the public welfare 
broadly defined, it is an established practice to use private plaintiffs as 
a means to that end. 
This point exposes the flaws in the Solicitor General's claim that in 
Nike, "as in Gertz, the state interest in providing a remedy in private 
litigation generally 'extends no further than compensation for actual 
injury."'252 This claim simply overlooks the fact that the state interests 
served by the law of defamation are typically different, and narrower, 
than the interests served by the law of consumer protection. The Gertz 
Court's account of the injury-compensating state interest in 
defamation law253 was a comment about the specific aims of that area 
of law as legislatures and common law courts have typically defined 
it.254 In other fields, including consumer protection, legislatures seek to 
advance broader interests. As the Solicitor General himself stated in 
Nike, "the government has a responsibility [under consumer 
protection laws] to prevent deceptive and fraudulent practices from 
252. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22, Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349). 
253. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-49. 
254. Even on that point, the Court's account of defamation law is best understood as a 
descriptive statement, not a rule of logical or doctrinal necessity. A legislature could, if it 
wanted, replace the common law of defamation with a broader, prophylactic statute aimed 
principally at preventing defamation from occurring in the first place. Cf Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) ("False statements of fact harm both the subject of 
the falsehood and the readers of the statement. New Hampshire may rightly employ its libel 
laws to discourage the deception of its citizens."). A First Amendment challenge to such a 
law might well prevail, but not for the precise reasons stated in Gertz. Were a legislature to 
define a broader set of state interests and further them with a more far-reaching defamation 
law, it would not be open to the Court to hold that the only state interest at stake was in 
compensating for actual injuries. The legislature itself would have provided otherwise. The 
Court could, however, conclude that the broader statute simply intruded too much on First 
Amendment values, and strike it down on those grounds. As discussed in Part IV, the critical 
point for purposes of this Article is that such a conclusion would have to be based on the 
substantive reach of the statute, not the identity of the party invoking it. 
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causing injury . . .  without regard to whether any person has relied on 
the misrepresentations or has yet been injured thereby. " 255 The state 
interest in consumer protection laws, in other words, is to pursue 
marketplace fairness and integrity by preventing false advertising and 
similar conduct from happening in the first place.256 That is what 
defeats the Solicitor General's Gertz analogy: legislatures create 
consumer protection regimes to pursue a broader range of public 
interests than those typically served by the private law of defamation. 
To the extent the Solicitor General would respond by asserting 
that the public interest in marketplace integrity extends only to direct 
government enforcement, his argument would simply ignore the 
private attorney general's long history, discussed above.257 This is not 
to say that all privately enforced speech regulations necessarily pass 
constitutional muster. Rather, it is to say that if such a regime is 
unconstitutional, it is not because of some categorical limitation on the 
public interests served by private enforcement. Put another way, the 
private attorney general's long history establishes that private 
enforcement of a broad remedial regime is not necessarily ultra vires. 
Once a legislature decides to pursue a certain set of substantive 
interests, it is, as a general matter, well within its prerogative to enlist 
private plaintiffs in the effort. 
Thus, although the Solicitor General in Nike at times appeared to 
contend that a private attorney general provision necessarily exceeds 
the state interest in regulating certain speech, that claim is not 
persuasive. The stronger case focuses on the individual right side of 
the scales, not the state interest side. It stresses that, whatever the 
state interest at issue, placing broad remedial authority in the hands of 
thousands or even millions of private attorneys general intrudes too 
much on the free speech rights of those subject to the underlying 
statute. Putting this point together with the call for reposing greater 
trust in public enforcement, the argument is that laws permitting 
private plaintiffs to seek broad speech-regulating remedies violate the 
First Amendment, while substantively identical laws authorizing only 
public enforcement do not. 
255. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17, Nike 
(No. 02-575). 
256. See Fellmeth, supra note 78, at 267 (arguing, in general defense of private 
enforcement of the California UCL, that "modern marketing allows substantial damage and 
unjust enrichment through the mass application of deception or unfair competition, and . . .  
society has a strong stake in an inherently fair marketplace, and in effective means to draw 
and enforce lines of behavior"). 
257. See supra Part I.A. 
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IV. ENFORCEMENT MODELS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In this Part, I turn directly to the assertion that the First 
Amendment should distinguish between private and public 
enforcement of laws implicating speech, and argue that such a 
distinction is untenable. To do so, I begin on the private enforcement 
side, and endeavor to specify the nature of the First Amendment 
argument against the private attorney general. The object in the 
opening section is not to agree or disagree with the substance of the 
argument, but rather to translate it into the language of the First 
Amendment so that we can understand its precise claims. As I explain, 
this translation reveals that the argument sounds principally in the 
doctrine of "overbreadth," as its main thrust is that private attorney 
general provisions have an intolerable chilling effect on protected 
speech. 
With that exposition accomplished, the next section moves to the 
public enforcement side and examines the suggestion that the 
government's proper exercise of enforcement discretion can alleviate 
any free speech concerns that would otherwise arise from the face of 
the statute. My argument is simply stated: appeals to government 
discretion cannot cure a statute's First Amendment infirmities. 
Accordingly, if a particular speech-related regulation is facially 
unconstitutional when enforced by private actors, it would remain 
unconstitutional if enforced by the government alone. The First 
Amendment should draw no categorical distinction between public 
and private enforcement. 
I would stress here that I do not argue that the substantive portion 
of the California unfair competition law or any other statute is 
necessarily consistent with the First Amendment. The California 
statute may intrude too far on the free speech rights of commercial 
speakers; it may be entirely consistent with the best understanding of 
the First Amendment. I take no position on that issue. Rather, I argue 
simply that the constitutionality of a statute's substance should not 
depend on the identity of the party enforcing it, and certainly should 
not turn on a categorical distinction between private and public 
enforcement. To conclude otherwise, I suggest, would be to turn the 
First Amendment on its head. 
A. Overbreadth 
As detailed above,258 the public/private distinction pressed in 
Nike. is premised on an argument of facial unconstitutionality.259 
258. See supra notes 1 99-224 and accompanying text. 
259. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, Nike (No. 
02-575) ("The First Amendment prohibits states from empowering private persons who have 
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Specifically, the assertion is that by permitting private actions in the 
absence of injury, and especially by making broad equitable remedies 
available in such actions, laws like the California UCL "chill[] the 
scope of public debate and the free flow of useful information."260 My 
aim in this Section is to parse this assertion so that we may know the 
precise nature of the "chilling harm" at issue. 
When a court examines whether a particular statute is facially 
invalid because it chills too much speech, the analysis typically 
proceeds under the doctrine of overbreadth. The public/private 
distinction proposed in Nike was not explicitly articulated in 
overbreadth terms, but the distinction's emphasis on the facially 
chilling effects of the California statute suggests that its doctrinal roots 
lie there. Accordingly, assessing the proposed public/private 
distinction must begin with overbreadth doctrine.261 
suffered no harm to seek judicial relief for allegedly false statements."); id. (arguing that the 
First Amendment bars "legal regimes in which a private party who has suffered no actual 
injury may seek redress on behalf of the public for a company's allegedly false and 
misleading statements"). 
260. Id. at 21. On the "chilling effect" generally, see Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and 
the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978). 
261. One problem with thinking of the Solicitor General's argument in Nike as asserting 
overbreadth is that overbreadth doctrine does not apply to laws regulating commercial 
speech. See Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496-97 
(1982) ("[I]t is irrelevant whether the ordinance has an overbroad scope encompassing 
protected commercial speech of other persons, because the overbreadth doctrine does not 
apply to commercial speech."). Protection against overbreadth is unnecessary, the Supreme 
Court has reasoned, because the profit motive driving commercial speech is thought to 
render it more "hardy" and less subject to chill. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 
381 (1977) ("Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such 
speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation."). Moreover, the 
Court has suggested that commercial speakers, especially advertisers, are well situated to 
know whether their expression is true (and thus constitutionally protected), and, if so, to 
proceed with the confidence that they are immune from liability. See Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) ("The 
truth of commercial speech . . .  may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us 
say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to 
disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself provides and 
presumably knows more about than anyone else."). The Court's reasoning on these two 
points has been heavily criticized in the academic literature. See Daniel A. Farber, 
Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 385-86 (1979); 
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 633 (1982); Shiffrin, 
supra note 197, at 1218. But the Court has not yet retreated from its position, and thus 
overbreadth analysis remains inapplicable to commercial speech. Accordingly, if the 
argument against the California law's private attorney general provision were heard to 
sound in overbreadth, it would likely fail. 
For two reasons, however, I do not press overbreadth's inapplicability here. First, one of 
the principal questions presented in Nike was whether the expression at issue was properly 
deemed commercial speech. Nike urged the Court to adopt a fairly narrow definition of 
commercial speech, under which most, if not all, of its challenged statements would be 
deemed noncommercial. It would be rather unfair, then, to dismiss the Solicitor General's 
argument by calling the speech at issue commercial, when doing so would assume an answer 
to one of the questions upon which the case arguably turned. Second, the public/private First 
Amendment distinction urged by the Solicitor General need not be confined to commercial 
speech. In any area where expression or expressive conduct is regulated - for example, 
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As Laurence Tribe has explained, overbreadth analysis typically 
"compares the statutory line defining burdened and unburdened 
conduct with the judicial line specifying activities protected and 
unprotected by the first amendment; if the statutory line includes 
conduct which the judicial line protects, the statute is overbroad and 
becomes eligible for invalidation on that ground."262 A statute is not 
impermissibly overbroad, however, simply by being marginally 
overinclusive. Rather, the overbreadth must be "substantial."263 If a 
party challenging a law on First Amendment grounds shows that it 
prohibits a "'substantial' amount of protected free speech, 'judged in 
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep,'" that showing 
"suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law, 'until and unless a 
limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove 
the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected 
expression.' "264 
pornography, as regulated by Dworkin and MacKinnon's anti-pornography ordinance 
discussed above - the legislature could elect to commission private actors in the 
enforcement of the regulation. In such circumstances, the overbreadth doctrine would apply. 
Thus, in the interest of conducting the analysis at a broader level of generality, I do not here 
rely upon the overbreadth doctrine's inapplicability to commercial speech. 
262. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-27, at 1022 (2d ed. 
1988) (emphasis in original). There is a considerable scholarly debate over whether the 
overbreadth rule is best understood as allowing litigants to assert the rights of third parties 
or as confirming each litigant's own right to be judged according to a constitutionally valid 
rule. The essential literature on the subject includes Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to 
State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense 
of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial 
Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 369 (1998); and Henry P. 
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1. The Court generally takes the former view. 
See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985) ("[A]n individual whose 
own speech or expressive conduct may validly be prohibited or sanctioned is permitted to 
challenge a statute on its face because it also threatens others not before the court - those 
who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so 
rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid."); 
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 555 (1993) (describing First Amendment 
overbreadth as a departure from traditional standing requirements). Yet on either account, 
the underlying concern is that overbroad Jaws will deter constitutionally protected speech. 
On the "third party" view of overbreadth, the plaintiff asserts the interests of those who are 
deterred by the statute from engaging in protected speech. See Isserles, supra, at 369 ("[T]he 
Court understands the doctrine's principal purpose to be protecting third parties, who might 
fear prosecution under an overbroad statute, from self-censoring or 'chilling' protected 
speech."). On the "valid rule" view, the invalidity of a rule comes from its imprecision and 
overinclusiveness - viz. , from its prohibition of protected speech. See Monaghan, supra, at 
37 (describing the "dominant idea" of the overbreadth doctrine as the requirement of 
regulatory precision). It is the point on which these two accounts converge that is important 
for purposes of this Article, and so I take no position as to which account is better. All that is 
required here is to see that overbreadth doctrine targets laws that, on their face, threaten to 
chill protected speech. 
263. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
264. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 1 18-19 (2003) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 
613). In addition to the problem discussed in note 261, supra, another difficulty with 
challenging the California UCL on overbreadth grounds is that the statute applies to more 
than just speech. It empowers private attorneys general to challenge "any unlawful, unfair or 
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Overbreadth doctrine generally takes account of two distinct 
speech-chilling harms, both of which are implicated in the First 
Amendment argument against private attorneys general. First, there is 
a worry about liability. Simply put, the concern is that private 
enforcement of speech-related regulations will yield a high volume of 
enforcement litigation, which will in turn increase the chances that 
anyone governed by the regulations will be held liable.265 This concern 
is heightened where, as with statutes like the version of the California 
UCL in force during the Nike litigation, the available remedies include 
not just civil penalties but potentially costly injunctive and other 
equitable relief.266 
The point is not that strict enforcement is always undesirable. For 
example, although the Supreme Court's commercial speech 
jurisprudence is muddled in several respects,267 it is clear under current 
doctrine that the government may prohibit the dissemination of false 
and misleading advertising.268 Thus, if a statute prohibited only false 
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising." 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997). Because overbreadth must be "judged in 
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, in the case of 
the UCL the analysis must take account of all applications that have nothing to do with 
speech - suits targeting anticompetitive behavior, tortious interference with business 
relations, failure to observe industry regulations, and the like. Even if every application of 
the UCL to speech or expressive conduct were deemed unconstitutional, it is far from clear 
that the total number of such applications would be substantial when compared to the 
statute's permissible applications. For that reason, the Court has suggested that overbreadth 
challenges to laws "not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily associated 
with speech" will succeed only "[r]arely, if ever." Hicks, 539 U.S. at 124. Whether or not one 
sees this as a salutary development in the doctrine, as a practical matter it would likely doom 
an overbreadth challenge to the California statute. Rather than resting my argument here on 
that rather narrow, statute-specific ground, I proceed on the assumption that the state law in 
question is structured to maximize the prospects for a successful constitutional challenge. 
Thus, I assume a state law targeting only the kinds of expression to which the overbreadth 
doctrine applies, and extending no further than that expression. 
265. Brief for Petitioners at 41, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) 
("A corporation faced with the prospect of post hoc strict liability in an uncertain but 
potentially staggering amount can forgo, or at the least substantially limit, speech on broader 
social and moral issues."); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 25, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (suggesting that 
"[c)ompanies like Nike that seek to engage in a debate on issues of public concern with a 
connection to their own operations" may be deterred from doing so, for fear that they will 
"subject[) themselves to the risk of a judgment . . .  that divests them of their profits on the 
basis of a statement that, after the fact, is held to have been ' likely to deceive' the public, 
even if it injured no one"). 
266. See supra notes 77, 193-194 and accompanying text. 
267. See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text. 
268. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (stating that, under 
the test articulated in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), "we ask as a threshold matter whether the commercial 
speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. If so, then the speech is not protected by 
the First Amendment."); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 
(1985) ("The States and the Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination of 
commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading."). 
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and misleading advertising (where the terms "false," "misleading," 
and "advertising" were defined with adequate precision), and if the 
only entities sued were those whose advertisements were clearly 
covered by the statute, the prospect of liability would be of no 
constitutional moment.269 
Concerns arise, however, when the statute seems to sweep within 
its ambit a substantial amount of constitutionally protected expression, 
or when the statute's outer boundaries are too unclear for a speaker to 
know whether it reaches certain protected expression. The Court has 
stressed the particular importance of accounting for a statute's 
ambiguity when determining overbreadth: "[A] court should evaluate 
the ambiguous as well as the unambiguous scope of the enactment. To 
this extent, the vagueness of a law affects overbreadth analysis. "270 
Indeed, "indefinite statutes whose terms . . .  abut upon sensitive areas 
of basic First Amendment freedoms" may cause speakers to '"steer far 
wider of the unlawful zone' than if the boundaries of the forbidden 
areas were clearly marked. "271 In either case, the concern is that the 
threat of liability will deter constitutionally protected speech. Rather 
than trusting the courts to shield them from liability, even those whose 
expression is clearly entitled to First Amendment protection will 
simply refrain from speaking.272 
269. This is wholly apart from the fact, noted supra note 261, that commercial speech 
regulations are not subject to overbreadth analysis under current doctrine. Frederick 
Schauer makes the point nicely with two examples drawn from two other areas of speech 
regulation: 
(J]t may be that the fear of punishment generated by federal and state obscenity laws chills 
the distribution of hard-core pornography. However, since hard-core pornography . . .  is not 
deemed to be constitutionally protected, any chilling effect of this nature is permissible, and 
indeed, the intended result of the regulatory measures involved. Similarly, the existence of a 
civil damage remedy for injury caused by the malicious publication of defamatory falsehood 
is expected to deter individuals from publishing such defamatory material. Again, these 
utterances are unprotected by the first amendment, and thus the possible imposition of civil 
liability creates another example of what I would term a benign chilling effect - an effect 
caused by the intentional regulation of speech or other activity properly subject to 
governmental control. 
Schauer, supra note 260, at 690 (footnotes omitted). 
270. Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.6 (1982); 
see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 88 n.10 (1973) ("[T)he problems of 
vagueness and overbreadth are, plainly, closely intertwined."). Although vagueness bears on 
the overbreadth analysis, the Court has also stressed the need to distinguish between 
overbreadth and void-for-vagueness analysis. The latter applies when a statute is not just 
ambiguous on its margins, but so imprecisely drawn that one simply cannot ascertain what it 
prohibits. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497 n.9 (distinguishing between overbreadth and 
vagueness). 
271. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 
513, 526 (1958) (citation omitted)). 
272. See, e.g. , Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-12 (1973) (describing 
overbreadth doctrine as proceeding from the "judicial prediction or assumption that the 
statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from 
constitutionally protected speech or expression"). 
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Applied to the California statute at issue in Nike, the argument is 
that by "arm[ing] millions of private citizens" with the power to seek 
broad injunctive and other equitable relief against those found to be in 
violation of an open-ended ban on "unfair competition," the version 
of the California UCL then in place created huge liability exposure for 
speakers like Nike.273 Such exposure "unacceptably chills speech, 
particularly unpopular speech that is likely to become the target of 
such lawsuits."274 Rather than engage in such speech, entities like Nike 
would simply remain silent.275 
The second chill-based concern focuses on litigation. The worry is 
that by permitting essentially any citizen to challenge an entity's public 
statements as false or misleading, laws like the California UCL 
threaten to produce a flood of litigation.276 Whether or not such suits 
have any merit, defending against them can be costly. Fearful of such 
costs, even those speakers whose expression is clearly protected by the 
First Amendment may simply decline to speak.277 
273. Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25, Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
274. Id. The Solicitor General elaborated: 
Companies like Nike that seek to engage in a debate on issues of public concern with a 
connection to their own operations (if only to respond to their critics) may well think long 
and hard before subjecting themselves to the risk of a judgment, at the behest of a single 
resident of California, that divests them of their profits on the basis of a statement that, after 
the fact, is held to have been "likely to deceive" the public, even if it injured no one. 
Id. As noted above, the argument that Nike risked a disgorgement remedy was premised on 
a misinterpretation of the UCL. See supra note 203. 
275. Nike argued that it had indeed forgone considerable speech during the pendency of 
the Nike litigation: 
Nike has determined on the basis of this suit that the very real prospect that a California 
resident will take it upon him or herself to dispute the veracity of one of the company's 
statements in a California court requires petitioner to restrict severely all of its 
communications on social issues that could reach California consumers, including speech in 
national and international media. 
Brief for Petitioners at 38-39, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). The self­
censorship concern is certainly real, though one suspects at least a touch of hyperbole in the 
reference to "all" communications on social issues. 
276. See Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25, 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) ("(T]o arm millions of private citizens 
with such (broad equitable] relief, and to permit them to demand it without showing of 
injury to themselves or anyone else, unacceptably chills speech, particularly unpopular 
speech that is likely to become the target of such lawsuits."). 
277. See First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 n.21 (1978) (suggesting 
that, without regard to the likely outcome of the litigation, "the burden and expense of 
litigating the issue . . .  would unduly impinge on the exercise of the constitutional right"); 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("The very 
possibility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and protracted process, is threat 
enough to cause discussion and debate to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' thereby 
keeping protected discussion from public cognizance.") (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 
513, 526 (1958)); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964) ("Plainly the 
Alabama law of civil libel is 'a form of regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms 
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Although the Supreme Court plainly recognizes the risk of 
litigation as a speech deterrent, the relationship between this risk and 
the risk of liability is not clear. Can the risk of litigation by itself be 
enough to establish overbreadth, without any regard to the likely 
outcome of the litigation? Or must there be some connection between 
the litigation risk and a liability risk? The Court's cases contain 
conflicting statements on this point. On one hand, cases like 
Dombrowski v. Pfister state that "[t]he chilling effect upon the 
exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the 
prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure."278 
On the other hand, Justice Scalia's recent concurring opinion in 
Virginia v. Black takes a seemingly contrary position: 
We have never held that the mere threat that individuals who engage in 
protected conduct will be subject to arrest and prosecution suffices to 
render a statute overbroad. Rather, our overbreadth jurisprudence has 
consistently focused on whether the prohibitory terms of a particular 
statute extend to protected conduct; that is, we have inquired whether 
individuals who engage in protected conduct can be convicted under a 
statute, not whether they might be subject to arrest and prosecution.279 
Can these positions be reconciled? 
The first step is to recognize that the Court's statement in 
Dombrowski cannot be taken literally. If the prospect of litigation 
constituted a cognizable First Amendment harm without any regard to 
the likely outcome of the litigation, the harm would be ubiquitous. 
Everyone faces some risk of being sued, however frivolously. Suppose, 
for example, a private plaintiff invokes a false advertising law to sue a 
newspaper for publishing editorials with which he disagrees. Clearly, 
the newspaper has a winning First Amendment defense. Just as 
clearly, however, the statute simply does not cover the newspaper's 
actions; writing editorials, even bad ones, is not advertising. If the 
newspaper is nevertheless saddled with a meritless suit of this kind, it 
markedly greater than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law."') (quoting Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
278. 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). The analysis appears no different if the potential litigation 
is civil rather than criminal. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785 n.21; Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52-53; 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. 
279. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 371 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring 
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). For support, Justice Scalia cited the 
following cases (parenthetical comments and emphasis his): R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 397 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (deeming the ordinance at issue 
"fatally overbroad because it criminalizes . . . expression protected by the First 
Amendment"); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 (1987) (a statute "that make[s] 
unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially 
invalid"); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972) (a statute may be overbroad 
"if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct"); Black, 538 U.S. at 371-72. 
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will likely incur litigation costs in order to obtain dismissal.28 0  Surely, 
though, the background possibility that other newspapers could be 
named in similarly frivolous suits does not establish unconstitutional 
overbreadth. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a statute could possibly 
be called overbroad simply because misguided plaintiffs might invoke 
it in places it has no application. 
In what circumstances should the fear of litigation become 
cognizable? In my view, the Court's cases are best read to suggest that 
the risk of litigation attaches when there is at least a colorable 
argument that the statute at issue covers the expression in question.281 
On that point, the question is essentially as Justice Scalia described it 
in Virginia v. Black: "whether the prohibitory terms of a particular 
statute extend," or reasonably appear to extend, to expression 
protected by the First Amendment.282 If the answer is yes, then we 
tum to the rule articulated in Dombrowski. That is, once we 
determine that certain protected expression is covered by the statute, 
we count the risk of suit as an independent chilling effect. Viewed this 
way, the underlying point of the Dombrowski rule becomes clear: not 
to convert the background risk of frivolous litigation into 
unconstitutional overbreadth in all cases, but to establish that, to the 
extent the terms of a statute at least arguably cover certain 
constitutionally protected expression, the fact that the speaker could 
assert a winning First Amendment defense does not negate the 
statute's chilling effect. 
Returning to Nike, the chilling effect of the threat of suit under the 
California statute was arguably quite substantial. The statute's rather 
open-ended terms prohibited, among other things, all false and 
misleading advertising and other forms of commercial speech.283 As a 
result, every commercial entity engaged in any amount of advertising 
or other commercial speech could have been exposed to litigation. The 
risk was heightened, moreover, if the entity engaged in advertising or 
other expression touching on areas of significant public interest, 
because its expression was more likely to come to the attention of 
more potential plaintiffs. As Nike argued to the Court: 
However careful it tries to be, no company can have confidence in its 
280. To the extent the suit is truly meritless or even frivolous, the newspaper may be 
able to recover fees and costs under a fee-shifting statute. But that is a separate inquiry. The 
Court's treatment of the chilling effect of litigation costs does not appear to take fee shifting 
into account. 
281. See, e.g., the references in Houston v. Hill, Grayned, and R.A. V. to what the statute 
in question prohibits, as quoted in note 279, supra. 
282. 538 U.S. at 371. 
283. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997) (prohibiting "any unlawful, 
unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 
advertising"). 
654 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:589 
ability to speak about hotly contested aspects of its operations or its 
employees' activities in far-flung facilities without inviting a lawsuit by at 
least one dubious or critical resident of California - a lawsuit that will 
impose on the company the substantial and one-sided costs of defending 
the litigation - even if the company believes that, by enduring years of 
litigation, it would ultimately secure a trial court's judgment that its 
statements were absolutely truthful.284 
* * *  
In sum, the Solicitor General's argument against the California 
statute was that it threatened to chill intolerable amounts of 
constitutionally protected speech. The chill came from two sources: 
from the risk of liability under such a broad and open-ended statute, 
and from the risk of having to litigate a First Amendment defense to 
such liability. According to the Solicitor General, the fact that the 
statute was enforceable by "millions of private citizens" - many of 
whom may be motivated by ideological agendas or pure greed -
accentuated both risks by maximizing the likelihood of both liability 
and litigation.285 
B. Free Speech and Government Discretion 
This Section turns directly to the contention that the speech­
chilling harms attending a regime of private enforcement would be 
absent (or at least substantially lessened) if a substantively identical 
regime were enforced only by the government. The assertion depends 
on the idea that public agencies will exercise wise discretion and 
restraint in their enforcement decisions. As the Solicitor General put it 
in Nike, "The provision of broad authority to seek such [wide-ranging 
equitable] remedies without proving an actual injury to specified 
individuals is by no means inappropriate for governmental agencies 
charged with enforcing the law. Such agencies are subject to numerous 
constraints and can be expected to exercise appropriate discretion in 
the invocation. "286 
To evaluate this assertion, recall that we are concerned here with 
the facial constitutionality of a statute. As described in the previous 
Section,287 the argument is that a regime of privately enforced speech 
regulations will chill too much protected speech. That assertion 
284. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 18, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 
02-575). 
285. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25, Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
286. Id. at 24-25. 
287. See supra notes 258-260 and accompanying text. 
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necessarily amounts to the contention that the text of the statute 
covers, or at least arguably covers, a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected expression.288 The inquiry considers the 
"literal scope" of the statute (including any ambiguities in its outer 
reaches),289 which is to say everything "ma[d]e unlawful" by the 
"prohibitory terms" of the statute.290 
There is a critical point here. Because overbreadth analysis 
evaluates a statute according to its full reach, the prospect of 
"millions" of private attorneys general suing under the statute adds 
nothing material to the analysis. Such actions are either within the 
scope of the statute (including any ambiguities on its periphery), in 
which case they are already included in the overbreadth analysis, or 
they are meritless invocations of the statute where it plainly does not 
apply, in which case they have no real substantive connection to the 
statute itself and thus do not bear on its facial validity. Overbreadth, in 
other words, assumes a flood of litigation within the terms of the 
statute; anything beyond those terms is not attributable to the statute. 
To be clear, by "flood of litigation" I mean full litigation against all 
potential defendants covered by the statute. I do not mean multiple 
lawsuits against the same defendant for the same conduct. Repeatedly 
subjecting a single defendant to liability for the same harm to the same 
public interest could well raise constitutional difficulties sounding 
principally in due process. But those concerns are distinct from the 
question of public or private enforcement, and can be addressed by 
adopting preclusion principles that would foreclose follow-on 
litigation after the first private (or public) attorney general suit has 
been litigated.291 That issue aside, the point here is that overbreadth 
analysis assumes litigation against all defendants whose conduct falls 
within the statute's prohibitions. 
Suppose, then, that a statute is deemed overbroad as privately 
enforced. The question here is whether the conclusion would be any 
different if enforcement authority rested exclusively with the 
government. It should not. The essence of the Solicitor General's 
argument on this point is that the public officials charged with 
enforcing the statute will be restrained in their enforcement decisions, 
that this restraint will produce less litigation under the statute, and 
288. See Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. The Aipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
494, n.6 (1982). 
289. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). 
290. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 (1987); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 
371 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting 
in part). 
291. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 106, at 160-61 (discussing general preclusion 
principles relevant to such circumstances). 
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that less litigation will diminish the statute's chilling effect. 292 Note 
what this argument is not saying. It is not saying that executive 
agencies entrusted with the enforcement of overbroad statutes will 
promulgate regulations or other binding guidance narrowing the 
statute to within constitutional bounds. 293 Such narrowing could 
indeed alleviate overbreadth concerns: as the Court has explained, 
statutory overbreadth can be cured by the adoption of a binding 
narrowing construction,294 and there is no reason to require the 
narrowing to be performed by a court rather than an executive actor. 
But the argument here is not that executive officials will publicly bind 
themselves to a narrow reading. Rather, it is that they will exercise 
wise discretion in enforcing the statute's broad prohibitions. 
There is a certain attraction to the idea that government actors 
have a special obligation to discharge their duties in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution and laws, and that this obligation 
includes a self-policing duty to promote constitutional values when 
exercising discretionary power. 295 Employed by the courts, the 
expectation that government officials respect constitutional 
boundaries is a familiar instrument of judicial restraint. Courts 
generally presume that the democratically elected branches of 
government act constitutionally, and thus will not strike down 
government action as unconstitutional absent a showing of patent 
irrationality. 296 As the Supreme Court explained in the early 
nineteenth century, applied to legislative action "[i]t is but a decent 
respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the 
legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favour of its 
validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all 
292. See, e.g. , Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
293. In Nike, the Solicitor General did refer to regulatory guidance provided by the FTC 
regarding what sorts of commercial statements trigger liability under the FTC Act. See id. at 
19 (citing 16  C.F.R. pt. 260; 16 C.F.R. 1 .1-1 .4). But the point of the Solicitor General's 
argument was not to say that regulatory narrowing would cure an otherwise 
unconstitutionally overbroad statute. Rather, he maintained that the FTC Act was 
constitutional as written. He also implicitly acknowledged that the Act's substantive scope is 
similar to that of the California UCL, and suggested that there would be no First 
Amendment problem with the California UCL if it were enforceable only by state officials. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19-20, Nike, Inc. v. 
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
294. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113,  1 18-19 (2003); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 769 n.24 (1982); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 n.7, 497 (1965). 
295. See generally JOHN A. ROHR, PUBLIC SERVICE, ETHICS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE (1998). 
296. Here I am referring, of course, to the standard account of "rational basis" review. 
See, e.g. , FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993) ("On rational­
basis review, a classification in a statute . . .  comes to us bearing a strong presumption of 
validity, and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden 
'to negative every conceivable basis which might support it."' (citation omitted)). 
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reasonable doubt. "297 The same reasoning supports an expectation that 
executive actors will enforce the laws in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution.298 
The general presumption that government actors will discharge 
their responsibilities in a manner consistent with constitutional values 
does not, however, justify the deference sought by the Solicitor 
General in Nike. First, presuming that a government official will act 
lawfully when enforcing a facially constitutional statute is not the same 
as presuming that government discretion will save an otherwise 
unconstitutional law. The public/private distinction at issue here 
champions the latter. The argument is that a private attorney general 
provision will yield a flood of enforcement litigation, which in turn will 
cause the underlying substantive regulation to be maximally enforced, 
and that such maximum enforcement will unduly chill protected 
speech. The statute as fully enforced, in other words, is 
unconstitutional. But government enforcement can be presumed to be 
restrained, and this restraint will bring the statute's speech-chilling 
effects down to tolerable levels. As the Solicitor General put it, 
government agencies are "subject to numerous constraints and can be 
expected to exercise appropriate discretion" when exercising their 
enforcement authority.299 Government discretion, in other words, will 
prevent the statute from being fully enforced, thus curing its facial 
overbreadth. This is not merely an argument that government 
enforcement will presumptively remain within constitutional bounds; 
it is an argument that government enforcement can cure a statute's 
unconstitutionality. In that sense, it goes far beyond the conventional 
presumption of constitutionality. 
Second, the argument here also asks for deference in a substantive 
area where it is not typically granted. As a general matter, the 
presumption of constitutionality does not apply when the government 
legislates or otherwise acts in an area affecting fundamental 
constitutional rights.300 In the First Amendment context, laws 
297. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827). 
298. At the federal level, the expectation is bolstered by the President's constitutionally 
prescribed oath of office: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
299. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25, Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (emphasis added). 
300. The first prominent articulation of this rule came in the "most celebrated footnote 
in constitutional law," Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1087, 1087 (1982), footnote four of Justice Stone's opinion for the Court in United States v. 
Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Although footnote four is today best 
known for its suggestion that the presumption of constitutionality does not apply to statutes 
reflecting "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities," its significance for present 
purposes derives from the first paragraph of the footnote, which states: "There may be 
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation 
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regulating expression on the basis of its content are not subject to 
mere rational basis judicial review; they are presumed unconstitutional 
unless they can withstand strict judicial scrutiny.30 1 Thus, the general 
presumption of constitutionality does little work when free speech is 
at stake. 
In addition - and apart from whether government action affecting 
speech should be presumed constitutional - the argument that 
government discretion can ever remove a statute's First Amendment 
defects is inconsistent with substantive tenets of free speech doctrine. 
At bottom, the argument effectively entrusts freedom of speech to the 
government's discretion. But as Justice Jackson famously explained, 
"[t]he very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public 
authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind," as "the 
forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the 
false for us. "302 Instead of committing the protection of free speech to 
official discretion, the First Amendment puts it beyond the 
government's reach.303 
The First Amendment's general distrust of government discretion 
is incorporated into its specific doctrines. This is particularly true of 
overbreadth doctrine and its sensitivity to the chilling effect. As 
Frederick Schauer explains in his classic treatment, the "chilling effect 
doctrine" is a response to two propositions. First, "all litigation, and 
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the 
first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within 
the Fourteenth." Id. at 152 n.4. See generally Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote 
and the Preferred Position of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan 
Fiske Stone, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 277 (1995) (suggesting that subsequent descriptions of 
the footnote by Stone's former clerk Louis Lusky and by John Hart Ely have characterized it 
as justifying invasive judicial review only when there is a process breakdown in majoritarian 
democracy, and that this characterization overlooks the special position accorded to 
personal, non-economic rights in the first paragraph of the footnote). 
301. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816-17 (2000) 
("When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the 
constitutionality of its actions. When the Government seeks to restrict speech based on its 
content, the usual presumption of constitutionality afforded congressional enactments is 
reversed." (citations omitted)); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 77 (1981) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("(T]he presumption of validity that traditionally attends a local 
government's exercise of its zoning powers carries little, if any, weight where the zoning 
regulation trenches on rights of expression protected under the First Amendment."). 
302. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); see Frederick 
Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112  HARV. L. REV. 84, 1 1 1  (1998) 
("[O]fficial discretion to determine the value of speech content has long been understood to 
be incompatible with the principle of free speech itself, one of whose central themes is 
distrust of government."). 
303. See, e.g., Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. at 818 ("The Constitution exists precisely 
so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and moral judgments about art and 
literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed. What the Constitution says is that these 
judgments are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the 
mandate or approval of a majority."). 
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indeed the entire legal process, is surrounded by uncertainty."304 
Second, "an erroneous limitation of speech has, by hypothesis, more 
social disutility than an erroneous overextension of freedom of 
speech."305 This second proposition "represents an ordering of values 
mandated by the existence of the first amendment within a legal 
system characterized by error and uncertainty."306 To be faithful 
to that ordering, "we must isolate . . .  those factors that cause a 
significant increase in the degree of uncertainty and fear normally 
surrounding the legal process. "307 
Overbreadth analysis treats the text of a statute as a source of 
legal uncertainty. A broad, open-ended prohibition reaching con­
stitutionally protected activity, especially when drafted in imprecise 
terms, creates both liability and litigation risks. As long as the· 
prohibition remains in effect, the uncertainty persists. And unless it is 
authoritatively narrowed, those potentially covered by its literal terms 
bear the brunt of the uncertainty. That is, even if a particular speaker 
has a strong First Amendment defense against the prohibition, the fact 
that it covers her expression subjects her to "a significant increase in 
the degree of uncertainty and fear normally surrounding the legal 
process."308 Those concerns are not dispelled by non-binding 
assurances that the government will exercise restraint in enforcing the 
law. That is partly because such assurances do not alter the text of the 
law, which is where the uncertainty resides. But it is also because, as 
noted above, the First Amendment generally regards government 
discretion as a further source of legal uncertainty, not a solution to it. 
Beyond the uncertainty point, an additional reason why the First 
Amendment takes no comfort in government discretion is that it 
creates opportunities for discrimination. As Steven Shiffrin has 
observed, especially where the regulation in question targets false or 
misleading speech, the government's discretionary enforcement 
decisions may mask highly problematic forms of discrimination.309 
Similar concerns of government bias and discrimination help to 
304. Schauer, supra note 260, at 687. 
305. Id. at 688. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 732. In this respect, Schauer is sensitive to the risks of both liability and 
litigation. See id. at 700 (describing "the costs involved in securing a successful judicial 
determination," explaining that " [t]hese costs of securing vindication create a fear of the 
entire process, with a commensurate increase in the degree of deterrence," and concluding 
that "even those with perfect knowledge of the ultimate outcome of litigation will be 
deterred from engaging in protected activity if it will be necessary for them to demonstrate 
publicly the lawfulness of that conduct"). 
308. Id. at 732. 
309. See Shiffrin, supra note 197, at 1262 ("If government intervenes to prevent speech, 
simply on the basis that it is false, without more, there are reasons to fear that the 
government acts out of bias or in an effort to repress minorities."). 
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explain the distinct, though related, void-for-vagueness doctrine.31 0 
Unless a legislature crafts its enactments with sufficient clarity, 
government officials charged with enforcing the law may be able to 
take advantage of the law's vagueness to act unreasonably, arbitrarily, 
or even discriminatorily. The substantive nature of the discrimination 
may take a variety of forms. It may, for example, coincide with the 
problem of agency capture noted above.31 1  That is, enforcement 
decisions may reflect which private actors have, and have not, 
managed to exert disproportionate influence on the enforcing agency. 
In addition, discriminatory enforcement may operate against speech 
that is especially controversial or offensive to the public.312 As the 
Solicitor General himself stressed in Nike, government officials are 
politically accountable for their decisions.313 Although such 
accountability ordinarily accords well with principles of democratic 
governance, in matters of speech it creates the risk that officials may 
base their enforcement decisions on assessments of political 
expediency and public sentiment. Such decisions cut to the heart of 
the First Amendment, one of whose core purposes is to protect dissent 
from majoritarian oppression.314 
To be sure, there is ample reason also to worry about 
discrimination by private attorneys general. In Nike, for example, both 
the Solicitor General and Justice Breyer suggested that the California 
statute enabled private individuals who opposed Nike on ideological 
grounds to express that opposition through litigation.31 5 As noted, such 
ideologically driven litigation matches one of the archetypal depictions 
of the private attorney general.316 And although the "social advocate" 
310. See, e.g. , Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) ("A vague law 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution 
on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application."); see also supra note 270 (noting relationship between overbreadth and 
vagueness). For the classic treatment of the vagueness doctrine, including an argument that 
guarding against discriminatory enforcement is the best defense of the doctrine, see John 
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. 
REV. 189 (1985). 
311. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
312. Cf Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (noting that 
the First Amendment bars licensing schemes that grant unduly broad discretion to licensing 
officials, given the potential for such discretion to "becom[e] a means of suppressing a 
particular point of view"). 
313. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
314. See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF 
AMERICA (1999). 
315. See supra notes 205-207, 227-230 and accompanying text. 
316. See Garth et al., supra note 2, at 356 (describing "the 'social advocate,' for whom 
litigation is a form of pressure group activity"). 
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litigant is not a problem in most areas of the law,3 17 it may raise 
concerns in matters rehting to speech. Suing to advance a political or 
ideological position can amount to using the law to punish certain 
points of view. Discrimination of that sort might be tolerated when a 
private plaintiff sues on her own behalf. But when private actors are 
invested with the authority to censor, punish, or otherwise control 
expression on a broader scale and on behalf of the public at large, the 
First Amendment properly regards them with as much suspicion as 
public actors wielding the same power.3 1 8  The point here, however, is 
that they should not be treated with any more suspicion.3 1 9  If a broadly 
phrased speech regulation permits an intolerable amount of private 
discrimination in how it is enforced, that may confirm the statute's 
unconstitutional overbreadth. But the constitutional infirmity does not 
disappear if the discretion is transferred from private to public hands. 
Discretion in the enforcement of speech regulations, whether 
exercised by public or private actors, threatens free speech values. 
Finally, even if government discretion could alleviate the chilling 
effect of an overbroad law in theory, there is little reason to expect 
this to happen in practice. The factors generally guiding official 
discretion - political accountability and resource scarcity - have 
little to do with free speech. Thus, wholly apart from the possibility 
that political accountability may actually increase the likelihood of 
content- or viewpoint-discrimination, a government official acting in 
all good faith may simply base his enforcement decisions on factors 
having no real bearing on the First Amendment. An official charged 
with deciding whether to bring a particular enforcement action must 
consider "whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or 
another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the 
particular enforcement action . . .  best fits the agency's overall policies, 
and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake 
the action at all."320 All of these factors are legitimate from the 
perspective of democratic accountability; none is particularly likely to 
reflect First Amendment values. 
317. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. 
318. See, e.g. , Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71-72 (1963) (holding that a 
regime of "informal censorship" by a citizens' commission violates the First Amendment). 
319. Bantam Books is instructive. There, the critical point for the Court was to "look 
through forms to the substance and recognize that informal censorship may sufficiently 
inhibit the circulation of publications to warrant injunctive relief." Id. at 67. That is. non­
formalist analysis enabled the conclusion that informal censorship was just as odious to 
speech as more formal versions of the same thing. See id. at 68 ("It is not as if this were not 
regulation by the State of Rhode Island."). The Court nowhere suggested, however, that the 
citizens' commission at issue in the case would be somehow less constitutionally suspect if 
formally run by the government. 
320. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 ,  831 (1985). 
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C. Two Objections 
My treatment of the First Amendment argument against private 
attorneys general has focused on concerns of overbreadth, and has 
attacked the assertion that the problems present in a private 
enforcement regime may be alleviated simply by converting to a 
regime of public enforcement. I pause now to address two possible 
objections to this treatment. 
1 .  Enforcement Discretion and Judicial Review 
First, one might object that I have placed too much emphasis on 
the problem of unfettered government discretion. True, an objector 
might concede, government discretion can indeed be a problem for 
First Amendment values, but a preference for public over private 
enforcement need not entail total judicial deference to the exercise of 
such discretion. Although the Solicitor General's account of the 
proposed public/private distinction in Nike v. Kasky did not seem to 
provide for any judicial review of that discretion, that part of the 
proposal need not be adopted. Instead, courts might reject initial facial 
challenges to publicly enforced statutes by presuming the government 
will exercise restrained enforcement, but remain open to later 
challenges asserting that the government has in fact overenforced the 
law.321 
To be sure, this approach would alleviate concerns about 
unchecked executive discretion. But it would replace those concerns 
with others, focused this time on judicial excess. If governmental 
underenforcement of a statute is required to preserve its 
constitutionality, then the government is not free to increase 
enforcement beyond a certain point, and the courts will be called upon 
to determine when that point has been reached. Suppose, for example, 
a newly elected governor determines that consumer deception has 
reached intolerable levels and therefore sets as her top priority the full 
enforcement of her state's unfair competition and false advertising 
321. This may have been what Justice Souter had in mind during the following colloquy 
in the Nike oral argument: 
QUESTION: [W]hy shouldn't it be sufficient to say that when it is the State rather than any 
citizen, self-selected, who brings this suit, we would at least depend upon some State . . .  [for] 
political responsibility . . .  and accountability as . . .  our safeguard, and we would let that go 
forward because we don't think there's enough risk of improper chilling? The distinction is, 
when anybody can walk in . . .  there's no accountability. Why isn't that the line to draw? 
MR. TRIBE [counsel for Nike]: Well, it seems to me, Justice Souter, that's a line enough to 
reverse this decision . . . .  
Tr. of Oral Argument at 15-16, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575). Justice 
Souter may have been advocating not complete immunity of a public enforcement regime 
from overbreadth scrutiny, but a presumption in favor of such a regime that can be rebutted 
if the government enforces the underlying statute too robustly. 
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laws. The statute is enforceable only by the government, so the 
governor obtains from the legislature a budgetary increase sufficient 
to fund a tenfold increase in the enforcement level. Or suppose the 
increase is one hundredfold. At some point, the government would 
reach a level of full enforcement - which, as discussed above,322 is the 
level presumed to exist under overbreadth analysis - whereupon the 
statute would become unconstitutional. The result, then, would be to 
prohibit the government from fully enforcing its laws. A statute's 
constitutionality would turn on a judicial assessment of whether the 
government has devoted too many resources to enforcement, even 
though all the enforcement remains within the literal terms of the 
statute. 
Such assessments are unknown to both the First Amendment 
specifically and judicial review more generally. To be sure, courts may 
well expect executive actors to construe ambiguous statutes to avoid 
constitutional difficulties, and may enforce that expectation by setting 
aside executive actions that exceed the reach of the statute as narrowly 
construed. But those are circumstances where the statute is 
ambiguous, triggering the familiar rule that ambiguity should be 
resolved in favor of a reading that avoids constitutional questions.323 In 
contrast, the premise of the public/private distinction at issue here is 
not that the government will formally adopt a narrow construction of 
the statute. Rather, the idea is that the government will simply initiate 
a lower volume of litigation under the statute while leaving its full 
substantive reach intact.324 Unless the statute itself manifests a 
legislative preference for a particular volume of enforcement, 
requiring such underenforcement cannot seriously be considered an 
act of interpreting the statute.325 
In short, the constitutionality of a statute does not, and should not, 
depend on a judicially decreed assumption that it will be 
underenforced according to a metric found nowhere in the statute 
322. See supra notes 227-291 and accompanying text. 
323. Though frequently the target of academic criticism, the canon of constitutional 
avoidance has been described by the Supreme Court as "'a cardinal principle' of statutory 
interpretation." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (quoting Crowell  v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). For a discussion of whether federal executive actors should construe 
statutes to avoid constitutional questions, separate from whether courts should do so in the 
context of litigation, see Trevor W. Morrison, Statutes Outside the Courts: Executive Branch 
Statutory Interpretation and the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance (in progress). 
324. See supra notes 221-222, 299 and accompanying text. 
325. By saying "the statute itself," I do not mean to suggest that statutory interpretation 
must be confined to only the plain text, without any consideration of the law's animating 
purpose as reflected in legislative history or other evidentiary sources. Rather, my point here 
applies without regard to one's preferred method of statutory interpretation. The point is 
that, unless the statute (as interpreted according to one's preferred method) can be read to 
dictate, or at least to prefer, a particular volume of enforcement, the judicial imposition of a 
volume requirement cannot be justified as a matter of statutory interpretation. 
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itself. Otherwise, courts will usurp the roles of both the executive and 
the legislature: the executive, by dictating enforcement (or rather, 
underenforcement) priorities, and the legislature, by effectively 
rewriting the statute to announce those priorities.326 
2. Multiple Mal-Enforcement 
One might also object that, by addressing the First Amendment 
argument against private enforcement in overbreadth terms, I have 
missed the real thrust of the argument. It is not, the objector might 
contend, that the choice between public and private enforcement 
somehow alters a statute's substantive scope, thus changing the 
overbreadth calculus. Rather, it is that a relatively small corps of 
public officials is likely to bring far fewer suits than a vast militia of 
private attorneys general, and thus that the in terrorum effect of a 
private enforcement regime is more severe than that of a public one. 
On this view, the constitutional flaw in a private enforcement regime 
is not that it fully enforces the statute, but that it predictably 
overenforces the statute in a way that renders the entire regime 
facially unconstitutional. Private attorneys general, in other words, will 
engage in multiple mal-enforcement, filing actions lacking in 
substantive merit in order to advance their own ideological or 
financial interests. 
To respond to this objection, I would first stress that I do not deny 
that a private enforcement regime might produce more litigation than 
a purely public one. Indeed, as I have described at length,327 one of the 
policy arguments in favor of private attorneys general is precisely that 
they will provide more robust enforcement of the underlying law. 
Especially where a private attorney general provision aligns the law's 
aims with the financial or ideological interests of private plaintiffs, it is 
na"ive to suppose that private and public actions will be filed at the 
same rate. 
326. There is a parallel here to severability analysis in the federal courts. When a court 
holds one provision of a federal statute to be facially unconstitutional, it must determine 
whether to strike down the entire statute on that basis or to sever the infirm provision from 
the rest of the law. In making that determination, the court looks in part to whether the 
unconstitutional aspect of the statute can be excised without requiring a rewriting of the 
remainder of the statute. If not - if the constitutional and unconstitutional parts can only be 
separated by inserting new distinctions into the text - then severance is improper. See Reno 
v. Arn. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997) ("This Court 'will not rewrite a . . .  
law to conform it to constitutional requirements."') (quoting Virginia v. Arn. Booksellers 
Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). Similarly here, a judicially imposed requirement of 
underenforcernent would amount to severing the statute as fully enforced from the statute as 
underenforced. Unless the text of the statute itself suggests that the legislature intended such 
a distinction, a court usurps the legislature's role by creating one. 
327. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
February 2005] Private Attorneys General 665 
The objection here, though, is that private enforcement will yield 
not just more litigation, but an intolerable amount of meritless 
litigation. And it is the risk of such litigation, the objection runs, that 
establishes a statute's facial unconstitutionality. To be clear, we are 
not here talking about litigation that could arguably fall within the 
substantive scope of the underlying statute. As noted above,328 that 
litigation is included in the overbreadth calculus and thus affects the 
statute's facial validity regardless of whether it is publicly or privately 
initiated. Instead, the argument that private enforcement will yield 
multiple mal-enforcement beyond what is captured by overbreadth 
analysis necessarily focuses on actions that invoke the underlying 
statute where it clearly does not apply. These actions can be divided 
into two groups. First, there are actions that, even on their own terms, 
fall outside the scope of the statute. Second, there are actions that 
allege what would be a violation of the statute if proved, but that turn 
out to be wrong in their factual assertions. These two kinds of suits 
bear separate consideration. 
The first kind of actions are those that simply fail to allege a 
violation of the relevant statute. Think, for example, of a suit that 
invokes a false advertising statute but does not actually allege that the 
defendant engaged in false or misleading advertising. Such a suit is not 
only meritless, but frivolous. 329 It should be summarily dismissed. As I 
have already explained,33 0 suits of this sort are properly excluded from 
overbreadth analysis; a statute is not deemed overbroad simply 
because a plaintiff attempts to invoke it where it plainly does not 
apply. The same should be true when considering multiple mal­
enforcement beyond the confines of overbreadth doctrine. To say that 
a lawsuit is frivolous is precisely to say that its claims have no arguable 
basis in law. And if the suit is not even arguably based in a particular 
law, why should it expose the law to facial invalidation?331 Instead, 
328. See supra notes 270-272, 281-282 and accompanying text. 
329. Cf Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (defining "frivolous" for purposes 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) as "lack[ing] an arguable basis either in law or in fact" and as 
"embrac[ing] . . .  the inarguable legal conclusion . . .  [and] the fanciful factual allegation"). 
330. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
331. Moreover, it is useful to recall the precise remedies that the First Amendment 
argument against private attorneys general would provide in this context. As the Solicitor 
General pitched the argument in Nike, it would require private plaintiffs to allege 
individualized injury in order to enforce speech-related regulations. As further elaborated 
above, the argument would also authorize private plaintiffs to obtain only those remedies 
necessary to redress their individualized injuries. Neither of these limitations is likely to have 
much impact on frivolous litigation. If the problem is that private litigants are abusing their 
litigating authority by filing frivolous lawsuits, why should we assume that those same 
litigants will adhere to standing or remedial limits? If a plaintiff is prepared to file a frivolous 
lawsuit in the hope that merely filing it will advance her ideological agenda or extract a 
nuisance-value settlement, why would she not be prepared to file a suit advancing a frivolous 
theory of injury, or seeking broad injunctive or other costly relief even though it is not 
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courts and legislatures have a variety of ways to address frivolous 
litigation without invalidating enforcement regimes in toto. Courts, for 
example, may impose sanctions for the filing of frivolous actions.332 
Legislatures may enact fee-shifting provisions requiring plaintiffs who 
file frivolous suits to pay the defendant's attorney's fees and costs. In 
short, frivolous litigation is better treated with plaintiff-specific 
sanctions, not facial invalidation of the statute's enforcement 
mechanism. 333 
The second, more vexing, kind of actions are those that properly 
allege a violation of the underlying statute, but that turn out to be 
premised on a factual error. Think, for example, of a private suit 
brought under a law like the California unfair competition statute, 
alleging that a company like Nike engaged in false or misleading 
advertising by claiming that the average hourly wage for its factory 
workers is higher than that of its major competitors. If those 
allegations are accurate, Nike did indeed violate the statute. Suppose, 
authorized by the statute? The answer, of course, is that we cannot exclude the possibility of 
frivolous litigation under any legal regime. 
332. See, e.g. , FED. R. CIV. P. 1 1. 
333. The Supreme Court adopted this approach recently in Cheney v. United States 
District Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004). The case involved a civil suit by two public interest 
organizations, alleging that the Vice President's energy task force had failed to comply with 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act's open meeting and public-disclosure requirements. Id. 
at 2583. As the case came to the Supreme Court, the principal issue was whether the Vice 
President was entitled to mandamus relief to vacate certain discovery orders entered by the 
trial court, even though the President had not yet asserted executive privilege against the 
orders. Id. at 2582. In holding that the President did not necessarily need to assert executive 
privilege in order for the Vice President to gain mandamus relief, the Court stressed the 
potentially harassing nature of civil discovery. More specifically, the Court drew a clear 
distinction between subpoenas directed at the President as part of a criminal prosecution, 
and discovery orders addressed to high-ranking members of the executive branch as part of a 
privately initiated civil suit. Whereas the decision to bring a criminal prosecution "is made 
by a publicly accountable prosecutor" who faces "budgetary considerations and . . .  ethical 
obligation[s]" that help to "filter out insubstantial legal claims," private litigants often assert 
"meritless claims against the Executive Branch." Id. at 2590. This was the precise point the 
Solicitor General made in Nike when he argued that private attorneys general would tend to 
abuse their litigating power, but that public officials can be expected to exercise appropriate 
discretion when discharging their enforcement authority. The critical point, however, lies in 
what consequences the Cheney Court assigned to the differences it perceived between 
publicly and privately initiated litigation. The Court did not invalidate all private 
enforcement of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, nor did it hold that the kind of 
discovery sought in that case is necessarily invalid. Instead, it simply directed the lower 
courts to consider the Vice President's arguments against the discovery orders, without first 
requiring him to assert executive privilege. Id. at 2593. That is, the Court held that in 
resolving discovery disputes of this kind, courts should maintain a case-specific sensitivity to 
the burdens imposed on the executive branch. To the extent the discovery process is subject 
to abuse, the Court's answer was not to impose categorical limits on private enforcement, 
but to ensure that courts balance the relevant concerns on a case-by-case basis. Although 
Cheney did not involve the First Amendment, its general approach supports the position I 
have advanced here - that litigation abuse is generally better addressed by judicial and 
legislative measures targeting the abusive litigants themselves, not the statute they are 
abusing. 
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however, that Nike's statements are actually true and nonmisleading, 
affording it a complete defense to the suit. But suppose also that 
establishing the truth of the statements will require considerable 
factual development. In those circumstances, even though Nike has a 
winning defense, it likely cannot obtain a summary dismissal of the 
suit.334 Instead, it will have to spend the time and resources necessary 
to litigate the case to summary judgment,335 or even trial. 
Suits of this kind obviously raise speech-chilling concerns relating 
to litigation exposure, since successfully defending against the suit 
could be a costly and time-consuming endeavor. They also raise 
liability worries, in that litigating a case to summary judgment or a jury 
verdict arguably increases the risk that the case may be resolved 
incorrectly. Thus, even a defendant with what should be a winning 
defense would face a heightened risk of liability. For these reasons, if a 
particular private attorney general provision were to yield a lot of 
lawsuits like this, the twin threats of litigation and liability could well 
chill substantial amounts of speech. 
The question, then, is whether the risk of this kind of mal­
enforcement should be enough to invalidate a statute's entire private 
enforcement regime. The best answer, I think, is no. The reason is that 
courts lack any stable method for determining whether a particular 
private attorney general provision will yield an intolerable amount of 
mal-enforcement. Just as a private enforcement regime will 
predictably yield more lawsuits falling within the literal terms of the 
underlying statute,336 it will also probably yield more mal-enforcement 
of the sort just described, where the defendant must incur substantial 
expense in order to defeat a lawsuit premised on factual error. But 
more mal-enforcement does not necessarily mean an unconstitutional 
amount. 
Borrowing from overbreadth doctrine, a court might say that 
multiple mal-enforcement reaches an unconstitutional level when it 
presents a "substantial" speech-chilling risk.337 But how would the 
court measure substantiality? 
334. Suits of this kind are properly excluded from the overbreadth calculus. As I have 
explained, overbreadth analysis considers the full sweep of a statute's terms, and also takes 
account of any ambiguity in the statute's outer edges by including cases that arguably fall 
within the statute's reach. See supra notes 270-272, 281-282, 287-290 and accompanying text. 
The defendant's conduct in the kind of case under discussion here, however, is not even 
arguably covered by the statute. The plaintiff's allegations make it seem like the defendant 
has violated the statute, but those allegations are factually incorrect. In other words, the key 
feature of this kind of case is that, once the facts of the case are properly established, it is 
clear that the defendant's conduct falls entirely outside the statute. 
335. For the rules governing summary judgment in federal court, see FED. R. Clv. P. 56. 
336. See supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
337. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
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Overbreadth analysis solves this problem by hewing to the 
substance of the speech regulation. That is, courts ask whether the 
statute prohibits a '"substantial' amount of protected free speech, 
'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."'338 The 
analysis thus trains on the text of the statute, and compares the 
amount of protected speech covered by the statute to the amount of 
proscribable speech so covered. Determining whether a particular 
statute is substantially overbroad on these terms still involves some 
degree of speculation, but at least the analysis is anchored in the text 
of the statute. 
A claim of multiple mal-enforcement, in contrast, is necessarily 
unmoored from the text. By definition, it focuses on litigation 
targeting speech that is not, in fact, subject to the statute's 
prohibitions. Accordingly, the text of the speech regulation itself is of 
no use. Indeed, there is nothing to guide the analysis, save the 
prediction that private attorneys general will engage in more mal­
enforcement than their public counterparts. But unless a court 
assumes that the level of mal-enforcement produced by public 
enforcement will be right at the constitutional maximum - and I see 
no reason to make that assumption - the fact that private 
enforcement will predictably yield more mal-enforcement does not 
necessarily make it unconstitutional. If, as Frederick Schauer has 
suggested, any analysis of chilling effects must seek "some way of 
determining under what circumstances the inevitable chilling effect 
becomes great enough to require judicial invalidation of legislative 
enactments,''339 the problem with the multiple mal-enforcement 
argument is that it affords no reliable means of making that 
determination. In short, the mere prediction that private attorneys 
general will produce more mal-enforcement should not be enough to 
invalidate an entire private enforcement regime. 
This does not mean, however, that courts should never take 
account of multiple mal-enforcement. To the contrary, if the 
prediction of multiple mal-enforcement were replaced by evidence of 
the extent of the problem in a particular context, a court might then 
provide a remedy. Suppose a defendant establishes that the actual 
pattern of litigation under a particular statute - whether by private or 
public enforcement - has included an intolerable amount of mal­
enforcement, chilling a substantial amount of protected speech. To 
support its claim, the defendant submits specific evidence regarding 
the historical pattern of mal-enforcement, its effect on protected 
expression, and the inadequacy of plaintiff-specific remedies to deal 
with the problem. In that circumstance, the court might conceivably 
338. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 1 13, 1 18-19 (2003) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615). 
339. Schauer, supra note 260, at 701. 
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strike down the enforcement provision on the ground that it has been 
shown to have an unconstitutional chilling effect that cannot be cured 
by other means. The critical point here, however, is that courts should 
not assume that private enforcement will necessarily yield 
unconstitutional levels of mal-enforcement. Instead, courts should 
require a powerful, context-specific factual record before striking 
down either a private or a public enforcement regime on grounds of 
multiple mal-enforcement. 
* * *  
I have argued in this Part that the proposed First Amendment 
distinction between public and private enforcement is inconsistent 
with both free speech doctrine and the values underlying that doctrine. 
The core of my argument is easily summarized. First, determining 
whether a speech-regulating law is overbroad involves examining the 
full sweep of the law, including cases in which ambiguities in the law 
make its applicability uncertain. Whether those empowered to sue 
under the law will actually enforce it to that literal maximum is 
irrelevant to the overbreadth calculus. Thus, a law's overbreadth is not 
affected by assurances that a particular plaintiff - whether public or 
private - will exercise restraint when enforcing it. An overbroad law, 
in short, cannot be saved by underenforcement. Second, and 
conversely, a statute does not become overbroad or otherwise facially 
invalid merely because particular plaintiffs might invoke it where it 
does not apply. Even if we can reliably predict that a private 
enforcement regime will yield more mal-enforcement than a public 
one, that bare prediction is not enough to hold the entire regime 
facially unconstitutional. 
V. CODA: THE SUPREME COURT AND PRIVATE ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL 
I hope to have established in the preceding Part that the First 
Amendment does not support a categorical distinction between public 
and private enforcement of speech regulations. Indeed, to the extent 
the distinction is premised on trusting the government to exercise 
restraint in its enforcement decisions, it is fundamentally at odds with 
core First Amendment principles. There is, however, reason to fear 
that the distinction may ultimately appear attractive to the current 
Supreme Court. This final Part develops that concern by returning to a 
point suggested earlier: that there are parallels between the First 
Amendment argument and the Supreme Court's other doctrinal 
moves against private attorneys general. Those parallels suggest that a 
Court already apparently inclined against the private attorney general 
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might seize upon the First Amendment argument to further that 
project at the state level.340 
As discussed in Part II, there is a common theme in the Supreme 
Court's decisions on state sovereign immunity, attorney's fees, and 
standing. In each area, the Court has made it more difficult for 
Congress to rely upon private actors to enforce federal law. Whether 
by limiting the kinds of federal laws that are enforceable against the 
states in private damages actions, by imposing new restrictions on 
plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's fees, or by conditioning plaintiffs' 
standing on their ability to show individualized "injury in fact," the 
Court has erected a number of barriers to privately initiated public law 
litigation in the federal courts. At the same time, however, it has 
imposed relatively few limitations on publicly initiated litigation in the 
federal courts. The result, in effect, is a two-track enforcement regime, 
with public enforcement enjoying the Court's favor.341 
Though limited only to areas involving speech, the First 
Amendment argument against private attorneys general would 
achieve parallel results not only in federal court, but in state court as 
well. Like the Court's decisions on sovereign immunity, attorney's 
fees, and standing, the First Amendment argument depicts private 
attorneys general as problematic because of their financial or 
ideological motivations.342 Simultaneously, the argument asserts that it 
"is by no means inappropriate for governmental agencies charged with 
enforcing the law" to be able to seek broad injunctive and other 
equitable relief against those who violate the underlying substantive 
law.343 Unlike private enforcement, which on this view is properly 
confined to redressing discrete injuries, public enforcement discharges 
the government's responsibility to advance the broad regulatory aims 
in the underlying law.344 Moreover, close judicial supervision of public 
enforcement is unnecessary; government actors "can be expected to 
340. In addition to the points raised in this Part, a First Amendment argument against 
private attorneys general may appear attractive to the Court because, as Frederick Schauer 
has observed, the First Amendment itself has a kind of "political, cultural, and economic . . .  
magnetism": 
[T]he First Amendment, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press provide considerable 
rhetorical power and argumentative authority. The individual or group on the side of free 
speech often seems to believe, and often correctly, that it has secured the upper hand in 
public debate. The First Amendment not only attracts attention, but also strikes fear in the 
hearts of many who do not want to be seen as opposing the freedoms it enshrines. 
Schauer, supra note 27, at 1789-90 (footnotes omitted). 
341. See Karlan, supra note 57, at 208-09. 
342. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, 
Nike (characterizing the California unfair competition statute as enabling "vexatious and 
abusive litigation"). 
343. Id. at 24-25. 
344. Id. at 17. 
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exercise appropriate discretion" when exercising their enforcement 
power.345 The First Amendment argument, in short, provides the 
Court with an opportunity to export to the state courts its project of 
privileging public over private enforcement. 
One might object that it does the Court a disservice to assume it 
would impose its policy preferences not just on the federal courts -
over which, after all, it wields supervisory authority346 - but on the 
separately sovereign states as well. To that objection one can respond 
that there are already hints of this approach in other areas. Consider, 
for example, the disparity between the Court's Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence on the proportionality of criminal punishment and its 
emerging due process doctrine governing punitive damages in civil 
litigation.347 Although the Court has construed the Eighth 
Amendment to impose a proportionality constraint on the duration of 
prison sentences,348 the constraint has become exceedingly modest.349 
In Ewing v. California,350 for example, the Court sustained California's 
"three strikes" law against an Eighth Amendment challenge. In so 
doing, it upheld a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence for a defendant 
convicted of stealing three golf clubs, where he had previously been 
convicted of several other serious felonies. In a companion case called 
Lockyer v. Andrade,351 the Court found no reversible error in imposing 
a life sentence on a defendant found guilty of stealing $150 worth of 
videotapes, where, again, he had committed a number of more serious 
345. Id. at 25. 
346. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Note, The Supervisory 
Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963). The precise scope of the 
supervisory power is far from clear. "By this point in our history, however, most observers 
(and certainly the Supreme Court and lower federal courts) accept the existence of some 
supervisory authority in the federal courts. The question is simply how far it extends." Fred 
C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court A uthority to Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in 
Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1311 (2003) (footnotes omitted). I do not mean 
to suggest that the supervisory power necessarily allows the Court to impose its own policy 
preferences on public law litigation in the federal courts. Rather, I simply note the possibility 
that the existence of the supervisory power might lead some to see such an imposition as 
somewhat less egregious at the federal level than at the state level. 
347. See generally The Supreme Court, 2002 Term - Leading Cases, 1 17 HARV. L. REV. 
255 (2003) (contrasting the Court's Eighth Amendment and punitive damages decisions). 
348. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
349. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court's Backwards Proportionality 
Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive 
Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1263-64 (2000) (noting that "while 
proportionality review of excessive criminal punishments survives, successful challenges are 
nearly impossible"). 
350. 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
351. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
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criminal offenses in the past.352 In contrast, the Court during the same 
Term adopted a much more robust proportionality constraint on 
punitive damages in civil litigation. In State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,353 the Court instructed that the Due 
Process Clause is likely violated whenever the ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages "significant[ly]" exceeds a "single-digit 
ratio."354 The Court went on to state that "[w]hen compensatory 
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to 
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due 
process guarantee."355 
The contrast between the two doctrines is stark. For example, it 
appears that had the defendant in Lockyer first been sued for 
conversion, he would have had a due process right not to be exposed 
to more than $1 ,500 in punitive damages. When prosecuted for the 
theft, however, he could be sentenced to life.356 This disparity may be 
accounted for in a number of ways. Pamela Karlan has suggested that 
it may be explained in part on the basis of differences in the level of 
appellate oversight and political accountability between states' 
criminal and civil court systems.357 Another, perhaps more obvious, 
distinction is that criminal prosecutions are brought by the 
government, while the vast majority of civil tort actions are brought by 
private plaintiffs. Thus, even if Karlan's thesis helps explain the 
Court's divergent approaches in these two fields, one might also see in 
the divergence a tendency to privilege the enforcement decisions of 
public officials over those of private individuals. One might, in other 
words, see the Court's Eighth Amendment and punitive damages 
decisions as consistent with its decisions on federal standing, state 
sovereign immunity, and attorney's fees. And in that light, one might 
352. Unlike Ewing, which came to the Court at the direct appeal stage, Andrade came 
on federal habeas corpus review. Because the federal habeas statute requires federal courts 
to defer considerably to the state court decision at issue, the denial of federal habeas relief is 
not the same as the denial of relief on direct appeal. 
353. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
354. Id. at 425. State Farm built on the Court's earlier decision in BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
355. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. 
356. This assumes that the criminal sentence in Andrade is indeed consistent with the 
Eighth Amendment. As noted above, see supra note 352, the posture of Andrade left that 
question at least somewhat open. It is possible that the sentence is inconsistent with the best 
understanding of the Eighth Amendment, but not inconsistent enough to warrant federal 
habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l) (2000) (providing that a federal habeas petition 
· challenging a state criminal conviction or sentence shall not be granted unless the underlying 
state court decision "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States"). 
357. See Pamela S. Karlan, Pricking the Lines: The Due Process Clause, Punitive 
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880 (2004). 
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well suspect that the Court may be inclined to adopt the First 
Amendment argument against private attorneys general in order to 
advance the same underlying project. 
Admittedly, there is a certain artificiality in describing the Court as 
a monolithic entity across these cases. The Court consists of nine 
individuals, and members of the majority in one case may dissent in 
another. Such was the case in Ewing, Andrade, and State Farm. Two 
Justices on the majority side of the 5-4 decisions in Ewing and 
Andrade (Justices Scalia and Thomas) dissented in State Farm, while 
three members of the 6-3 majority in State Farm (Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer) dissented in Ewing and Andrade.358 Thus, to the 
extent one can attribute any common purpose to the Andrade, Ewing, 
and State Farm decisions, the attribution is most justified when 
confined to the three Justices who were in the majority in all three 
cases: Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.359 
My suggestion here is that those three Justices (in addition to Justice 
Breyer, who has already expressed agreement with the Solicitor 
General's argument in Nike) may be among those especially inclined 
to embrace a First Amendment rule preferring public over private 
attorneys general. 
It is also useful to distinguish between two rather different reasons 
why a member of the Court might support a rule favoring public over 
private enforcement. First, a Justice might support robust enforcement 
of the underlying law, but believe that such enforcement should be 
done by the government. That is, a Justice might prefer strong public 
enforcement. The problem with this position is that even if the 
legislature and executive also favor strong public enforcement, it is not 
always feasible. In the resource-constrained environment in which 
they so frequently operate, state legislatures are often required to 
discount the importance of certain regulatory goals against the cost of 
implementing them. Public enforcement is expensive. If states are 
required to rely on such a resource-intensive form of regulation, some 
enforcement discounting is inevitable. Put simply, states will not 
always be able to afford robust public enforcement. 
358. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 411 (noting that Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion 
of the Court, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer 
joined, and that Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg each filed dissenting opinions); 
Andrade, 538 U.S. at 65 (noting that Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined, and that Justice 
Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined); 
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 13 (noting that Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court 
and delivered an opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined, that Justices 
Scalia and Thomas each filed opinions concurring in the judgment, that Justice Stevens filed 
a dissenting opinion in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined, and that Justice 
Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined). 
359. See id. 
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The second reason why a Justice might support a rule privileging 
public enforcement is precisely because it will yield less enforcement. 
That is, a Justice opposed to robust enforcement of the underlying law 
may perceive a rule against private attorneys general as, in effect, an 
instrument of deregulation. This can happen in either or both of two 
ways. First, as just described, the sheer cost of government 
enforcement means that an exclusively public enforcement regime will 
likely be less effective than a regime with private attorneys general. 
Second, in some instances the executive branch may be less 
enthusiastic about the underlying law than the legislature that passed 
it. A judicially declared rule privileging public over private 
enforcement puts enforcement discretion primarily in executive hands, 
and an executive branch that does not shate the legislature's 
regulatory goals may simply refrain from enforcing the law as robustly 
as the legislature would prefer. In these ways, a judicial preference for 
public over private enforcement may further a fundamentally anti­
regulatory agenda.360 
Ultimately, whatever the basis for a Justice's preference for public 
over private enforcement, the problem is that constitutionalizing the 
preference would read state legislatures out of the analysis. Instead of 
deferring to legislative decisions about whether to employ private 
actors in the enforcement of public norms, the First Amendment 
argument embraces a categorical, judicially imposed rule nullifying 
such decisions.361 Yet in the absence of a genuine constitutional reason 
to treat public and private enforcement differently - and, as I argued 
in Part IV, the First Amendment provides no such reason - the 
Court's own suspicions about the reliability, efficacy, and importance 
of private attorneys general should not displace a state legislature's 
faith in them. This point sounds in both practical considerations of 
institutional competence and the more formal doctrinal values of 
federalism: legislatures are generally better situated than cour�s to 
balance the costs and benefits of a given method of law enforcement, 
and the Supreme Court cannot possibly justify substituting its own 
policy preferences on such matters for those of a state legislature. In 
short, the fate of state private attorneys general should rest with the 
states. 
360. See supra notes 138-139, 175-176 and accompanying text. 
361. Cf Karlan, supra note 57, at 194 (arguing that the Court's privileging of public over 
private enforcement in its state sovereign immunity decisions "defies the central idea behind 
the private attorney general - that Congress might decide that decentralized enforcement 
better vindicates civil rights policies 'that Congress considered of the highest priority'"). 
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CONCLUSION 
As the lines between the public and private domains continue to 
blur, hard questions arise about the legal limits and policy 
ramifications of relying upon private actors to advance public 
interests. Even when a particular practice is deeply rooted in our legal 
traditions - such as legislative reliance on private plaintiffs to enforce 
public-regarding norms - new dilemmas may surface. Policymakers 
in particular must balance the benefits of such arrangements against 
their tangible costs. But skepticism about the policy wisdom of an 
institution like the private attorney general should not lead courts to 
create novel constitutional prohibitions on their use. In particular, the 
suggestion that the First Amendment categorically prohibits certain 
speech restrictions when privately enforced, but permits them when 
enforced by the government, has no support in First Amendment 
doctrine. Speech regulations may comport with the First Amendment; 
they may violate it. But a statute's facial status under the First 
Amendment should not change with the identity of the party the 
legislature picks to enforce it. 
